

THE COMPENDIUM OF THE DR. ABDUL WAHAB SURI PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTS.

THE CRITIC OF MODERNITY, POST- MODERNITY ,CAPITALISM ,LIBERALISM
AND RELATED IDEAS.

EDITOR

MUHAMMAD ALI JUNAID



KARACHI UNIVERSITY RESEARCH FORUM

جامعہ کراچی دارالتحقیق برائے علم و دانش

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Courtesy :Pakistan Business Review , Bio Cosmology ,Market forces, policy perspective, past and present ,Pakistan journal of International Relation Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics .

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Karachi University Research Forum
جامعہ کراچی دارالتحقیق برائے علم و دانش

Muhammad ali Junaid

B.A (Hon) pol.science and Master In political science from University Of Karachi (2002- 2005).

Is a research scholar at Department of political Science, university of Karachi, his p.hd Dissertation has been submitted to the University of Karachi .pk(2015) for approval.

He has edited more than 28 E-books online For the Karachi University Research Forum in Both English and Urdu . And he worked as Intern at question, branch. provincial assembly of Sindh powered by USAID (plsp:2007-2008).his field of specialization is in Islamic History, politics, philosophy, jurisprudence and comparative studies.

Ali Junaid received best commentator certificate for consequent 4 years in the University of karachi for foot ball tournament, he also delivered more then twenty five presentations and he also earned experience in student politics in his Academic life At the University oF Karachi .

He has edited and presented many books online related to Karachi University School of thought to whom Dr. Abdul wahab suri is also linked over Modernity,post Modernity and Philosophy of science ,his current focused is over Athism and Rationality.

Dr. Abdul Wahab Suri

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Dr.Abdul Wahab Suri's areas of interests are political theory and post-modernity and he specializes in liberal political theory and its corresponding institutions. He obtained his Master of Arts in Philosophy (1995) and his Ph.D. in Political Philosophy (2004) from the University of Karachi. Dr. Suri's doctorate dissertation focused on "Philosophical Analysis of Rawls' Theory of Justice." He is Fellow of Kakenhi Project: The Research into Bio-ethics in Asia based on Three Levels Structural Analysis Directed by Professor Takao Takahashi Sansee UNESCO-Kumamoto University 2011-2013.

He has published several research articles which include "The Future of Communal Identities: Inherent Contradiction between Human Rights Framework and Collective Identities," and "Ethics, Values and Society: Social Transformation" published by Oxford University Press in 2006. Dr. Suri is the chairman of the Department of Philosophy at the Karachi University and was In-charge of the Department from 2004 to December 2006. He was also Secretary General of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress. He teaches Philosophy of Art, History of Ideas, Modernism, Post-Modernism, Hermeneutics and Muslim Philosophy in different institutions including IBA, Indus Valley and KU's Visual Studies dept.

Editor Note :

This compendium is basically a collection of articles and research papers written by Dr Abdul Wahab suri ,the famous philosopher and critic of Western Philosophy for Different journals from 1999 to 2016.

This compendium consist of 12 articles covering different topics like Modernity,postmodernity,medical ethics,Rawls theory of justice ,democracy ,Zakaria ideas regarding liberalism,and democracy,ibn -khuldun philosophy ,metahistory , AnthroPocentrism ,gender discourse,human rights,fundamentalism, and modern ethos,identity ,historical hermeneutics , liberalism,freedom,rights and justice etc.

I was working over atheism ,enlightenment and rationality so the writings and philosophical critique that was done by Karachi University Philosophical School convinced me that their writing may be useful for the researchers and general readers who wanted to understand the essence of atheism ,agnosticism and humanism .

Without understanding the foundation of liberalism,modernism,post-modernism,humanism ,rationality and enlightenment one may not understand atheism thoroughly .

This compendium has been divided into two parts in part one I included those articles who were easily converted to text and then that text files were edited and modified but no change was done in original text and research as they were published in journals previously .

In part two I included the scan images that were so dirty and dark it seemed that they may not be included in this compendium ,and they were not convertible to text so I tried my level best to clear the images to fit for E -reading environment .

I left message to dr.abdulwahab suri for preface writing but he did not reply even I contacted Syed Khalid Jamie for introduction for this compendium and he assured me for that ,but in several reminding sessions with him ,when fruit

didn't come so I after waiting and working several months over this compendium on public demand presenting You this first Edition.

In new edition if I got any reply and peace of paper in support by them I will update this edition ,and if I got text files of part two I will try to change that part .

This compendium is equally useful for researchers and general readers who have an interest in applied political philosophy and for those who wanted to understand the reality of western modernity and rationality.if you find any flaw and mistake kindly pardon me.

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PUBLICATIONS

RESEARCH ARTICLES

- 1) *From the Discovering of Reality to Creating multiple Realities: The Aristotelian Roots of Modern Anthropocentrism. Published in journal of “Biocosmology – neo-Aristotelism, Vol.6, No.1 Winter 2016.*
- 2) *Global Financial Capital VS Islamic conception of Wealth: The Question of Ideological Dominance. Published in Journal of Islamic Business and Management, Vol.05, No.02, Dec.2015.*
- 3) *Is liberty possible? The trajectory of liberal institutionalization of liberty in post-colonial societies. Published in journal of “Biocosmology – neo-Aristotelism” Vol. 5 No.1 Winter 2015*
- 4) *Rise Fundamentalist Discourse and the Trajectory of the Reassertion of Modern Ethos, Paper under publication in the Journal of IPS “ Policy Perspective” Vol. 12, No. 2, 2015.*
- 5) *Liberal Principles of Justice and Emerging Trends if Economic Liberalization: Lesson from Rawlsian Scheme of Distributive Justice. in Market Forces; Journal of Management Business and economics, Vol. IX No.2 December 2014.*
- 6) *Market, Mind and Growth of Knowledge: The dilemma of Post-colonial Health-care apparatus from Hayek’s perspective. Paper presented in 5TH International conference on Mind Studies (ICCSM) 11-12 Nov.2014.Chung-Aug University Seoul Korea.*
- 7) *The exclusive epistemological foundations of irreconciliatory bioethics: the limit of contemporary bioethical discourse. Paper presented in UNESCO-Kumamoto University Bioethics Roundtable, KBRT 7, International Dialogue and the Future*

- of Asian Bioethics, held on 7-8 December 2013, Kumamoto Japan. Under publication
- 8) The Possibility of Bio-Grand-Narrative: The Re-assertion of Modern Ethos at the Juncture of Post-modernity. Paper presented The 6th International Seminar on Biocosmology held on the 9th of December 2013, Kumamoto Japan in Under publication
 - 9) *Right without Choice and the Future of Bio-ethics Discourse in Post-Colonial Society*, Paper presented at the UNESCO-Kumamoto University Bioethics Roundtable “Bioethics: From Theory to Practice” December 8-10, 2012, at Kumamoto University, Japan In EJAIB Vol. 23 - (3) May 2013, www.eubios.info ISSN 1173-2571, Official Journal of the Asian Bioethics p.83 Association (ABA) , Copyright ©2013 Eubios Ethics Institute.
 - 10) “Sacred vs Secular: The Dilemma of Islamic Political Forces in Post Colonial Societies” was presented on 7th Annual Humanities and Social Sciences Conference at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) February 24-26 2012. (Under Publication)
 - 11) *What is wrong and what is not wrong with fundamentalism* paper presented in an international conference *Islam in Europe* on November 16-17, 2011 in collaboration with the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Islamabad .(Under publication)
 - 12) Truth and Method: The Dilemma of Postcolonial, Developing Societies in Postmodern Intellectualism paper presented in Seminar: Tradition & Art Karachi, 23rd April 2011 Poppy Seed Gallery & Baytunur in collaboration with Indus Valley School of Art & Architecture and Iqbal Academy Pakistan (Under publication).
 - 13) The Living Death of Modernity: The poverty of Post-modernity in the time of Terror, paper presented in national conference on, Contemporary Paradigms of International-Relations Theory, held on 9th March 2011 in Dept. of International Relations. This is published in Vol: 2, Number: II, January 2011 in Pakistan Journal of International Relations, University of Karachi, Pakistan.
 - 14) “What is living and what is dead in Iqbal” in “Revisioning Iqbal As a poet and Muslim and Political Thinker” Published by Oxford University Press Pakistan 2011
 - 15) The ontological basis of De-ontological liberalism: The limits of Right based politics in *Pakistan Business Review* Vol. 12 No.1 April 2010, p.110-133.
 - 16) “The Liberal Metamorphosis within a Human Rights Framework: The future of the Nation State”, in *Market Forces* Vol. 5, No. No.4, Jan. 2010.
 - 17) What is living and what is dead in Iqbal:, in *Revisioning Iqbal: As poet and Muslim Political Thinker*. (ed) Gita Dharampal-Frick, Ali Usman, Katia Rosteller, Heidelberg, Dravpadi Verlag 2010- p. 193-228.

- 18) The possibility of Meta-History in Market Forces Vol. 2, No. 1, Jan-2007
- 19) "The Future of Communal Identities: Inherent Contradiction between Human Rights Framework and Collective Identities", Ethics, Values & Society: Social Transformation, Conference Proceedings, Edited by Ghazala Irfan Lahore University of Management Sciences , published by Oxford University Press April-2006, pp. 284-299
- 20) "The Incoherences of Multi-Culturalism" In *Pakistan Business Review* Vol. 6, No.1, April-2004.
- 21) Democracy as Idiosyncrasy: The Rortian Interpretation of Rawls, In *Pakistan Business Review* Vol. 4, No. 3, October 2002, p.43-53. "Reading Zakaria's Defence of Liberal Terrorism", In *Pakistan Business Review* Vol. 6, No.2, July-2004
- 22) Democracy as Idiosyncrasy: The Rortian Interpretation of Rawls, In *Pakistan Business Review* Vol. 4, No. 3, October 2002, p.43-53.
- 23) "Is History A Hermeneutical Activity", In *Past and Present* Vol. 1, No.1, December 2001 p. 160-168
- 24) "Deconstructing Gender Discourse", In *Pakistan Business Review* Vol. No.3, Number 2, July 2001 p. 38-52.
- 25) "Identity Crisis and the Dilemma of Progress" in *Philosophy and Social Action* Vol.1, No.1 1st April 1997.
- 26) "Linguistic analysis of the Concept of "LOVE" Part I, in "THEERA" *The Island of Arts*, Vol. 1, No. 1 January 1999.
- 27) "Some Contradictions in Capitalist Democracy", *Pakistan Business Review* Vol. I. No.1, April 1999 P. 42-46.
- 28) "Linguistic Analysis of the Concept of "LOVE", Part II in *THEERA" The Island of Arts*, Vol. 2 No. II May/June 1999 Page 9-11.

1) **POPULAR ARTICLES**

1. “The Possibility of Principle Art: Liberal Perspective” in Theera, Vol.9, No.2, Sept./Oct. 2000.
2. “Art and the Problems of Hermeneutics”, in Theera Vol.4, No. 3, Nov./Dec.1999.
3. “Jamhuriat: IslamiTahreekokaAlamya” Trans. “Democracy: the Dilemma of Islamic Parties” in Sahil (monthly) Feb. 1997.
4. State Vs Capital “The future of Democracy” in Universal Massage Vol. 20 No. 8/9 August/September 1998.
5. “Is A Piece of Art A Commodity” in “THEERA” THE Island of Arts July/August 1999, Page 7-10

URDU ARTICLES

1. MaghribiTehzeebKeUsool-o-Mubadiyat, SahilShawal 1421 Hijra- P. 17-30
2. AalmiSarmayaAurAmerikiRiyasat, Sahil Shaban-1421 Hijra P. 41-45
3. JamhooriatKaTaswar-i-AksariyatAurIskaInsaniHuqooqiAurSarmayadari se Taaluq, Sahil- Rabi-ul-Awal-1422 Hijra p. 57-61
4. JamhooriatAalauIslamiTehrikoonkaalamiayah, Sahil-October, 1996 p. 65-70
5. QuomiRiyasatkeZawalkisadiSarmayaaaurRiyasatkiKashmakashFaisalakunMarhala Main, Sahil-June 2000, P. 34-39
6. DastooriateYaJamhoriat: JamhoriatYa Islam, Edited by Moulana M. Ahmad , MoulanaMehboob, Ghazali Publishers Nov.2007.
7. Liberal SamadaranaInqalabkiFikriBunyadien, Under Publication by Ghazali Publisher.
8. Latini-AmerikiSamayadaranaInqilab-EkJaiza, Under Publication, by Ghazali Publisher.

BOOK

Democracy in Question?, to be published by Karachi University Press, the draft has been submitted.

THE FORTH COMING ARTICLES

1. *The Victory of Poetry Over Philosophy, The Poverty of Post-modernity in the Time of Terror*, To be presented in upcoming conference on American Studies, Organized by Area Study Center for American Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Nov. 05-08, 2010.

2. *Is Bio-Ethics without the Morality of Rights? The priority of De-ontologism and the limits of Bio-ethics Discourse* , paper presented Asian Bio-Ethics Association. Ninth Asian Bio-Ethics Conference 3-7 Nov. 2008, Yogyakarta Indonesia, Under Publication.
3. *The Ontological Vs De-Ontological: The Trajectory of Secular Liberal and Religious Political Forces of Pakistan* Paper presented, in Conference Under Publication.
4. Truth and Method: The Dilemma of Post-Colonial Societies at the Juncture of modernity and Post-modernity in final networking conference organized Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, UPSAM in Jordon near Dead Sea 01 August 2010-4th August 2010.
5. From Hedonism to De-ontologism: The Trajectory of De-ontological bio-ethics. Paper to be presented in Bio-ethics and the concept of Happiness: *The fourth Joint UNESCO-University of Kumamoto. Japan Dec 11-13 2010.*

Ph. D. DISSERTATION

I have received my Doctorate in Political Philosophy, my Ph.D. thesis was “Philosophical Analysis of Rawls Theory of Justice”.

CONFERENCES SEMINARS AND WORKSHOPS

- 1) *Market, Mind and Growth of Knowledge: The dilemma of Post-colonial Health-care apparatus from Hayek's perspective. Paper presented in 5TH International conference on Mind Studies (ICCSM) 11-12 Nov. 2014. Chung-Ang University Seoul Korea.*
- 2) *From the Discovering of Reality to Creating multiple Realities: The Aristotelian Roots of Modern Anthropocentrism. Paper presented in 8TH International Seminar on Bio-Cosmology 12-13 Nov. 2014. Chung-Ang University Seoul Korea.*
- 3) The exclusive epistemological foundations of ir-reconciliatory bioethics: the limit of contemporary bioethical discourse. **Paper presented in** UNESCO-Kumamoto University Bioethics Roundtable, KBRT 7, International Dialogue and the Future of Asian Bioethics, held on 7-8 December 2013, Kumamoto Japan.
- 4) ***The Possibility of Bio-Grand-Narrative: The Re-assertion of Modern Ethos at the Juncture of Post-modernity. Paper presented*** The 6th International Seminar on Biocosmology held on the 9th of December 2013, Kumamoto Japan.
- 5) *Right without Choice and the Future of Bio-ethics Discourse In Post-Colonial Society,* Paper presented at the UNESCO-Kumamoto University Bioethics Roundtable “Bioethics: From Theory to Practice” December 8-10, 2012, at Kumamoto University, Japan

- 6) "Sacred vs Secular: The Dilemma of Islamic Political Forces in Post Colonial Societies" was presented on 7th Annual Humanities and Social Sciences Conference at Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) February 24-26 2012
- 7) *What is wrong and what is not wrong with fundamentalism* paper presented in an international conference *Islam in Europe* on November 16-17, 2011 in collaboration with the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Islamabad
- 8) Truth and Method: The Dilemma of Postcolonial, Developing Societies in Postmodern Intellectualism paper presented in Seminar: Tradition & Art Karachi, 23rd April 2011 Poppy Seed Gallery & Baytunur in collaboration with Indus Valley School of Art & Architecture and Iqbal Academy Pakistan.
- 9) The Living Death of Modernity: The poverty of Post-modernity in the time of Terror, paper presented in national conference on, Contemporary Paradigms of International-Relations Theory, held on 9th March 2011 in Dept. of International Relations.
- 10) *The Victory of Poetry Over Philosophy, The Poverty of Post-modernity in the Time of Terror*, To be presented in upcoming conference on American Studies, Organized by Area Study Center for American Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Nov. 05-08, 2010.
- 11) *Is Bio-Ethics without the Morality of Rights? The priority of De-ontologism and the limits of Bio-ethics Discourse*, paper presented Asian Bio-Ethics Association. Ninth Asian Bio-Ethics Conference 3-7 Nov. 2008, Yogyakarta Indonesia, Under Publication.
- 12) *The Ontological Vs De-Ontological: The Trajectory of Secular Liberal and Religious Political Forces of Pakistan* Paper presented, in Conference Under Publication.
- 13) Truth and Method: The Dilemma of Post-Colonial Societies at the Juncture of modernity and Post-modernity in final networking conference organized Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, UPSAM in Jordan near Dead Sea 01 August 2010-4th August 2010.
- 14) "Representing Islam", International conference organized by British Council held in Watford U.K. from 23 June – 29 June 2003. Paper presented Philosophy in Pakistan.
- 15) Workshop organized by British Council held in Darbal Hall, Sharton Hotel 20th Dec. 2003. Paper presented Incoherence of Multiculturalism.
- 16) Ethics Values and Society: Social Transformation, International Conference held in LUMS in April 2004. Paper presented "Future of Communal Identities:

- Inherent Contradiction between human rights framework and collective identities”.
- 17) “History Conference” An International Conference organized by Pakistan Historical Congress in May 2004. Paper presented The Possibility of Meta-History.
 - 18) “The Roots of Terrorism in Post-Colonial Literature”, An International Video Conference among British, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Pakistani Participants. Respond the Article of Alicia Bohemier.
 - 19) An international conference organized by the Department of Philosophy University of Karachi in Nov. 2005. Paper presented State Metamorphosis in Human rights framework.
 - 20) Quality in Education Teaching leadership in changing Times, An International conference at Aga Khan University Institute of Educational Development Feb 21-23-2006. Paper presented The Poverty of Methodology.
 - 21) Final Net Working Conference: Peace and Conflict Studies, in Jordan near Dead Sea. 1st to 4th Aug 2010. Paper Truth and Method: Dilemma of Post-colonial Societies.

ADMINISTRATIVE / ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE

1. I am Chairman of the Department of Philosophy from 15 Oct.2015 to 15 Oct.2018.
2. Fellow Kakenhi Project: The Research into Bio-ethics in Asia based on Three Levels Structural Analysis.Directed BY Professor Takao Takahashi Sansee 2011-2013.
3. I was Secretary General of Pakistan Philosophical Congress for one year (2005 to 2006).
4. Head of the Department of Philosophy from September 2004-uptill Dec 2006.
5. I am a member of Bio Ethics Group (SIUT) for the last three years till the date.
6. I have developed a course on Bio-Ethics for Aga Khan University and have taught that course along with my colleagues from Oct. to Dec. 2005
7. I was the Student Advisor in the Department of Philosophy from January 2002-2004.
8. I was the Assistant Editor of ‘Philosophy and Social Action’ Vol. 1 No. 1 April 1997.
9. I am the Member of the Editorial Board of “THEERA” the Island of Art and the Incharge of its Philosophy section (Sophistaya).
10. I was also teaching in the Department of General History as a Visiting Faculty Member. The course that I have been teaching is, “Historiography” to the MA Final class from January 1998 to 2001.

11. I am also involved in teaching, Philosophy of Art at the Visual Studies in University of Karachi
12. Member of the Board of Studies, Department of Visual Studies. I have also designed six courses in newly established Department of visual Studies, (which have later been approved by the Board of Faculty).
 1. History of Ideas-I-VS-351
 2. History of Ideas-II-VS-352
 3. Modernism-VS-451
 4. Post Modernism-VS-452
 5. Hermeneutics-VS-551
 6. Aesthetics-VS-552-A
 7. Muslim Philosophy-VS-552-B
13. I am visiting faculty member at IBA and developed a course on Islamic Political Theory.
14. I am visiting faculty member at INDUS Valley School of Art and Architecture

As a member of the Board of Studies of Philosophy, we have revised the whole syllabus of the Department of Philosophy, which has been approved by the Board of Faculty.

Member of the Board of Faculty since 2000 and attend number of meetings.

I have also been engaged in teaching different courses of Philosophy in Institute of Business Management (Korangi Creek) for last ten years.

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1	Some Contradictions of Capitalist Democracy (pp:42- 46)	Pak Business review, April,1999.
2	Deconstructing Gender Discourse: A Review (pp:38-52)	Ibid :2001
3	Reading Zakaria's Defense of Liberal Terrorism (pp:36- 52)	Ibid:2004
4	FROM THE DISCOVERING OF REALITY TO CREATING MULTIPLE REALITIES: THE ARISTOTELIAN ROOTS OF MODERN ANTHROPOCENTRICISM. (pp:121-138)	BIOCOSMOLOGY – NEO-ARISTOTELISM: Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 2016.
5	THE POSSIBILITY OF META-HISTORY	MARKET FORCES: JANUARY ;2007-Vol:2.
6	. Rise of the Fundamentalists Discourse and the reassertion of Modern Ethos.(pp:106-130)	POLICY PERSPECTIVES: VOL:12:N;2:2015.
7	Identity Crises and the dilemma of Progress. (pp:99-109)	
8	Is History A Hermeneutical Activity. (pp:160-166)	Past and present :2001
9	IS LIBERTY POSSIBLE? THE TRAJECTORY OF LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF LIBERTY IN POST-COLONIAL SOCIETIES .(pp:110-125).	BIOCOSMOLOGY – NEO-ARISTOTELISM: Vol: 5; No:1: Winter 2015 .
10	The Living Death of Modernity and the poverty of Post Modernity In the Time Of Terror.(PP:107-139).	PAKISTAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATION.
11	Right without Choice and the Future of Bioethics Discourse in Post-Colonial Society.(PP:83-93).	Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics : 23 (May 2013).
12	Liberal principles of Justice and Emerging Trend of Economic Liberalization: Lesson from Rawlsian Scheme of Distributive Justice (PP:1-20)	Market Forces: Vol: IX: No;;2 December :2014.

PART : 1

FROM THE DISCOVERING OF REALITY TO CREATING MULTIPLE REALITIES: THE ARISTOTELIAN ROOTS OF MODERN ANTHROPOCENTRICISM

ABSTRACT:

The Kantian derivation of the categories of reason from Aristotelian logical form of judgment is one of the most remarkable shifts in Enlightenment epistemological discourse and consequently has substantive ontological implications that have radicalized the discourse over anthropocentricity.

Kantian transcendental deduction of categories of reason provides an understanding of the human mind which can transcend history, culture, traditions and the matrix in which it has been situated. This implies that the human mind not only has the capacity to have absolute, certain and universal knowledge rather it implies that fixed categories of reason also provide the rational foundation of categorical imperative and its universal application. Thus it provides an anthropocentric foundation of universal values and rational civilization.

Secondly and most importantly, Kant's claim that it is the structure of the mind which gives structure to the reality rather than vice versa, has radically changed the theoretical dynamics of knowledge about reality. This new role of the human mind has turned the discovery of reality into a meaningless pursuit because there is no structure outside the mind. The intelligible reality is the result of the imposition of the structure of the human mind, over reality. Thus the only option left is to create reality rather than discover reality. This emancipatory and anthropocentric tendency of Enlightenment thought is the result of Kantian-Copernican Revolution which cannot be possible without Aristotle.

In this paper it will be argued that the contemporary search of scientific investigation is not a search to discover reality; rather a quest to create reality and it is the result of the Aristotelian roots of modern anthropocentricism

KEYWORDS: Aristotle, Kant, Anthropocentrism, Enlightenment

	Contents
1	From the Priority of Ontology over Epistemology to that of Epistemology over Ontology.
2	Kantian Transcendental Rationality and Aristotelian Root of Modern Anthropocentricity.
3	The Science of Self and the Creation of reality

1. From the Priority of Ontology over Epistemology to that of Epistemology over Ontology :

The history of ideas reveals a continuous struggle to seek legitimation of one's knowledge claim. Sometimes, the epistemological legitimacy of the "subject of knowledge" i.e. the knower is under question:

sometimes the ontological existence of the "object of knowledge" i.e. the "known" or external world or anything other than the subject is under question. Most of the time, the relation between the "knower and the known" is also under scrutiny.

In the context of this process of legitimation, it is very difficult to segregate one's ontological underpinning from its corresponding epistemological assertions, or vice versa. Secondly, the prioritization of epistemological question over ontological question; or the precedence of ontology over epistemology, is also one of the most important rather most controversial aspects of the history of ideas.

Classical philosophers usually begin with the resolution of the ontological question first and their epistemological position is derived from its corresponding metaphysical foundations. This pattern is consistent with the philosophical attitude of classical thinkers generally and Post- Socratic philosophers in particular i.e. Plato and Aristotle. Interestingly, the same philosophical pattern is followed by Christian and Muslim thinkers.

However, the modernist philosophical tradition has questioned the conventional pattern which presumes the precedence of ontology over epistemology i.e. the question concerning "what is the nature and origin of reality?" is prior to the question; "how do I know reality?" This traditional priority of metaphysics over epistemology has been delegitimized in Enlightenment epistemological discourse. The conventional hierarchy of the etiological questions and their corresponding responses has been reordered by modern thinkers. They assert the "priority of epistemology over ontology".¹

The rationale of this prioritization was initially defended by Descartes and eventually it became one of the most important tendencies of Enlightenment intellectual tradition.

This Cartesian precedence “characterizes philosophy after the scientific revolution from Descartes to Kant”.²

Descartes believes that one should determine the limit of his knowing capacities before indulging oneself to resolve the etiological questions concerning the nature, origin and order of reality. The most important implication of this shift is that the limit of human knowing capacity will now determine the limits of one’s knowable reality. And if the issue of the holding of knowledge is raised for instance what Confucius asserts; “when you know a thing, to hold that you know it; and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it: this is knowledge”.³

Knowing the limits of one’s knowledge is in itself a state of awareness however most importantly, if something is unknowable then what will be the theoretical status of such ontological standing. Thus the modernist prioritization of epistemology over ontology has actually circumscribed one’s notion of reality, i.e. in the substantive sense; the limit of epistemology determines the limit of ontology. The distinction between knowable and unknowable reality, at first instance, has actually eliminated the unknowable reality from the discourse of metaphysics in general and ontology in particular.

Later on in this epistemological discourse, both the “object of knowledge” and the “source of knowledge” directly question the theoretical legitimacy of the reciprocating ontological positions.

For instance, the intellectual antagonism between Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism begins with the prioritization of the ultimate source of knowledge, eventually it has trapped into the ontological possibility of the legitimate and illegitimate object of knowledge, in other words, knowable and unknowable objects of knowledge. This reveals that neither ontological nor epistemological discourses are specific to their respective parameters; either there is an ontologically-grounded epistemological approach and its corresponding source of knowledge, or there is an epistemologically-driven ontological position and its corresponding subject of knowledge.

Cartesian Dualism, Leibniz’s Monadology, Spinoza’s Theory of Attributes, Lockean Dichotomy of Primary and Secondary qualities, Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism and Hume’s Skepticism; all are fundamentally metaphysical and ontological positions

emerged from their specific epistemological positions and its corresponding source of knowledge.

The logical implications of a given epistemological position are not specific to the issue, “how do we know?” Rather it is also fundamentally linked with the issue of “who we are?” and “what actually it is?” that we want to know. So the epistemological search has never been transcended from the ontological search.

The early modern thinkers, particularly the Continental Rationalists believe that reason and only reason alone can answer all the questions raised by the human consciousness in order to make sense of one’s existence. “We hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there is a sufficient reason why it should be so and not otherwise. 4

This fundamental belief of rationalists regarding the non-contestable centrality of transcendental reason is rested upon the ontological assumptions of anthropocentric discourse of Enlightenment. There is no doubt that Cartesian “methodic doubt” is methodologically epistemological however its theoretical corollaries are intrinsically ontological .5

According to Descartes “I am, I exist – that is certain: but for how long? For as long as I am thinking...As he put it elsewhere, It is a contradiction to suppose that what thinks does not at the very time when it is thinking exists”.6

This reveals that it is not just the mythological derivation of a particular kind of ontological conclusion. Rather it eventually creates lot of philosophical problems in Descartes’ system of thought. For instance as identified by Husserl, according to Descartes, due to the misapplication of his own epistemological method, he derives a substantive conclusion regarding the determination of the ontological status of “ego”.

In Cartesian Meditation, Husserl claims that “Descartes introduced the apparently insignificant but actually fateful change whereby the ego becomes a substantial cognitions; a separate human *men sive animus* [mind or soul]”.7

This dualistic realism is theoretically prior, or at least imbedded, in the epistemological framework of Cartesian thought.

However right now we are not interested in the correct on incorrect application of Cartesian methodic doubt for the derivation of the realm of apodictic evidence. For now, we are just interested in identifying the organic link between epistemology and its possible ontological implications; and consequently the false presumptions about the derivation of one's ontological position as if it is grounded in apodictic evidence.

The ontological derivation from particular epistemological conditions is not specific to Continental Rationalism. This phenomenon has equally manifested itself in Locke's Representative Realism, Berkeley's Subjective Idealism and Hume's Skepticism. In short, the whole British Empiricist tradition is not able to emancipate itself from the realization of metaphysical impulse.

But unlike his Empiricist predecessors, Hume has actually questioned, on the one hand the epistemological possibility of ontology in itself, and on the other hand the certainties of one's epistemological claim itself. Thus he actually left us at the dead end of knowledge.

2. Kantian Transcendental Rationality and Aristotelian Root of Modern Anthropocentricity:

What we can learn from Hume's analysis is that the prioritization of one specific source of knowledge for the derivation of certain knowledge will eventually collapse into a dead end of knowledge.

This will consequently limit the scope of human knowledge by restricting the knowable reality for the subject of knowledge. This lacuna is the result of the prioritization of inappropriate source of knowledge. The Kantian transition from positivist dichotomy of judgment (which was rested upon the traditional distinction between analytical and synthetic propositions) towards the "trichotomy of (1) analytic a-priori, (2) synthetic a-posteriori and (3) synthetic a-priori judgment" .8

which is empirical and logically necessary to provide a theoretical and logically sound ground to resolve the epistemological deadlock between rationalism and empiricism .9

This Kantian trichotomy .10 is central in his distinction between judging and perceiving which according to him represents two distinct faculties of mind i.e. sense and understanding. According to him, "by means of sense, objects are given to us and sense alone provides us with perceptions; by mean of understanding objects are thought and from it there arise concepts" .11

The collaborating role of these faculties of mind makes knowledge possible. In this way, reason provides the form and sense experiences provide the content of knowledge. Although he acknowledges that, "directly or indirectly, all thinking must ultimately ... refer to perceptions" .12

which creates an illusion that he is essentially an empiricist, but he claims that perceptions are meaningless without being properly formalized. This implies that perceptions are not synonyms to knowledge. He claims that "perceptions without concepts are blind" .13

The conceptualization cannot be possible without reason however in his framework, reason alone cannot function because sense experiences are the content of thought. “Thoughts without content, (that is to say concept which cannot be applied to anything perceivable) are empty” .14

Thus the formalizing capacity of reason is central to make perceptions intelligible because the condition of being thinkable is equally important; rather it is necessary. This means that “no object of experience is possible if it be either unperceivable or unthinkable” .15

This implies that the formalizing capacity of the human mind in general and rational faculty in particular, not only make things understandable, it also makes perceptions thinkable.

The Kantian derivation of pure concept of understanding or categories of reason from logical form of judgment under the epistemological conditions set by Kant himself provide us with a theoretical justification to acknowledge the Aristotelian contribution in the resolution of the epistemological crisis faced by the Enlightenment epistemological tradition .16

It is an acknowledged fact that Kant’s selection of the term “categories” to refer to the pure concept of understanding. is semantically derived from Aristotle; “the categories itself applies to any object whatsoever. Concepts which apply to any object whatsoever were called ‘categories’ by Aristotle, which explains Kant’s adoption of the term for the elementary concept of pure understanding.” 17

However it is also an acknowledged fact that Aristotle’s use of the term categories and its conceptual derivation are quite different from that of Kant’s. However we can find certain common denominator between them, for instance; Aristotle’s use of the word categories, is specific in the sense that categories are not determined by empirically derived classification rather they are determined by the very conditions that determine a philosophy”- 18, Same is the case with Kant as categories for Kant are also pure a-priori concepts of understanding rather than empirically schematized classifications of mind processes.

According to Thompson, the use of categories is different in Aristotle as compared with that of Kant. He claims that Aristotle's approach towards categories is metaphysical whereas Kant's approach is "epistemological"- 19 ,This actually is the core concern of this paper; to show how Aristotelian metaphysically-grounded logical form of judgment has provided an epistemological justification for the derivation of pure a-priori concept of understanding.

It is important to note that without indulging into any ontological analysis, Kant has tried to methodologically explain the structure and process of the human mind. The method of determining the pure a-priori concept of understanding "is often called transcendental argument". 20

Kantian transcendental argument in general and derivation of categories in particular are dependent on Aristotelian metaphysical analysis (for instance In Metaphysics IV) which demands the logical condition of "something which signifies the substance ."21

This logical demand of Aristotle is predominantly discussed in the context of Aristotle's distinction between category of substance and accident. But here we are interested in its role in identifying the clue of the logical form of judgment which makes significant utterances possible and even the functionality of the principle of contradiction.

Kant has used the thinking and judging capacities of the mind to make meaningful utterances about the empirical reality which the human mind is confronted by. Kant thinks that judging cannot be possible without the unification of the judgment and the a-priori concept. The objectivity and generality of objective empirical judgments (despite of their reliance on sense experiences which are intrinsically subjective and private) cannot be identified without a-priori concepts or categories.

In his own words " if we resolve all our synthetic judgments, in so far as they are objectively valid, then we find that they never consist of mere perceptions... but that they would be impossible, had there not been added a pure concept of understanding to the concepts which were abstracted from perception ."22

Kant believes that the logical form of judgment can be distinguished from the application of particular concepts and their integral relations with the utterances, or in other words, with judgments.

This implies that the logical form of judgment has a specific relation with the structure of the mind. The Kantian transcendental argument is actually an attempt to derive the list of pure a-priori concepts of understanding (categories) from the list of all logical forms of objective empirical judgment. In this derivation of the categories of reason, without indulging into any speculative psychology, Kant has relied on the work of traditional logicians; primarily on the work of Aristotle. It is believed that each specific category of reason corresponds to specific logical forms of judgment. This shows Kant's trust on Aristotelian logic because he considers it as "closed and complete ."23

It is due to this trust that the Kantian list of categories is also closed and completed. Secondly, his reliance on Newtonian physics is also unshakeable. "Kant's twofold dependence on Aristotle's logic and Newtonian science" .24

reveal that a comprehensive understanding of natural physical world is possible through the correct application of pure a-priori concept i.e. categories which are imbedded in the logical form of judgment expressed in traditional logic.

The core concern of this paper is not whether the list of categories identified by Kant is correctly corresponded by all the possible logical forms of judgments, for instance according to Korner, Kant believes that hypothetical judgment has only one form but even Stoics knew - 25 , that "hypothetical judgments have grammatical similarity which disguises fundamental logical differences amongst them." 26

A lot of work has already been done to explore the weakness in the Kantian argument regarding the determination as well as the completion of the list of categories .27

However, it is a general consensus among the contemporary Aristotelians and Kantians that:


- 1) Kant derives the list of categories coherently or incoherently from Aristotelian logical form of judgment.
- 2) Aristotle's approach towards categories is metaphysical.

3) Thompson's argument regarding the Aristotelian distinction between the signification of substance from that of accident, is to establish that Aristotelian categories are actually ontological .28

This implies that the being of substance is different than the being of accident. Thus the distinction is fundamentally ontological -29 ,Due to this ontological foundation of categorization, it is difficult to determine the exact list of categories related to accidental being .30

4) Kant's approach towards categories is epistemological.

5) Kantian use of categories due to its epistemological approach demands specific as well as exact list of categories in order to be presented as objective basis of knowing. If there is no exact list available, then it cannot be acknowledged as an objective basis of absolute knowledge because of its relativistic and contingent nature-31 On the "logical forms" and "categories", see the scheme of Stephan Korner- 32:



The Kantian derivation of the concept of pure understanding is a fundamental turning point in modern epistemological tradition and it provides a theoretical framework to reconcile the traditional epistemological antagonism between rationalism and empiricism.

Secondly, it also provides an alternative framework to make an objective epistemological claim about the absolute understanding of external reality. The Kantian objective to derive a complete list of non-mathematical, a-priori concepts of understanding keeping his transcendental argument within the epistemological parameters he has set for the logical construction of his system of thought: without indulging into any intellectual adventure of speculative psychology, is one of the most important epistemological contributions of Kant. But it is important to note that this transcendental analysis cannot be possible without Aristotelian metaphysically-grounded logical forms of judgments. The Kantian derivation of the logical form of judgment is central to acknowledge that:

- 1) The fundamental limit of Modern epistemological discourse is the result of the prioritization of epistemology over ontology regarding the determination of objective knowledge claims.
- 2) The Aristotelian logical form of judgments which is actually the result of his ontologically-grounded categories is central for Kantian derivation of pure a-priori concept of understanding. For instance, the Aristotelian ontological distinction between substance and accident is central in his epistemological distinction between the apprehension of essence (nous) from that of accident. “Without prior support from ontology this epistemological distinction has seemed ad hoc and arbitrary .”³³
- 3) The Kantian logical forms of judgment provide a theoretical justification for significant metaphysical claims that keep his argument within the limits of his epistemological parameters. For instance Kant’s distinction between Phenomena and Noumena is the result of the dichotomization of knowable and unknowable reality which cannot be theoretically justified without a-priori concept of understanding. In his transcendental argument, he acknowledges that the incapacity of sense and understanding to know things-in-themselves despite this fact that both, “perhaps spring from a common but to us unknown root”. ³⁴


4) The transcendental Idealism of Kant cannot be sustained without his transcendental analytic which provides the theoretical foundation for the structure of objective experience from the derivation of the list of pure a priori concepts. Transcendental dialectic also provides the theoretical justification to demonstrate metaphysical illusion through differentiation between correct and incorrect applications of pure a-priori concepts.

Unlike Empiricist epistemologists, for Kant the mind is not a passive tabula rasa which receives ideas from empirical reality; nor is it just a processing zone for innate a-priori ideas without having direct encounters with empirical reality as thought by Continental Rationalists. The experience of the world cannot be epistemologically possible without systematic structuring of representation provided by mind. Unlike Kant, both Continental Rationalists and Empiricists primarily focus on the mind-world interaction.

This dualistic realism under the conditions of their respective epistemological frameworks is both epistemologically and ontologically insufficient because they do not have any theoretical framework to explicate the nature of the mind and its corresponding structure. Thus it is not the experience of the world which makes ideas possible, rather it is the structure of the mind which makes experiences possible, according to Kant.

On the basis of these pure a-priori concepts of understanding, Kant questions the epistemological legitimacy of the traditional search to discover the structure of reality as an objective standard of knowing. Kant claims that it is not the structure of reality to which the mind should correspond; rather it is the structure of the mind which actually structures reality.

This revolutionary worldview which is commonly known as Kantian-Copernican Revolution cannot be possible without pure categories of reason. The Kantian epistemological certainty for having the complete list of the categories of reason without any speculative psychology provides an anthropocentric foundation to impose human will on external reality as per rational order of the mind which is independent of reality outside the human mind. Once again, referring to Stephan Korner-35:



The chart shows that it is not the structure of the proposition which is to be confirmed by the mind rather the structure of the mind gives structure to reality. In Kant's words, "Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge." 36

This actually a radical shift in the Enlightenment epistemological discourse because this active role of the mind has shifted the fundamental epistemological objective from the discovery of reality to the creation of reality. Since things in themselves are unknowable, and if there is any structure of reality in-itself, it exists due to its noumenal nature beyond the comprehension of one's active mind. However, as there is a structure of the human mind which is also logically demonstrable (thanks to Aristotelian logical

form of judgment) then it is reasonable to imply from this Kantian framework that we have to impose this structure of the mind as per our rational will.

3. The Science of Self and The Creation of reality:

The spirit of Kantian thought demands that the future dynamics of philosophical investigation must be on the one hand to participate in the creation of a world that can be experienced and on the other hand, intrinsically anthropocentric.

The fundamental question which needs to be addressed is that how much Kant can rely on categories of reason for the sustenance of his anthropocentric world view without referring to any specific speculative psychology as provided by Fichte.

The theoretical possibility of the science of self on the basis of so-called pure reason i.e. independent of any specific empirical analysis or a-posteriori observational system of understanding was an intellectual fashion of Kantian times. The a-priori ontological claim about the objective knowledge of self is usually called, rational psychology. Rational psychology, according to Kant, is a mistake of the human mind or an illusion of metaphysics. The rational ontological analysis and its corresponding claims are not epistemologically demonstrable. Kant contends that the illusion of metaphysics is actually the result of the misuse of the categories of reason.

Although there is no doubt that Kant has extensively written on this subject, but he has made a clear distinction between the thinking self as a being in process which makes synthetic unity possible and the “empirical self-i.e. introspected, self which is itself the presentation.”³⁷

Kant claims that it is actually the pure a-priori aspect of the self which was the subject matter of rational psychology but since pure self is not the object of experience therefore the application of the categories of reason is not possible without objective experience. This implies that although pure self is there which makes the synthetic unity possible it is not knowable.

The Kantian contribution about the determination of anthropocentric foundation of Enlightenment humanist tradition is unquestionable. Kant’s commitment with the priority of an anthropocentric approach for the determination of a well-ordered society

and universal morality is a fundamental cornerstone of his thought. He provides the metaphysical foundation for liberalism in general and constitutional democracy in particular, from his anthropocentrism.

There is no doubt that the Kantian distinction between empirically-determined reason and pure, practical reason is very significant for the absolute defense of liberal order, however this distinction cannot be possible without a particular kind of philosophy of the mind.

Kant's explication of the defining features of Aufklärung (Enlightenment) is actually a departure from the state of immaturity to the state of awareness i.e. acknowledgment of Rational-self-determined-autonomous-self which is driven by reason and not by some inhuman authorities. Thus it is his notion of reason which enables him to establish "man as end in him-self rather than a mean to an end." which is presumed to be the *raison d'être* of modern anthropocentrism.

The empirically determined reason guides our actions within a sphere of desires and instincts. The practical reason contains unconditional imperative i.e. it is not influenced or determined by our empirical awareness. Thus it deals with the formal aspect of the truth. Kant defends his idea of categorical imperative which is the fundamental idea to justify the anthropocentric foundation of his defense of universal morality on the basis of pure practical reason. Thereby the validity of categorical imperative is not determined by its content; rather it is determined by its form which is derived from a pure a-priori concept of understanding. Kant's idea of categorical imperative provides the justification of "pure law".

This formal law of conduct provides the ultimate justification for the derivation of substantive moral principles. Categorical imperative is, in fact, the principle of universalizability. The ethical principles which can be passed through the test of universalizability are considered as substantive moral laws. The conditions of the universalization may be conceived as follows; firstly, the requirement to universalize rules out differential treatment between individuals on arbitrary grounds.

Secondly, the truth value of the formal principle must not be determined by an individual's personal preferences instead it must be true for all. Finally and most

importantly, the formal principles chosen by an individual must be independent of his particular value system. This means that the individual chooses principle as if he is “anyone” (i.e. not a person having specific identity and possessing a specific value system).

Every ideology presumes a particular conception of the person. Kant provides the basic philosophical assumption underlying “right-based liberal” -38 , conception of the person in general while that of Rawls, in particular. Kant provides an epistemological argument for the justification of a transcendental subject.

His epistemological argument is grounded in the ontological incapacity of the subject regarding the possibility of self-knowledge. He believes that if the self is the sum total of desires, virtues and inclinations then it is not possible to apprehend a unified self in which all these desires, aims, dispositions etc, converge.

And if there is a self, it is not empirically demonstrable. Introspective analysis cannot deliver self-awareness on the basis of these empirical appearances. Nevertheless Kant claims that we can presume the possibility of a unified self.

He says; “...I can grasp the manifold of the representation in one consciousness, and do I call the one and all mine. For otherwise I should have as many – colored and diverse a self as I have representation of which, I am conscious to myself”. 39

This means that there is an antecedently individuated self that converges diverse perceptions and holds them together in a single consciousness or awareness. Kant believes that the experience of impressions and the object of experience are not the source of moral obligations. It is Reason which provides the basis of moral obligation (das Sollen). Kant acknowledges that external factors, natural causes and even sensory stimulations affect the individual’s drive to “will” something, however he claims that “they cannot produce (my state of) being under obligation. 40

This rational sense of moral obligations helps us to unveil the conception of the self, presumed by Kant. The conception of reason presumed by Kant is two-dimensional. He believes that the individual can relate himself to the object, rationally “either by merely determining it and its concept... or making it real.”⁴¹

He considers the first function as theoretical and the second function as practical. Kant acknowledges that the conflict of desires is inevitable however the nature of conflict has been differentiated by him. He contrasts the conflict of desires with the conflict of desire with “duty”. The purpose of practical reason is to resolve this conflict between desire and duty. Korner believes that the Kantian linguistic expression presumes a particular structure of terminology and generally “the logical grammar of the term ‘duty’ is different from the grammar of desire and impulse.”⁴²

Moreover in the Kantian paradigm, the conflict of desire and duty simply means the “conflict of one desire with the other.”⁴³ , It follows that the purpose of practical reason is to resolve this “conflict” with a sense of moral obligation. Thereby we consider Kantian ethics as rationality bound by desires.

The Kantian idea of the categorical imperative is helpful to understand a particular kind of “self” and the “ontological” possibility of individual autonomy. Kant believes that everything in nature is determined by the law. But “only rational being has the ability to act according to the presentation (Vorstellung) of the law i.e. according to principles”,⁴⁴ This means that the individual’s capacity or autonomy to adopt maxims makes man’s existence moral or immoral.

This reveals the inevitable link between the individual’s liberty and his morality. Kant’s emphasis on the practical necessity of the categorical imperative makes his claim vulnerable because in his framework, the choice of ends is governed by the order of desires of the individual. Thus in concrete life situations, people may have different ends because they may order their desires differently. So the difficulty arises that “our subjective qualitative beings to the categorical imperative cannot be explained in terms of our seeking ends which depend on our desire.”⁴⁵

In order to resolve this difficulty, Kant introduces a conception of the self, which is, an end in itself. Thus the transcendental “self” itself provides the grounds for the necessity of

practical law. This notion of “end” is independent of any kind of desire. This emancipation of the self from the instrumental chain of means-end relationship holds the harmony of every rational “will” and binds them together in a coherent moral order.

The Kantian notion of “self” is that of a “rational self”. Being a rational self, it is an end in itself i.e. the “absolute end”. The theoretical corollary of this absolute end is that “man stands outside all causal chains and consequently outside every hierarchy of means and ends.”⁴⁶

The Kantian commitment with the prioritization of the rational self as an absolute end compels him to reformulate the structure of the categorical imperative in a manner that “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, both in your own person and in the person of all others, never as a means only but always equally as an end.”⁴⁷

Kant claims that this new formulation of the categorical imperative provides same result as what we were getting from the old formulation of categorical imperative. Korner believes that this new formulation reflects the moral intuitions of human being in general and Western man in particular. Therefore the postulate, “man as end in him-self”, corresponds to the “moral experiences at least to moral experience of our (Western) culture.”⁴⁸

Kant adopts an anthropocentric approach and presumes that the individual has a capacity to “will” autonomously. By autonomy, Kant means individual’s ontological capacity to determine his ends and virtues independent of history and social determinism. The Kantian subject not only has the desire but also the capacity to determine his ends autonomously. His subject stands outside or independent of history and culture.⁴⁹

In order to sustain the autonomy of the self, the value of non-interference has lexical priority over all other substantive values. The natural corollary of this precedence is that the right has priority over the good, i.e. “the subject is prior to his end”.⁵⁰

The existence of the antecedently individuated self reveals that our voluntary actions are not determined by the community or culture but there is an autonomous and self-determined agency functioning independently, of the world and standing outside history.

This super-sensible paradigm of the self legitimizes the possibility of the existence of a free and transcendental subject. This transcendental subject is actually independent of the causal determinism prevailing in this sensible world. The subject is free, autonomous and self-determined. The conception of self emerges from Kantian analysis is as follows:

the self is rational, autonomous, and a-historical. The autonomy of the self emancipates it from the organic chain between means and ends, thus it is end in itself. This legitimizes the priority of right over the good. The rational self is not only subject to moral law (universal principle) but also the creator of it. This transcendently rational, unencumbered and antecedently individuated self is ontologically capable to legislate. The nature of legislation is universalistic, because the “idea of the will of any rational being (is interpreted) as a universally legislative will”.⁵¹

Kant’s aim was to reconcile the antagonistic relationship between science and morality. He believes that the Newtonian world view provides the justification of universal determinism and the Rousseauian moral philosophy defends individual’s autonomy. He tries to resolve this paradoxical co-existence of natural determinism and moral freedom by differentiating phenomenal world from noumenal world. In Kantian framework “the world of phenomena is what science can know, the world of noumena is the realm which is opened up by morality”.⁵²

In order to understand one of the most important metaphysical foundations of humanism this distinction between phenomena and noumena is central. It provides the basis of dualism in Kantian conception of self. Kant differentiates the lower self from that of upper one.⁵³

The lower self is the phenomenal one, which is the part of empirical world. On the other hand, the upper self is the noumenal aspect of self which is the part of intellectual world (“the world of things in them-selves”). This noumenal world is unknowable. Kant insists that although noumenal world cannot be known it can be believed in. He introduces the concept of “rational belief”, the belief which leads us (beyond experience) to the idea of

freedom. Thus as a noumenal being man is absolutely free. On the other hand in phenomenal world man is heteromoniously determined. “This duality of human nature is over come in Kant’s kingdom of ends”-54, The Kingdom of Ends is a union of all rational individuals in a system of law.

In such sphere all the ends determined by pure rational will are harmonized in an organic whole. In Kingdom of Ends “each individual realizes his private ends by means of the other and regards the other as an end in himself”-55 , Thus we can say that the Kingdom of Ends is a sphere in which the actions determined by pure reason and actions determined by desires are completely harmonized with each other and the contradiction between reason and desire will be abolished.

In the Kantian framework “Kingdom of Ends” is realized through a course of history. Thus the contradiction between desires and pure reason will be eliminated through the teleological process of self-development. Thus man as a rational being is teleologically destined to construct a perfect social arrangement i.e. Kingdom of Ends.

Concluding remarks :

The relevance of Kantian anthropocentricity has consistently persevered in contemporary discourse and there is no disagreement between Modernists and Post-modernists regarding the precedence of human-centricity over any other kind or other spectacles to understand the contemporary life-world. There is no doubt that the Post-modern discourse has substantively extended the domain of “being” which has theoretically questioned the so-called intellectual colonization of anthropocentricity.

For instance, Deleuzean substitution of “Logos” from “Nomos”-56, to justify his notion of unstructured conception of being provide a theoretical possibility to transcend the anthropocentric spectacles, but this Deleuzean attempt to extend the intellectual horizon at the cost of identity. This novel conceptualization of pure difference has actually questioned the universality of the anthropocentric notion of becoming. However, the institutional conditionality of this pure notion of difference is actually the continuation of the already

institutionalized capitalistic from of production and obsession with an unprecedented desire for autonomy of the will and there is no meaning of autonomy in absence of identity.

It is also important to note that the contemporary manifestation of Modern or Post-modern anthropocentrism is more concerned with “what is possible?” rather than “what is?” Both of its manifestations are more concerned with “becoming” rather than “being”. The impact of this predominantly futuristic orientation regarding the understanding of reality in general and the human being in particular that it is more concerned with the creation of reality rather than its discovery. Any attempt to understand reality is meaningless in this anthropocentrism if we are not interested to impose our will as per our desire.

For instance, take the example of medical sciences and their corresponding methodological frameworks. They all are actually working on human becoming rather than human being. «The whole discourse of cloning, genetic mutation, stem-cell methodologies, innumerable possibilities of vaccinations, transplantation etc. are all predominantly futuristic and teleologically grand mechanism to engineer a super-human-being i.e. Übermensch.”⁵⁷

It means that the spirit of Kantian-Copernican Revolution is not just the acknowledgement of the limit of human rational capacity to know the reality of things-in-themselves rather it also opens up a gateway to determine the structure and nature reality by imposing our will as per our desire. It is due to this reason in the absence of the knowledge of thing-in-themselves that the claim about normative rational formalism for the determination of absolute and universal imperative as claimed by Kant is just the adventure of rationality bound by desires. Secondly, and most importantly, the Aristotelian ontologically-determined logical forms of judgment are conceptual necessities for the understanding of Kantian transcendental idealism and rational morality.

End Notes :

- 1 .Floridi, Luciano. The Ethics of Information, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 38.
- 2 . Ibid. p. 38.
- 3 .Confucius: <http://www.braingquote.com/quote/a/confucius134028.html>
- 4 . Leibniz, Gottfried, Discourse on Metaphysics, Modern Philosophy, An Anthology of primary sources. Edit. Day Roger Ariew, Eric Watkins, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009, p. 278.
- 5 . In Husserlian words the result of the assumptions of dualistic realism.
- 6 . See in Philosophical Writing of Descartes, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff and D. Murdoch, Vol.2 Cambridge: Cambridge university press 1985. Quoted in Descartes, J. Cottingham New York, Basil Blackwell Inc.1986. p.36.
- 7 .See Husserl, E. Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorian Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1977 quoted in Understanding Phenomenology by Michael Hammond, Howarth, Rverel Keat, Oxford Basil Book Well Ltd. 1991. P. 31
- 8 . See Korner S. Kant, Penguin Books 1954 p.21-22.
- 9 . It is important to note that in this paper we are not interested to question and explore the validity of the Kantian trichotomy regarding the determination of legitimate epistemological claims about reality. Rather we are interested in his contribution in the overall history of ideas in general and the sustenance of modern epistemological tradition in particular. Secondly the Aristotelian roots in his derivation of the categories of reason.

10 . Kant did not explore the forth possibility of judgment i.e. Analytic a-posteriori judgment because logically speaking there can be no analytic a-posteriori judgment. Although it is beyond the scope of our article to critically evaluate the logical possibility of forth possibility of judgment however it is worth mentioning that lot of work have also been done in this regard for instance Saul Kripke and Stephen Palmquist, in a very important article A Priori Knowledge in Perspective – Palmquist tries to establish that proposition that is synthetic a -posteriori in one context might be analytic a priori in another context. See The Review of Metaphysics 41:2 (December 1987), pp. 255–282.

See also : “A Priori Knowledge in Perspective: (I) Mathematics, Method and Pure Intuition”, The Review of Metaphysics 41:1 (September 1987), pp. 3–22.

11 .Kant I. Critique of Pure Reason (2nd edition) Konigsberg, 1787, p. 49, quoted in Korner S. Kant, Penguin Book, 1954, p. 27

12 . Ibid., p. 27.

13 . Ibid., p. 58.

14 . Ibid., p. 58.

15. Korner S. Kant, op.cite p. 59.

16 . The Crises is the result of the prioritization of epistemology over ontology.

17 . Korner S. Kant, op.cit p. 54.

18 .ThompsonManley, “Philosophical Approaches to Categories,” The Monist. Vol. 66, No. 3, July 1983, p. 336.

19 . 20 Ibid., p. 336.

20 . Ibid., p. 336.

21 .The works of Aristotle, trans. and ed. by W.D. Ross quoted in Thompson Manley, Philosophical Approaches to Categories, in The Monist. It is also important to note that Thompson has used signifies instead of the word denotes, as it is

mentioned in Oxford edition – translating Semainon the writer prefers the signifies which reveals more semantically appropriate, in his thinking, with over all semantic mood of Aristotelian linguistic jargon.

22 . Kant, I. Prolegomena to every future metaphysics, trans. by P. E. Lucas (Manchester 1953), p. 302, quoted in Korner S. Kant, op.cite, p. 49.

23 . Kant I. Critique of Pure Reason (2nd edition) Konigsberg, 1787, p. 49, quoted in Korner S. Kant. Op.cite. p.50.

24 . Korner S. Kant. Op.cit. p. 50.

25 . See Bochensiki, Ancient Logic, Amsterdam, 1951, quoted in Korner S. Kant. Op.cite. p. 50.

26 . Korner S. Kant. Op.cite. p.50.

27 . Lot of work has been done in this regard for instance: Putnam, H. Reason, Truth and History Cambridge University press 1981; Putnam, H. Philosophical Paper, Vol.2, Cambridge University Press 1975; Beck, Lewis White. "Kant Theory of Definition" in Philosophical Review Vol.65, 1965 ,Kant: A collection of critical essays (ed.) Robert Paul Wolff New York Double and CO. 1967 ,Ontological relativity and other essays New York Columbia university press 1969; Stroud, Barry "Transcendental Argument" in the Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 65, 1968.

28 . See Thompson Manley, "Philosophical Approaches to Categories," The Monist, Vol. 66, No. 3, July 1983, p. 340.

29 . See: Ibid., p. 339.

30 . The works of Aristotle. Trans. and ed. by W.D. Ross, quoted in Thompson Manley, Philosophical Approaches to Categories, in The Monist, op.cite. p. 341.

31 . See: Ibid., p. 344.

32 . See: Stephan Korner, Kant, op.cite. 1954, pp. 73-74.

33 . See: in Thompson Manley, “Philosophical Approaches to Categories,” *The Monist*, op.cite. p. 345.

34 . Kant I. *Critique of Pure Reason* (2nd edition) Konigsberg, 1787p.46, quoted in Korner S. Kant, op.cite. p. 91

35 . See: Korner, Stephan. Kant, op.cite. 1954, p. 73-74.

36 . Kant I., *Critique of pure reason*, trans. By N. Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, 1963, B xvi.

37 . Ibid., p. 112.

38. The Rawlsian defense of liberalism is one of the forms of right based liberalism which provide a theoretical justification universalization of human rights frame work and its cross cultural application. See Rawls J. *A Theory of Justice*, Oxford University Press, 1971.

39 . Kant, I (1887). *Critique of Pure Reason* (II ed.), trans. by N.K. Smith. London: Macmillan, 1927, p. 154.

40. Ibid., p. 371.

41. Ibid., p. 8.

42. Kornor S. Kant, Penguin Book 1954, p 130.

43. Ibid., p. 130.

44. Kant I. *Ground work of Metaphysics of morals*, in H.J. Paton, London, p. 412.

45. Korner, S. Kant, op. cite p. 145.

46. Ibid., p. 147.

47. Kant, I. Ground work of Metaphysics of moral, opcite page 429.

48. Korner S. Kant, op. cite p. 148.

49. Good-based liberalism (utilitarianism) has been rejected by Kantians like Rawls because, in it, the individual becomes a means to realize certain ends, as Kant considers the individual as an end-in-himself.

50. Sandal, M.J., Liberalism and the limits of justice, Cambridge University press, Cambridge New York, 1982 P. 7.

51. Kant I., Ground work of Metaphysics of morals, op.cite page 43.

52. Hassner, Pierre. "Immaneul Kant," in History of political philosophy (ed.) by Leo Strauss and J. Cropsey (London / Chicago) University of Chicago Press (1972), page 582.

53. The distinction of upper and lower self is not standardized but for conceptual convenience we are using this distinction.

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55. Ibid., p. 22.

56. Nomos according to Deleuze distribute "people (or animal) in an open space, one that is indefinite and non-communicating nomad distribute himself in smooth space; he occupies, inhabits, holds that space; that is his territorial space. See Deleuze&Guttari, A thousand Plateaus (first South Asian ed.) R. Hurley, MussumiTrans. Chennai India Viva Books Pvt. Ltd., p. 420.

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IS LIBERTY POSSIBLE? :THE TRAJECTORY OF LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF LIBERTY IN POST-COLONIAL SOCIETIES

ABSTRACT:

The gradual emergence of the order of freedom in a traditionally structured society creates an illusion that the emerging order will provide an unprecedented freedom and no coercive mechanism will be there to deny human will.

This expectation of unquestionable freedom in traditional, tribal, religious or patriarchic societies will be interpreted a social form without any restrictions or limitations if not purely order-less. This unreasonable expectation from the order of freedom is not the result of inappropriate knowledge of liberal order of freedom rather it is due to the understanding of the notion of freedom through post-colonial spectacles.

The liberty as political ideal is one of the most important political ideal in post-colonial historical context but due to specific colonial legacy the meaning of freedom presumed or at least idealized in these parts of the world is actually in-formalized in the sense that it generally defined in antagonism with any form of authority i.e.

religious, traditional, communitarian, patriarchal and most importantly bureaucratic order of governance. The empirical justification of this claim is in itself a domain of research but this actually not the core concern of our paper. In this paper it will be argued that our post-colonial notion of informal non-institutionalized freedom is beyond the scope of freedom make available by liberal order. The demand of unprecedented freedom is anarchic.

An attempt will be made in this paper to conceptually explicate the order of freedom rather than freedom itself. It will be argued that freedom without order is not acceptable for liberal socio-political order thus it offers certain restrictions and limitations on human expression which are presumed to be necessary to guarantee individual freedom.

KEYWORDS: post-colonial society, order of freedom, civil disobedience

Introduction :

It is an acknowledged fact the freedom in political sense is the area of non-interference defined, acknowledged and protected by the State apparatus. This formalization of the area of non-encroachment is presumed to be one of the most celebrated political ideal of liberal political order.

It means that liberal order must necessarily presumed a very well defined institutional mechanism to define the area of non-interference, it's possible encroachment and its legal corollaries. Secondly it must also presume a very clear role of State apparatus regarding the determination of legitimate public sphere and the limits of the freedom of expression in a given public order.

The culturally non-liberal societies according to Fareed Zakarya are the real cause of illiberal democracies or the dis-functionality of democratic political procedure. But this actually an over simplified understanding of post-colonial non-liberal tendencies which manifest in the form of illiberal democratic orders. In such democratic order people (due to their non-liberal particularities) often consider "order of freedom" as illegitimate because it not only provides you freedom but at the same time limits your freedom by defining the area-of non-encroachment or in other words defining what ought not to do i.e. not to encroach others freedom which most of the times contradictory to the values of the people of post-colonial societies and their notion of informal freedom.

The ordered life is generally being considered as a socially recognized mechanism of discipline and punishment. The nature of order is in itself instrumental to overcome the fundamental existential vacuum of human urge for security and stability. Different justifications have been given to bridge the gulf caused by the fear of instability and insecurity for instance traditional, tribal, religious orders have their own justifications to legitimize their mechanism of discipline and punishment to overcome the fear of instability and insecurity. Historically different institutions have been emerged or evolved for the determination of well-ordered society.

The most important question is whether the security or stability is end in itself or they are the mean to an end. In this sense it was traditional to provide a teleological justification of a given social order. The nature of social order will be determined by the telos it guarantees. It is important to note that the

mechanism of discipline and punishment is one of the integral aspects of social order. Thus social control is legitimized by virtue of its capacity to actualize the telos which has been emerged from the tradition, intuition, revelation or the collective historical experience of a given civilization.

The teleologically grounded grand-narrative provides a hermeneutical space to reasonably argue the justification of a given order. It reveals that the institutionalization of a given order and its corresponding mechanism of discipline and punishment is not just a political issue which can be resolved by coercive State apparatus and by certain bureaucratic mechanism. Rather gradual historical process which provide condition for evolving the “telos” actually interwoven into the socio-cultural fabric of a given society.

Thus the order of religion in a society which considers the order of tradition, or tribe, or patriarchy or matriarchy etc. as legitimate as the imposition of the order of religion will be considered by such society as coercive. Similarly if the order of freedom is going to be imposed through direct state apparatus or indirectly through humanitarian aid incentives, strengthening civil society net works and international bureaucratic institutions etc. is equally coercive from the perspective of those who do not consider encroachment in individual’s private sphere as immoral or illegitimate.

It reveals that principally establishment of any mechanism of order presumes a particular grand-narrative which has to be acknowledged as meta-rational. Secondly any mechanism of order cannot be established without identifying the theoretical limits of the notion of tolerance i.e. it should be clear in that mechanism of order that what cannot be tolerated otherwise no order can be maintained. If any establishing order fail to legitimize the sanctity of the given telos from which the order is to be derived than the coerciveness of a given order can be presented as threat to the given political community hence its order will be considered as illegitimate.

Liberal order in culturally non-liberal societies is generally considered as unjust and coercive because its far more judgmental regarding the traditionally or religiously emerged mechanism of discipline and punishment which most of the times do not respect the sanctity of the area of non-encroachment and individual’s inviolable right of self-determination.

It is because of this reason internalization of liberal order i.e. order of freedom, in a culturally non-liberal society through constitutional codification, legislation and its corresponding institutionalization eventually emphasizes more on what should not be done? Rather than, what should be done?

The gradual institutionalization of individual freedom through active state interventions pave the way for a constant antagonistic dialectics between non-liberal communal attachments and individual urge to transcends those pre-modern coercive particularities and historical specificities. As a result of this the liberal activists emphasize more on what they don't want? Rather than what they do want? In the following section we will provide Rawlsian attempt to institutionalize the order of freedom.

This exposition of the institutionalization of individual freedom will be helpful to understand the order of freedom, its theoretical limits of tolerance and possible conditions of being violent towards those who challenged the order of freedom.

Section 1 :

In his analysis of liberty, Rawls is not concerned with the definition of liberty. It is more than obvious that he is much more interested in "the relative values of the several liberties and why they come into conflict" with each other ¹ . So he sets aside the traditional distinction between positive and negative conceptions of freedom expounded by Berlin.

According to Rawls, any meaningful explanation of freedom must address three questions as follow:

- i) Who are the agents of freedom?
- ii) Freedom from what? I.e. what kind of restrictions or limitations is required to be eliminated?
- iii) What legitimate constraints are needed to enhance general freedom i.e. "what it is that they are free to do or not to do?"²

It is customary to define freedom in terms of obstacles and maximization of freedom is considered as synonymous to the elimination of the identified obstacles. The identification of obstacles (political, social, cultural, religious, emotional, aesthetical etc.) is a never-ending phenomenon; therefore, the absolute realization of freedom is not possible.

For Rawls, these questions ³ are organically linked with each other as well as they pose a challenge for contemporary political philosophy to resolve. “This or that Person (or persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not to do) so and so”. ⁴

Rawls focuses on the constitutional and legal restrictions, which refrain individual’s freedom. He acknowledges that there is no one sense of liberty because there are different agents of freedom, for instance :

- i) person
- ii) associations or organization or cooperation and
- iii) state.

Therefore liberty is in fact the name of “certain system of public rules defining rights and duties.”⁵ This means that freedom is just a space whose frontiers are determined by the system of rights. According to Rawls, in political sense the meaning of freedom is determined by the publicly acknowledged institutions, because the prioritized system of rights cannot be protected without having proper institutional structure.

There are different spheres of liberties due to which there is always an open possibility of clash among different spheres of liberties. The role of institutions (political, legal, and economic) is to protect one agent (person, association, state) from the interference of the other. It is the institutional framework, which imposes legal obligations over the agent, not to interfere in others political, religious, moral etc. affairs.⁶ Since there are different spheres of liberties, therefore basic liberties should be assessed in a single system rather than particular liberties on their own. The task of the delegate (in a constitutional convention)¹ and legislator is to balance one sphere of liberty against that of the other for the attainment of “best total system of equal liberties”. ⁷

¹ Here the constitutional convention has been used in the specific Rawlsian sense which he has used in the analysis of original position i.e. a hypothetical choice situation in which fair principles of justice will be discovered behind the veil of ignorance.

In the Rawlsian framework, the conception of freedom is not anarchic. He acknowledges certain restrictions and limitations as legitimate and necessary for the sustenance of the system of liberty. The limitation of freedom is not unjust because “these limits are subject to certain criteria expressed by the meaning of equal liberty and (the) serial order of the two principles of justice.”²
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He acknowledges that the framework of constitutional democracy is not a perfect political system but in such a system two conditions must necessarily be satisfied namely

- i) the principle of equal liberty and
- ii) the possibly “just and effective system of legislation”.⁹

In Rawlsian framework, the principle of equal liberty is concretized (in constitutional procedure) in the form of “principle of equal participation”. The initial reference of constitutional democracy is equal political participation. The worth of a democratic decision is determined by the fact that to what extent the principle of equal participation is realized. Before discussing the relation between liberty and political participation, Rawls mentions the general features of constitutional statecraft as follows:

- i) Socio-political and economic policies are decided by elected representatives for a limited period.
- ii) These representatives are accountable to the electorate.
- iii) The representatives have advisory capacity for effective legislation according to the legitimate public sentiments.

² The two principles of justice which Rawls put forward as likely to be chosen are: First Principle
“Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberties for all.” (See Rawls J. A Theory of justice, op.cite p. 302 – 303)

Second Principle

“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of equality of opportunity.”(Ibid. p. 302–303).

- iv) The executive body (i.e. judiciary) is responsible for monitoring legislative procedure according to the constitution or the spirit of constitution.
- v) Political parties are not just interest groups rather they must have some political agenda and public conception of the good.
- vi) The constitution determines the parameters of the legislative body; however, “a firm majority of the electorate is able to achieve its aims by constitutional amendment”.¹⁰
- vii) All sane adults have the right to vote (one man one vote).
- viii) Fair, free and regular elections are also important for the sustenance of constitutional regime.
- ix) The need of a loyal opposition to counter one party dictatorship, to open up healthy bargain and clash of opinion for the realization of the principles of justice, for the promotion of public good, and to critically evaluate and analyze the prevailing socio-economic and political policies of the government.¹¹

In the Rawlsian framework, the principle of equal liberty is institutionally concretized (constitutional procedure) in the form of the principle of equal political participation. Therefore the initial reference of constitutional democracy is the realization of the principle of equal political participation.

Rawls believes that there is always an open possibility of the clash of certain spheres of liberties therefore, there is a need of a “firm constitutional protection for certain liberties particularly freedom of speech and assembly and to form political association.”¹²

The institutionalization of the principle of equal liberty in the form of equal participation requires three-dimensional analysis namely the meaning of equal participation, the extent of this participation and its limitation and the measures which are necessary to be taken for the enhancement of its (i.e. equal participation) worth.

In this regard, the equal participation is characterized by :

- a) one man one vote.
- b) if the electorate is divided into single member territorial constituencies, the constituencies must have about the same number of electors (TJ, page 223)
- c) every citizen has equal access to public offices. It means that everyone is free to :
 - i. join political parties.
 - ii. run elective positions.
 - iii. hold places of authorities.¹³

However reasonable constraints of “age limit” and condition of permanent residence must be imposed. As far as the question of the extent of participation is concerned, Rawls is not very clear though he believes that the problem of the extent of political liberty (equal participation) is raised if:

- a. The constitution establishes majoritarian dictatorship.
- b. The ability of majority (of electorate) to achieve its objectives through constitutional amendments.

In order to cope with these problems there is a need to limit the scope and authority of the majority through constitutional checks and balances, separation of state power, judicial review of the bill of rights etc. But the problem is that these constraints eventually “limit the scope of the principle of participation”.¹⁴

Interestingly Rawls believes that these constraints are consistent with the principle of equal participation, because “similar restrictions apply to everyone and the constraints introduced are likely over time to fall evenly upon all sectors of society”.¹⁵ Lastly there is always a need of institutional backing to promote the sanctity of the principle of equal liberty through the systematic, coherent, and consistent realization of the principle of participation.

Rawls precisely identifies that the major cause of the failure of constitutional government is the lack of systematic institutionalization of the principle of participation. He believes that the root cause of all defects is the “failure to insure the fair value of political liberty”.¹⁶

It is a historical fact that ironically the disparities in the distribution of material welfare were tolerated by the legal system of the constitutional governments. The reason of this was that the economic inequalities were mistakenly considered as compatible with political equality. The natural corollary of this is that no measures have been taken to develop such institutions (distributive), which are necessary for the sustenance of the formally given political equality.

However Rawls believes that the political injustice is much more disastrous than that of market imperfections. Concentration of political power is much more dangerous than that of capital concentration. It is another question that in today's world capital and power (political) is become synonymous. Rawls acknowledges that "parties and elections are financed not by the public funds but by private contributions, the political forum is so constrained by the wishes of the dominant interest."¹⁷

This simply means that the dominant finance group directly or indirectly affects the political process in general and individual's liberty in particular which is constitutionally guaranteed and institutionally protected. It implies that between the lines Rawls acknowledges market domination as an unintended consequence of the constitutional democracy, which needs to be countered. Rawls believes that since these problems are in fact the problems of political sociology, therefore they are not directly addressed in his theory of justice. In other words theory of justice must not be taken as "a theory of political system."¹⁸

Rawls believes that the existence of a loyal opposition is necessary for just political process, because it helps to derive a conception of the good (according to the will of the people), and at the same time without negating the only legitimate public good i.e. "individual freedom" (freedom of conscious, freedom of thought, assembly, expression and property).

Thus the loyal opposition creates a hermeneutical circle to keep on interpreting or reframing the meaning of public good. There is no single and ultimate policy or methodology to maximize individual liberty, therefore the purpose of opposition is to critically analyze the socio-political policies and constantly identifying the obstacles which obstruct individual's freedom.

The role of representatives in the political institutionalization of the theory of justice is decisive. The representatives are not the vehicles of the blind will of the majority or just the agent of their own constituencies. The legislators, according to Rawls, "represent their constituents in the substantive sense".¹⁹

By substantive representation he means just and effective legislation. The credibility of the representative is judged on the basis of his loyalty with the principles of justice. Moreover, the priority of equal liberty for all, without systematic and coherent institutionalization of the principle of political participation is meaningless. Rawls believes that constitutional democracy is a political procedure which has the capacity to not just ensure equal freedom but also its proper institutionalization.

In such political procedure principle of equal liberty is only realized, when the principle of equal participation is satisfied. The principle of participation is applicable to institutions not the individuals therefore it should not be taken, according to Rawls, as a condition of citizenship to take an active role in political affairs. It means that the state cannot force their citizens to take active part in political affairs, however no state institution can refrain their citizens to take part in political affair. Rawls introduces certain moral and ethical argument regarding the importance of political life and one's participation in that aspect of life, but there is no legal compulsion legitimate in this regard. In more specific sense, the citizens are free to participate in the consolidation of the system, but they are not free to destabilize the system.

We have taken a brief survey of the corresponding institutions of the two principles of justice. Rawls differentiates principles for institution from principles for individuals.

Rawls believes that the principles of institutions are different from principles for individuals. He claims that justice as fairness not only derives fair principles which apply to institution but also identify principles for individuals. According to him, a complete theory of right not only derives principles for institution but “includes principles for individuals as well.”²⁰

Rawls does not discuss the principles for individuals comprehensively but he acknowledges that “principles of this type are an essential part of any theory of justice.”²¹

Three sorts of principles are to be chosen:

- (1). The principles for the basic structure of society .
- (2). The principles for the individuals .
- (3). The principles for the law of nations .

He discusses the first two principles and emphasizes that the lexical order of the choices of these principles must be followed. In order to defend his sequence he insists that in this way identification of moral obligation and duties are much easier and can be short listed after the settlement of the basic structure of society. In this regard, he agrees with Bradley's argument that "a person's obligations and duties presuppose a moral conception of institutions and therefore that the content of just institutions must be defined before the requirements for individual can be set out."²²

Rawls believes that the agreement on the principles for institutions is not enough and there "must be an agreement on principles for notions such as fairness and fidelity, mutual respect and beneficence as these apply to individuals as well as principles for the conduct of the states."²³

The principles which apply to the individuals are considered as "principles of fairness."²⁴ The principles of fairness hold that an individual has to do his part accordingly, if two conditions are met. Firstly, the institution and the practices are just i.e. they satisfy the two principles of justice.

Secondly, one has accepted voluntarily the benefits of the institutional structure. It means that if a citizen takes advantage of the opportunities and benefits from the institutional arrangement then it is his obligation to act voluntarily for the sustenance, protection and stability of the just socio-political arrangement. Thus, the principle of fairness has two parts: "the first (part) states that institutions or parties are in question must be just, the second (part) characterizes the requisite voluntary act."²⁵

Rawls also identifies certain natural duties, for instance "the duty to help another; duty not to harm or injure another; and the duty not to inflict unnecessary suffering."²⁶ The duty of mutual aid is basically positive, i.e., it tells you, what one ought to do. The rest of the two are negative in the sense that, they tell you what one ought not to do. Rawls believes that "negative duties have more weight than positive ones",²⁷ because the violation of negative duties is much more disastrous regarding the realization of fair and just scheme of social cooperation. Rawls identifies some important features of these natural duties, for instance, the natural duties do not hold between institutional relationships rather they hold between individuals. Moreover, the natural duties morally compel each and every citizen of a well-ordered society to consider every other citizen as equally moral, respectable and worthy.²⁸

The natural duty which is most fundamental to complement justice as fairness is the duty of justice. The duty of justice encourages us "to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us."²⁹ It is important to

note that the principles for institutions are prior to the principles for individuals. Therefore any realization (based on subjective or incorrect interpretation) of the principles for individuals which is in conflict with the actualization of the principles for institution would be illegitimate.

Rawlsian conception of “right” is derived from the principles of natural duty and obligation, in order to understand the whole body of right / duties and their institutional implication it necessary to understand these ideas which are organically linked with his concept of justice. The most important natural duty identified by Rawls is “to support and to further just institutions.”³⁰

According to Rawls, in the context of the theory of justice, this natural duty has two dimensions:

- 1) The individuals (citizens) must comply with just institutions and also do their share when they (just institution) exist or function.
- 2) Every citizen should take part in the establishment of just arrangement and also be ready to sacrifice, for the stability of the just institutions at the cost of his (immediate) interests.

These two dimensions basically reflect two different sorts of prescriptions. The first one tells us what the citizen ought to do, i.e. “to uphold justice, mutual aid, and mutual respect.”³¹ The second one prescribes what the citizen ought not to do, not to instrumentalize other, “not to injure not to harm the innocent.”³²

In a well ordered society, individual’s involuntary acts are governed, ordered and structured through principles for institutions. But the voluntarily acts ought to be governed by the principles for individuals. It implies that the individuals may prefer principle of utility rather than principle of fairness as a governing principle for their voluntary acts.

For instance, if a legislator presumes utility principle as a governing principle then, according to Rawls, this incorporation of the principle of utility to guide individual’s decision or conducts eventually leads to contrary directive and does not ensure individual’s commitment with just institutions at the cost of his immediate interests. As a result the spirit of the fair principles is unrealizable.

It is very crucial to understand that Rawls emphasizes the need to harmonize the principles for institutions with principles for individuals. If the principles for individuals (i.e. utility maximization) is not compatible with the principle

for institutions (i.e. two principles of justice) then the actualization of justice as fairness cannot be guaranteed.

The principles which define the duties of individuals must be simple, clear and supportive to just arrangements. Rawls prefers the principle of “agreement” or “consensus” rather than principle of utility to guide individuals and the realization of their natural duties. However the principle of obligation just plays a complementary role in this regard. The natural duties identified by Rawls are presumed to be reasonable but they cannot be legally enforced.

The adoption of the duties is a matter of choice which cannot be institutionally imposed upon individual. However, Rawls claims that actualization of natural duties (independent of any legal or institutional compulsion) enhances individual confidence on his own self, system of values and sense of worth etc. At times our sense of duty compels us to sacrifice our own interest for that of others. This voluntary help to others makes little difference to our self but it is very significant for the other. Rawls claims that the value of help is not determined by the qualification of the “help” rather “by the sense of confidence and trust in other men’s good intention and the knowledge that they are there if we need them.”³³

Rawls provides a pragmatic argument regarding the desirability to act according to the demand of natural duty. If people become indifferent regarding the realization of their natural duties then “it would express indifference if not disdain for human beings that would make a sense of our own worth impossible.”³⁴

Rawls believes that the principles for institutions and priority rules are finite. On the other hand, the moral principles (virtues of institutions) are infinite. Therefore, the violation of moral principle cannot be tackled institutionally. So “the significance of the moral reasons that are not accounted for becomes negligible as the conception of right is more fully worked out.”³⁵

This problem is of a practical nature because in a well-ordered society everything cannot be legalized. There must be a sphere of life which is independent of institutional intervention. Therefore, Rawls believes that “the priority rules are sufficient to resolve conflicts of principles as at least to guide the way to correct assignment of weights.”³⁶ The finite conception of “right” provides a framework which is claimed to be enough to guide one’s moral actions in a given situation.

As far as the problem of obligation is concerned, Rawls believes that all sorts of obligations are dependent on the principles of fairness. The voluntary support of the institutional structure provides the basis of legitimate obligation. Moreover, all sorts of obligations are dependent on the “principle of fairness.” Rawls claims that principle of fairness has two dimensions the first part deals with the question of How? i.e. “How we acquire obligations?”³⁷

The second question deals with the conditionality of the obligations i.e. “the condition (is) that the institution in question is just, if not perfectly just, at least as just as it is reasonable to expect under the circumstances.”³⁸ This implies that obligations must not be superficial or subjective rather they should be institutionally backed as well as there must be some objective conditions of their satisfaction.

Section 2. Principle of liberty and the violation of institutional order :

In the light of the above theoretical discussion, further we will focus on the specific institutional problems which are closely related to the problem of civil duty. Rawls accepts the possibility of unjust laws in a just constitution. However he thinks that injustice of law is not the sufficient basis of legal violation. If the basic structure of the society is just then we have “to recognize unjust laws as binding provided that they do not exceed certain limits of injustice.”³⁹

In the original position it is presumed that the principles of justice “will be strictly complied with and followed by everyone.”⁴⁰ Therefore the tolerance of partial structural injustice is a crucial and questionable issue of the procedural conception of justice. In the political scenario the problem of “civil disobedience” and “conscientious refusal” are the core issues of political theory in general and Rawlsian political liberalism in particular.

According to Rawls, there is a need to discuss the issues of “political duty” and ‘obligations’ before discussing the problems and the legitimacy of civil disobedience and conscientious refusal. In some cases, non-compliance is justified, for instance, in case of the violation of fundamental rights. Similarly unjust laws can also be violated but there are certain conditions of such intolerant expression. He believes that “non-compliance is justified to the extent to which laws and institutions are justified.”⁴¹

According to him, there are two major reasons for non-compliance: firstly, the existing socio-political, legal arrangement and publicly accepted standards of justice are incompatible with each other. Secondly, the socio-political and legal arrangement of a given society reflects the sentiments and interests of the dominant class, which is apparently unjust.

Rawls acknowledges that different conceptions of justice are relatively reasonable to each other but he claims that, “the principle of justice and the related principles of natural duty and obligation define the most reasonable view among those on the list, others principles are not unreasonable.”⁴² The incompatibility between the existing socio-political structure and generally accepted standards of justice eventually lead to civil disobedience.

However if the principles of justice are not specifically violated then it will be illegitimate. In short civil disobedience is legitimate only when the principles of justice (derived in the original position) are structurally violated (by structural violation he simply means the establishment of such institution which:

- i. either in conflict with the institution derive from the principles of justice
- ii. against the spirit of the principles of justice).

The structural violation indicates the contradiction between the theory and practice, though Rawls grants the reasonable deficiencies regarding the complete realization of the theory into practice. The structural violation may be identified as :

- a) the incapacity of the theory to be practically realized,
- b) the methodological error in the institutionalization of the theory and
- c) the corruption of the agency of the just procedure (i.e. individuals), which is the decisive factor.

Rawls discusses the possibility of (a) and (b) while ignores (c) as a factor of injustice.⁴³ Because he is apparently structuralist and does not deal with the role of agency in the establishment of just order.

Rawls acknowledges that the political process governed by the constitution is just but imperfect because no one “guarantees that the laws enacted in accordance with it, will be just.”⁴⁴ He also accepts the practical deficiencies of procedural justice whereas “in practical affairs perfect procedural justice cannot be achieved.”⁴⁵

There are a number of reasons for this imperfection as follows:

(1) The role of voting or election for the continuation of constitutional process
 (2) Majoritarian suppression, i.e. the narrow and self interested pursuit of majority Since disparities (either political or economic) are inevitable even in a well-ordered society, therefore it is only our natural duty to be committed with just institutions which compels us to “comply with unjust laws and policies”⁴⁶ or at least refrains us to pursue any illegal way to oppose unjust outcome (enacted legislation) of just institution until they do not exceed certain limits of injustice.

It is important to note that “justice” in Rawlsian framework simply means the realization of the principles of justice. The problem arises that how the term “realization” is to be interpreted. The realization of the principles of justice is possible at two different levels namely formal level and practical level.

An institution is considered to be just if it formally accepts principles of justice as initial reference to the realization of a just social order. The institutional enforcement of the principles of justice is the practical dimension of the theory of justice. The dilemma is that if an institution fails to practically implement (though it is a question of interpretation of the principles of justice) the just principles, it eventually yields injustice in Rawlsian sense. Since the institutions are embryonically just (formal acceptance of the principles of justice) therefore illegal or violent political expression is not legitimate according to Rawls. It is important to note that

the practical or actual realization of the principles of justice is a problem of interpretation. A highly complex hermeneutical activity is required to consider legislation just or unjust.

In theory, a well-ordered society is a contractual society. In such a society, all socio-economic, political relations are established on the basis of contract among equally free, rational self interested individuals. Rawls believes that apparently it seems to be obnoxious that free, autonomous and self-interested individuals “rationally accept a procedure that may decide against (their) own opinion and give effect to that of others.”⁴⁷

Rawls emphasizes that despite all the limitations, constitutional democracy does have some substantive qualities which appeal to rational individuals to be committed with this political procedure. He offers two reasons in this regard. First, in the constitutional convention, very few procedures have been accepted unanimously. And there is no such procedure which always favors' one group.

Second, the minimal agreement at any procedure (political process governed by constitution) is a more better than no consensus at all. These pragmatic reasons reveal that constitutional democracy is, if not the best then one of the best political procedures. Rawls claims to identify three concrete facts which must be faced by any political process assuming the framework of constitutional democracy.

The three facts are as follows:

- (1) The parties necessarily make concessions to each other for the realization of consociational ventures in the constitution of just political order.
- (2) The clashes regarding the interpretation of fairness are inevitable.
- (3) The choice of best possible constitution necessarily presumes some form of majority (suitably defined and circumscribed) role.⁴⁸

Rawls opines that the basic liberties can never be denied in any form of constitutionalism. He claims that constitutionalism is the only political form which guarantees equal liberty for all. He introduces the idea of "civility". By civility he means a duty to tolerate the weaknesses of the inevitable imperfections in a constitutional system which is embryonically just.

According to him, in a constitutional framework the role of majority is not ignorable. The consent of majority is necessary to ensure just and effective legislation. In a liberal political order, majority is a form of collectivity which is motivated by its general interests. He accepts majoritarian rule with certain conditions that it must insure the, "political freedom, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom to take part in public affairs and influence by constitutional means, the cause of legislation and the guarantee of the fair value of these freedoms."⁴⁹ However he acknowledges that majority rule does not necessarily legislate justly.⁵⁰

Rawls believes that the just political institutionalization must not be purely autocratic or technocratic. According to him, common people must be incorporated (through the process of election) in political decision making. He claims that the legislation is a highly complex hermeneutical activity even “rational legislator would often reach different conclusion, there is a necessity for a vote under ideal condition.”⁵¹

Concluding remarks :

The natural outcome of the first principle of justice in political sphere is “universal suffrage”, i.e., equal political participation in the establishment of a constitutional body which “determines the outcome of the constitutional process and establishes the law with which they are to comply.”⁵² Rawls is interested to ensure individual’s participation in the constitution of legal body and collective decision making even indirectly (i.e. by elected representatives) for the realization of basic fundamental rights. There are two specific arguments for this approach:

a) Since everybody has equal right to pursue his own conception of good and interest in political sphere, therefore the exclusion of any individual or group from the power structure will necessary be exploited by the others.⁵³

b) Everybody has a unique capacity to participate in discussion (as consociational venture). The exclusion of any individual or group of individuals to participate in discussion negatively affects the quality of discussion and of course eventually affects the quality of final decision / agreement.⁵⁴

In Rawlsian framework the ideal political procedure or original agreement is not the manifestation of a compromise rather it is result of a fair bargain between opposing and self-interested parties, who are trying to enhance their own interests.

Therefore, the importance of discussion and equal participation (direct or indirect) is necessary for the constitution of just and fair socio-political order. However, the legislative discussion must not be conceived as a contest between interests rather, “as an attempt to find the best policy as defined by the principles of justice.”⁵⁵

Rawls has precisely mentioned that a just constitution is one which, on the one hand, satisfies the two principles and on the other, produces just laws under the condition of ideal legislation. Another important aspect which is needed to be highlighted is that the society emerges from such state / market relationship is market society.

Market society is essentially a class based society, i.e., class domination of more advantaged class is the unintended consequence of market society.

Rawls's interventionist state stabilizes market society by protecting basic liberties and maximization of the benefits of the least advantaged group.

In short we can say that the Rawlsian difference principle eliminates absolute poverty and legitimizes the enhancement of relative poverty as an unavoidable outcome of well-ordered society. The above analysis reveals that the order of freedom although acknowledges the diversity regarding the determination of "what ought to be?" which creates an illusion that this order is only concerned about the institutionalization of freedom from and the autonomy principle will provide equal opportunity to all the citizens to exercise their particular conceptions of good according to their will but the above analysis reveals that the institutionalized order of freedom is equally concerned with "what ought not to do?".

If we try to analyze the institutionalizing mechanism of the notion of freedom from in a society which is not culturally individualistic than the protection of the area of non-encroachment through active state apparatus will be more concerned with those encroachments which refrain individuals to determine his own conception of non-encroachment is not a static, well-defined objective which is to be realized and formally satisfied by active state intervention once for all rather it is in-itself an infinitive process. Thus what one should not do is actually the real challenge for the state apparatus rather than what one should do, that is for institutionalizing freedom and established the order of freedom.

End Notes :

¹ Rawls J. A Theory of Justice”, New York Oxford University Press, 1971, page 201.

² Ibid page 202.

³ This sort of analysis of the issue of freedom is borrowed from MacLannen’s article “Negative and positive freedom” by Rawls (Dimensions of freedom, New York st. Martin’s Press 1961).

⁴ Rawls John A Theory of Justice, op. cit page 202.

⁵ Ibid page 17.

⁶ However it is not the case, in reality, in liberal framework everybody is forced to be free. The prioritization of individual. Liberty disintegrates religious, racial cultural and even political communities.

⁷ Rawls John A Theory of Justice, op. cite page 19.

⁸ Ibid page 20.

⁹ Ibid page 21.

¹⁰ This capacity of majority eventually opens up the possibility of majoritarian dictatorship see Ibid page 222.

¹¹ See Ibid page 222-223.

¹² Ibid page 223.

¹³ Ibid page 224.

¹⁴ Ibid page 224.

¹⁵ Ibid page 224.

¹⁶ Ibid page 226.

¹⁷ Ibid page 226.

¹⁸ See Ibid page 227. The problem is that in his theory of justice Rawls categorically supports the liberal theory of political system and he obviously thinks that above mentioned problems will be eliminated by the reconciliation of the economic and political spheres (capitalism / liberalism) in the name of individual freedom.

¹⁹ Ibid page 227.

²⁰ Rawls J. A Theory of Justice, op.cite p. 108.

²¹ Ibid p. 108.

²² Bradley F.H. Ethical studies 2nd ed. Oxford Clarendon Press 1927 p. 163–189. Quoted in A Theory of Justice by J. Rawls op. cite p. 71.

²³ Ibid p. 71.

²⁴ Ibid p. 111.

²⁵ Ibid p. 112.

²⁶ Ibid p. 144.

²⁷ Ibid p. 114.

²⁸ See Ibid p. 115.

²⁹ Ibid 115.

³⁰ Ibid 334.

³¹ Ibid page 109.

³² Ibid page 109.

³³ See : Ibid page 339. Between the lines the ulterior motive is actually interests i.e. to sacrifice short term or immediate interest for the protection of long term interests.

³⁴ The Rawlsian conception of self is ontologically “antecedently individual” otherwise the prioritization of individual’s freedom cannot be possible. In the context of such conception of self the question of moral life is irrelevant. The moral questions like what “what should I want?” provides the criterion on the basis of which legitimate desires or wants can be judged.

Since in Rawlsian system “right” has priority over “good” therefore the question of “good” is insignificant in the constitution of just social order. The theoretical corollary of this is that no moral life is possible, because to be moral there is a need of:

a) Knowledge of intrinsic goodness.

b) Agency or criterion to judge our desires, compatible with that of intrinsic goodness.

Since the question of “goodness” was suspended in the original position and it has trivial possible in his system. There is one way to resolve this problem if we consider Rawlsian prioritization of right as “hyper good” and derived all implication from this good for instance. On the basis of that good one can differentiate between legitimate / illegitimate desires. In this way the questions like “what should I want” or “what should I desire” can specifically be answered. So on theoretical ground moral life would be possible. (see Ibid page 339)

³⁵ Ibid page 340.

³⁶ Ibid page 341.

³⁷ Ibid page 343.

³⁸ Ibid page 343.

³⁹ Ibid page 35.1

⁴⁰ Ibid page 351.

⁴¹ Ibid page 352.

⁴² Ibid page 352.

⁴³ It shows two things: (1) it seems that Rawls does not consider the role of agency, due to which it appears that he is a structuralist. (2) He prioritizes legality over morality, which is of course a structuralism approach regarding the solution of theory / practice contradiction.

⁴⁴ Rawls J. A Theory of Justice page 353.

⁴⁵ Ibid page 353.

⁴⁶ Ibid page 354.

⁴⁷ Ibid page 354.

⁴⁸ These points reveals that although principles of justice affirm a-social individualism even then the framework of justice as fairness is such in which “the parties give up any hope of free – rider egoism” (354 T.J.).

⁴⁹ This prioritization of freedom eventually disintegrates any form of collectivity which might be dangerous for constitutional democracy in future. Secondly Social atomization and pluralism are inevitable outcome of such political rule.

⁵⁰ I

(1) By just constitution he simply means “a constitution that would be agreed upon by rational delegates in a constitutional convention who are guided by the two principles of justice”. (357 T.J.).

(2) By just law and policies he simple means, the law and policies that would be enacted by “rational legislator who are constrained by just constitution and who are conscientiously trying to follow the principles of justice as their standard”. (357 T.J.)

⁵¹ Rawlsian John A theory of Justice, op. cite page 357.

⁵² Ibid page 221.

⁵³ I think this might be over simplified implication that in Rawlsian framework everybody is free to pursue his own political interests. It is not the case, in Rawlsian framework everybody is free to pursue his own conception of good (or interest) subject to the constraint that the only public good is will to freedom. Therefore any political interest which in conflict with that of “will to freedom” is not only unrealizable in Rawlsian political framework but also legitimately suppressible.

⁵⁴ This view also foresees Rawlsian condition that the principle of justice must necessarily be presumed in the constitutional as well as legislative stage. Therefore those who disagree with the legitimacy of the principles of justice are necessarily being excluded from the discussion. It implies that, Rawlsian theory of justice is not theory of justice per say it is a liberal theory of justice.

⁵⁵ Rawls J. A Theory of Justice, op. cite page 357.

THE POSSIBILITY OF META-HISTORY

Abstract :

This paper evaluates the post-modernist critique of Enlightenment rationality. It argues that the universal claims of Enlightenment epistemology have been effectively deconstructed. However, a universal rationality is possible and Imam Ibn Khaldun's work on history provides a basis for explications of universal rationality.

Research :

The basic purpose of this paper is an epistemological one. The question which will be discussed in this paper is whether we are epistemologically capable of transcending our historical particularity and cultural specificity. If the answer is yes, then what is the epistemological instrument we have, which makes this transcendence possible. If the answer is no, this means that "truth" and "goodness" both are historically specific and culturally determined and we all are the subjects of historical processes. The second position creates an epistemological dilemma; if truth and goodness are derived from history then what will be the criterion to assess, judge and analyze the direction of this historical process itself. We believe that it is an epistemological necessity to have a meta-historical reference point which must have the potential to provide a criterion of truth and goodness and ideals and virtues etc. which are emerging from the historical unfolding of human civilization as a whole.

This paper has been divided into two sections. In the first section, we will discuss the significance of history in the determination of truth and goodness, particularly in the context of the post-modern critique of modernity and its a-historical claim of universality. In the second section, we will discuss the possibility of the existence of a meta-historical reference point in Imam Ibn-I-Khaldun's system of thought. In the concluding section, we will try to establish that there is an epistemological necessity for articulating a meta-historical reference to judge and assess the conception of the good which has emerged

from Modernity. This means that such a meta-historical reference provides the epistemological content for the assessment of the historical process itself.

History, Truth and the Good: The postmodern antique of modernity The phenomenon of globalization has not only brought different cultures together but it has also revitalized the issue of identity. People become aware about similarities and differences between cultures and individuals. Multi-culturalism is claimed to be a realistic framework to reconcile the differences among cultural particularities. This contemporary discourse of multi-culturalism and diversity of comprehensive doctrines has emerged from the epistemological crisis faced by the modernists due to the “collapse of the enlightenment, project on a world historical scale” (Gray. 1991 .p :176).

Enlightenment thought in general and Modernist thought in particular considers “rationality” as a fundamental criterion for determining the “truth-value”: or objectivity of a moral theory and a political stance. The Modernists believe that the essence of man lies in his “rationality”. Thus rationality was considered to be a fundamental basis of agreement among persons and justified the cross cultural application of rationally derived “truths”. Such truth is claimed to be absolute, certain, universal and most-importantly a historical. The intellectual outcome of this Modernist assumption is that it is believed that the, “theory guarantees that a moral belief that cannot be justified to the mass of mankind is irrational” (Gray. 1991. P:2).

The absolutist or universalist posture of modern thought rested upon the assumption of universally valid reason and the epistemological possibility of its cross-cultural application. This epistemologically grounded stance of universalism undermines the significance of cultural particularity, historical specificity and the role of traditions in the constitution of the good. This the historical bent of Modernism has developed an organic relation between self-perfection and public policy through the instrument of universally valid reason. Modernist reliance on universally valid reason compels this ideology to provide a framework in which, “human beings will shed their traditional allegiances and their local identities and unite in a universal civilization grounded in generic humanity and a rational morality” (Klinger. 2004 .p :122).

The Modernist discovers the essence of humans in their rationality. This anthropocentric essentialism has questioned the epistemological legitimacy of traditional-religions authority. Modernity claims to possess an epistemological criterion which has the potential to emancipate the human subject from traditional and religious frameworks to determine the meaning of life and the telos of existence.

The detachment of the modern subject from traditional religious epistemology and the emergence of secularization are the unintended consequences of this alternative epistemology. Under concepts of “nature” and “culture” the yoke of modern rationalization “the subject is forced to take up the god-like position of a transcendental nodal point in order to ensure the unity and totality of being and experience” (Klinger. 2004. p :122). According to Klinger concepts like “origin” and “traditions” were substituted by because of the former religious and mythological connotation. The idea of origin presumes the act of creation which “refers to a transcendental anchorage mediated to the present through the chain of traditions” (Lorner .1954 .p : 94). This replacement has specific epistemological and ontological underpinnings.

The continental rationalists believe in the unlimited potential of human rational faculty. They try to resolve metaphysical questions through the epistemological instrument of universally valid reason. Kant was the first Enlightenment thinker who acknowledges the limits of human reason. Kant has not only successfully reconciled the epistemological antagonism between rationalism (as postulated by Descartes and Spinoza) and empiricism (of Locke, Berkeley and Hume) he also acknowledges the limits of human reason. He identifies the epistemological incapacity of universally valid reason to understand the noumena (i.e. the realm of reality which is not empirically accessible).

“Kant calls things in themselves as “Noumena”, because they are the entities of the understanding to which no object of experience can ever correspond and contrasts them with phenomena” (Korner. 1956. p: 66). Kant believes that the categories of reason are only applicable to phenomena i.e. to the empirical. The application of pure rational categories to the objects which are not subject to perceptions cannot provide any knowledge. In this epistemological framework “any attempt of metaphysicians to achieve knowledge in this manner is

doomed to failure” (Korner. 1956 .p :66). Since metaphysical objects are noumenal therefore Kant believes that knowledge of “metaphysical of this sort is at most a universal disposition to theoretical hallucinations which must be diagnosed and cured” (Korner. 1956 :p168). But this does not mean that he undermines the capacity of human reason.

Man, according to Kant has been equipped with reason therefore he must not be influenced by instincts; rather “he must produce everything out of himself” (Kant .1993. p: 24). He believes that “Reason in a creature is a faculty of which it is characteristic to extend the laws and purposes involved in the use of all its powers far beyond the sphere of natural instincts” (Kant .1933 .p: 24).

Despite the fact that Kant acknowledge the limits of Rationality, and does not abandon the possibility of universally valid reason and its legitimate applicability in the domain of phenomena, which provides the epistemological ground for universalist claims, particularly, his idea of the categorical imperative provides an absolute, certain and universal basis for moral imperatives. He has a universalistic conception of history which rests upon the epistemological ground of reason.

He believes that, “the history of (the) human race, viewed as a whole may be regarded as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about political constitution internally and for this purpose, also externally perfect, as the only state in which all the capacities implanted by her in mankind can be fully developed” (Kant 1933. p: 39). The process of history is judged by its compatibility to the rational laws. Kant believes that it will be mistaken to assume that “nature even in the play of human freedom does not proceed without plan and design” (Kant .1933 .p:12).

We may imply that it is a philosophical attempt to workout the universal history of the human race which is compatible with the plan of nature. Kant thinks “the universal history of the world according to the plan of nature in its aiming at a perfect civil union must be regarded as possible and as even capable of helping forward the purpose of nature” (Kant .1933 .p :32). However, he acknowledges that , “the idea of universal history is no doubt to a certain extent of an a-prior character” (i.e. Rational) (Kant. 1933 .p: 32). (emphasis added).

The major thrust of the philosophy of history within the Enlightenment tradition is rationalistic. Enlightenment thinkers were influenced by the discoveries in the realm of physical sciences. It is because of this that they generally believe that in order to resolve social problems we have to use scientific methodology.

For instance the Hegelian approach towards the understanding of history rested upon the assumption that, “the underlying structure of the world could be understood by grasping the content of certain fundamental concepts or categories, these being related to one another in such a manner as to form a self-determining series or progression” (Gardner. 1933. p :59).

There is no doubt that Hegel tries to establish a metaphysical framework for the understanding of history as a whole, despite the fact that Kant abandons the possibility of the epistemological grounding of metaphysics. Hegel claims to have discovered the law of history through the process of dialectical reasoning. It is important to note that since the phenomenal world is epistemologically accessible within the Kantian framework human history is the concretization or the expression of the absolute in the Hegelian context. Hence by postulating the imminence of the absolute or spirit.

Hegel reduces the contradiction between transcendence and imminence and everything become phenomenal. This means that the phenomenal world is the expression of ideal relationships, and these are interpretable through the framework of logic. Therefore, Hegel believes that, “nature and spirit, nature and mind must be treated as confirming to similarly dialectical laws” (Gardner .1933. p :59).

Despite this, Hegelian dialectical law is the product of a specific historical age, but interestingly he considers himself as the last philosopher because he thinks that some how he has discovered the internal law of human history as a whole and the epistemological instrument which makes this wonder possible is “logic”. In this sense, this law is itself a historical. Hegel considers his method as “a science of pure thought” (Catlin. 1939 .p :490).

This reflects the modern spirit of his thought. His idea of history because of its meta-historical temperament provides the theoretical ground of not only the understanding of history but of understanding all domains of human intellectual endeavors. For instance this methodology is claimed to be workable “to develop an unprecedented political philosophy ... like geometry in its coherence in which human philosophical thought would reach systematic expression” (Catlin. 1939 .p: 490).

Marx has eliminated the idealistic content of the Hegelian dialectical method. The Marxist idea of history rests upon the assumption that dialectical methodology is essentially scientific. It is because of this positivistic approach, that secularization and material progress are theoretical corollaries of scientific socialism as expounded by Marx. It is an acknowledged fact that through the framework of historical materialism. Marx in effect redrew the map of history. Marx was influenced by Holback’s idea of generalities which enabled him to conceptualize historical materialism as “a doctrine applicable like a science, to all phases of social and political life” (Catlin. 1939. p :460).

The Marxist scientific explanation of the historical process presumes a “law” (which despite the fact that it has been discovered by an individual, i.e. Marx, who himself was the product of his own historical material conditions) is actually a-historical and provides, such an objective framework for historical understanding that it will be “difficult for historians even to look at their subject in quite the same fashion as they had done before” (Gardner. 1933. p :14). Since historical process is governed by a-historical law which is itself meta-historical, thus in this context the historical person is for Marx only the exponent of historical forces (i.e. material forces). This implies that the agent of history that is individual “does not make history, he executes it”.

This is also true for Hegel. This a-historical and universalistic potential of Marxist historical materialism is a manifestation of Modernist epistemology. And his epistemological reliance on scientific methodology unveils its organic relation with the epistemological legacy of Modernity. It is reasonable to claim that both extremely powerful ideas of history expanded by Hegel and Marx (irrespective of how scientific, logical and rational they were) are actually teleological. The telos for Hegel is rational progress, and for Marx it is material progress. This reveals a theoretical nexus between a-historical frameworks and

“telos”, on the basis of this we may hold that any a-historical framework must necessarily be teleological.

This theoretical amalgamation of a-historicity and teleology revitalizes the traditional philosophical problem regarding the priority of ontology over epistemology. The real issue is whether the “telos” determines the a-historical principle which explains the historical movement itself. Or the a-historical principle itself determines the telos of historical movement. This problem must to be resolved for an epistemologically viable historical analysis. And one can imagine the gravity of the epistemological situation because both “telos” and the “a-historical principle” are derived by the individual who is ontologically situated in a particular historical context, a subject of the historical process himself.

The purpose of Enlightenment thought was the realization of freedom and the instrument which made that universal freedom realizable was presumed to be reason. This quest for freedom has questioned the epistemological priority of traditional forms of authorities (i.e. God, Church, revelation, tradition etc) “Kant ... describes the Enlightenment as the movement when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjugating itself to any authority” (Foucault 1976 p 18). The epistemological reliance of Enlightenment thinkers in general over transcendental conception of reason rests upon the assumption that the essence of the human lies in its rationality. This fundamentalist approach has not only rationalized the whole socio-cultural fabric of the Western world but has also established the institutional framework for the realization of freedom and progress (the transformation of the world into heaven through the application of universally valid reason). Their faith in human rationality enables the Modernists to replace God by rational man, “all that Christian theology says is absolutely true, provided it is applied not to a transcendental and imaginary God, but to Man himself (Descomber. 1988. p: 29).

The twentieth century experience has shattered the epistemological authority of reason and has also questioned the universalizable capacity of reason. Post modern thought, “rejects the transcendental conception of reason, and puts forth conceptions of reason, which are ungrounded and lack ultimate justification” (Lyotard .1985. p :XXIV).

The post-modernists do not abandon the possibility of being rational. They consider reason to be “a thing of this world” and reject its transcendental capacity. This post-modernist conception of reason not only undermines the Enlightenment project and its institutions but most importantly also the epistemological basis of modern thought. The philosophical rejection of the possibility of transcendental reason, transforms the epistemological discourse of Modernity and the justification of the institutions. Megill acknowledges that, “yet for all its importance in defining our problems and justifying our institutions, my guess is that, the primacy of the Enlightenment, its importance in setting the terms of our discourse will not continue much longer” (Megill 1984. p: 340).

Post modernists, claim that the modernist conception of the epistemological priority of universally valid reason undermines the possibility of human freedom. They believe that freedom is not achieved through transcendental rationality because the rational identifies the realm of necessity. They argue that modernity is the continuation of the traditional form of authoritarianism. It replaces revelational authority by the authority of transcendental reason. This ontologically grounded epistemological priority of transcendental reason according to the Post-modernists is the legacy of the Christian ideas of authority. This conception of reason provides the epistemological framework of transcendental subjectivity, universality, necessity and essentialism.

The Post-modernists reject the modernist thirst for grounding, foundation and essence by the abandonment of transcendental reason which provides a-historical criterion for all kinds of evaluations. The Post-modernist conception of reason is ungrounded, and lacks ultimate justification. Reason is seen as culturally specific and historically determined and it reveals the ontological ungroundedness of human being. Reason acknowledges the epistemological incapacity of the human to discover an abstract realm of absolute, certain and universal knowledge. The rejection of transcendental reason opens up a new realm of epistemological discourse, Bernstein acknowledges that, “a new conversation is now emerging among philosophers – a conversation about human rationality and as a result of this dialogue we are beginning to gain a new understanding of rationality that has important ramifications for both

theoretical and practical life” (Beusteen .2001. p: 74). Gadamer believes that the modernist quest for a neutral epistemological paradigm is unrealizable.

For a meaningful epistemological pursuit, “what is necessary is a fundamental rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and a recognition of the fact that there are legitimate prejudices if we, want to do justice to man’s finite, historical mode of being (Gadamer .1985. p: 261). Gadamer thinks that the Enlightenment thinkers have their own prejudices but the problem is that they consider that the use of their own reason (i.e. transcendental reason) enables them to transcend the traditional bonds of authorities and prejudices.

He claims that, “the distinction that Enlightenment draws between faith in authority and the use of one’s own reason is, in itself legitimate. If the prestige of authority takes the place of one’s own judgment, then the authority is in fact a source of prejudice. But this does not include the possibility that it can also be a source of truth and this is what Enlightenment failed to see when it denigrated all authority” (Gadamer 1985. p : 263).

MacIntyre believes that the human telos is “vital to morality, understood as a rationally justifiable or objective enterprise, because it alone can license immediate transitions from “is” to “ought” (Mulhall .1991. p:731). This means that without identifying a “telos”, existing character traits cannot be identified as good / bad. In a nutshell without “telos” there can be no ground for morality. MacIntyre presumes an Aristotelian framework for the objective moral evaluation of human conduct. In such a framework telos is considered as a theoretical instrument which provides the basis for judging existing character and is grounded in the culture and history of a civilization.

MacIntyre believes that internal substantive values are evolved by consociational human endeavors. These internal goods cannot be realized or achieved without engaging in practice. By practice he means “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence and human conception of the ends and goods involved, are

systematically extended” (MacIntyre .1981. p :175). This means that virtue by definition is communally determined. It can objectively be acquired by participation in practices and acquirement of internal goods which are specific to these practices.

But participation in a practice requires that I subjugate my preferences / attitudes to the communal standards and authorities that currently defines a practice. These standards of the practices define the limits of criticism. The practice can only be criticized on the basis of the criterion that the practice itself recognizes. Moreover practices can only be criticized by the participants. Thus the judgment about the practices cannot be regarded as purely subjective or arbitrary, in other words moral judgments are not of emotive nature.

Participation is intrinsically a shared project based on communally and historically determined standards. It creates a valuable form of life which has objective grounds to differentiate between meaningful and meaningless forms of life. There can be many practices with different internal goods and evaluations within them. These practices can be based on norms / procedures inherent in them. But there is no basis for objectively evaluating one practice against another. Thus objective moral evaluation is possible and it can only be possible within a culturally specific paradigm.

Therefore MacIntyre rejects any claim on the basis of universally valid reason. MacIntyre believes that “participation in such shared projects, acceptance of such communally and historically determined standards initiate the individual into forms of life in which human judgments of worth are immune to the threat of emotivism (Mulhall 1891 p 137). This means that the meaning of any event can be grasped by relating it to the history of the performer’s life and contextuality of the act which is being performed. In a nutshell “being / life is lived historically”. Life is lived both in response to (unpredictable / arbitrary) developments and teleological struggle to achieve some purposed.

It implies that the particular history of the individual determines the purpose of his life. For instance when I am confronted with the question, shall I be a chess player or a father? I can only prefer one practice over another on the basis of what is more consistent with the history of my life (in a particular cultural context). Since in the Modernist specially Kantian framework the

person is standing outside history therefore on the one hand there can be no such thing as moral personal development and on the other hand he is incapable (ontologically) of pursuing an objectively determined purpose.

The incompatibility between the priority of right (over the good) and the possibility of moral growth is explored by liberal communitarians. Communitarians in general and Taylor and MacIntyre in particular believe that conceptions of the good have been derived by the evaluation of moral intuitions namely “strong evaluations”. By strong evaluation Taylor means “discriminations of right and wrong in terms of standards that are independent of our desires and preferences and that allow us to evaluate their worth (Mulhall .1991. p: 131).

The strong evaluation is in one sense rational and on the other hand aesthetical, rational in the sense that the evaluation of the moral intuitions takes place within a social matrix of a particular linguistic community with a specific concept of the “rational”. It is possible to rationally order and determine the worth of different competing conceptions of the good on the basis of its coherence with the meta-ethical narrative. These supra-rational, meta-ethical narratives provide the substance of rational ordering in a specific community;

they have emerged from the history of a particular community. Therefore there is no possibility of rational ordering of the conceptions of good among two different communities. In this context that objectively rational ordering of the conceptions of the good is possible within an intra-communal paradigm and aesthetical in the context of the extra-communal sphere. In a nutshell the preferences of one language community cannot be rationally evaluated by that of an other community. This incommensurability is due to the experiential differences of the historical experience of one community to that of an other. Thus moral growth is possible within a particular civilization. It is possible only to differentiate between people on the basis of the reflection in their moral life of the “ontological truths” which are considered to be valid in that civilization alone.

Taylor pointed out that every individual has many conceptions of the good in his life, and sometimes these conceptions are in conflict with each other. So there is a need of a traditional reordering of these conceptions of the good. This

hierarchical categorization of different conceptions is possible on the basis of a good which is relatively superior to others. Qualitatively higher-order goods are called “hyper-goods”. This reordering of goods is not a subjective phenomena, it has an objective basis, which is ontologically backed and historically grounded.

The communitarian rejection of moral subjectivism in general and the notion of the unencumbered self in particular is based on their presumption that without having an ontologically grounded conception of the good it is not possible to derive abstract principles of justice. Taylor believes that the individual’s self identity, his conceptions of the good and his historical specificity are all ontologically linked with each other. He claims that the hyper goods “usually arise through a historical suppression of earlier (conceptions of the good. Mulhall .1991. p: 119). This means that the hyper-goods endorse the justification of hierarchy among different conceptions of the good. This reordering of the good is not the manifestation of emotivist or subjective inference of personal preferences / desires.

This trans valuation is based on practical reason. Taylor believes that “practice; reasoning ... is a reasoning in transition. It aims to establish, not that some position is correct absolutely but rather that some position is superior to some other (Taylor. 1990. p: 92). The contestability of interpretations on the basis of meta-ethical narratives makes it possible to realize a way of life in which “we have lived a transition which we understand as error-reducing and hence as epistemic gain (Taylor. 1990 .p: 71). This makes objective trans valuation possible by practical reasoning.

Thus we find a reconciliation of relativism and objectivism in a moral context, relativistic in the sense that there is a legitimate transformation among different conceptions of the good and objective in the sense that the contestability among different conceptions of the good is based on practical reasoning specific to a history / culture. This conciliation essentially negates moral subjectivism and universalism.

The rejection of universalism culminates in the transition to practical reasoning. The natural corollary of this transition is that the derivation of a-historical abstract principles of justice is not possible. This rejection is the rejection of the Archimedean position and Rawlsian original position, the paradigm which makes the operation of external reason possible.

It implies that the contestability of interpretations among different conceptions of the good is only meaningful within a historically specific linguistic community. This means that trans valuation of hyper-goods is possible due to the participation of within a linguistic matrix of a community which is prior to the individual. The conception of hyper-good negates the neutrality of the good because” (it) presents us with a good which challenges and displaces others” (Taylor. 1950. p :721). This is one of the reasons that hyper-goods are considered as a source of conflict “they presuppose an ultimate intolerance of the other goods to which they assign lower rank” (Mulhall .1991. p: 115).

This intolerance has an epistemological basis which justifies “moral growth”. “A hyper-good involves our changing, a change which is qualified as ‘growth’, or ‘satisfaction’ or ‘higher consciousness’ and even involves one repudiating earlier goods” (Taylor. 1990. p :70). Thus we find a rejection of emotivism and justification, of objective relativism because the repudiation of one good in favor of the other has historically specific and ontologically grounded objective justification. Since the hyper-goods “have usually arisen through a historical suppression of earlier, less adequate views; they present themselves as steps to a higher moral consciousness (Mulhall. 1991 .p :115). Thus the conception of the hyper-good legitimizes “moral growth”.

From the above discussion we can imply that the epistemological priority of universally valid reason is not only questioned by Post modernists but this idea has also been replaced by culture specific and historically determined reason in post modernist discussion. If this is true, then in contemporary discourses it is very difficult if not impossible to find on epistemological source which can provide a meta-historical criterion to judge the movement of the historical process itself.

II Meta History and Imam¹ Ibn-e-Khaldun

Khaldunian socio-political analysis is relevant to addressing the epistemological problem with which we are dealing . It can provide an epistemological basis for generating a-historical principles for the assessment of historical processes. Despite the fact that Khaldunian socio-political theory is based on cultural specific and ethno-centric reality i.e. “Asabiya”² there is in it an embodied truth which is not the product of history but is essentially a-historical. Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun claims this is an epistemologically validated a-historical criterion which provides a normative standard for the evaluation of the historical process and the institutions which emerge from this process.

Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun³ believes that the state has a life of its own. He considers the state to be an organism which functions according to the law of causality. The Imam argues that the development of the state is a natural phenomenon governed by the principle of causality and necessity for the socio-cultural and political survival of a civilization. The analysis of state structure, constitution, evolution and deterioration is essential for understanding human civilization as a whole Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s approach is views history as an organic whole. It is because of this that the Imam’s thought is epistemologically relevant in the analysis of all aspects of social life and behavior. The Imam tries to eliminate the apparent antagonism among economic, social, political and theological domains, collapsing them within a single unifying metaphysical framework.

We cannot detach Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s presumed “sociology”⁴ from his philosophy of history. In Muqaddima ⁵he tries to elucidate the history of cultures (Basharat .1967. p ;39). Orientalists⁶ regard Ibn-e-Khaldun to be an

¹ In religious sense most of the Islamic scholars called him :ibn Khuldun or Alama Ibn Khuldun not by the title of Imam ,it’s a strange thing to be noted that he didn’t call the reputed Islamic scholars by the title of Imam like Imam ibn taymia ,imam Mawardi and Imam jamahaah (Maj)

² عصبية

³ ابن خلدون

⁴ العمرانيات

⁵ مقدمه

⁶ مستشرقين

original thinker, a genuine “sociologist” and a critical-historian who considers history to be an indispensable tool for the understanding and analysis of socio-cultural transformation and for understanding how axiological conflicts emerge within social systems. But they glass over and ignore the fact that Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s methodology does not transcend the epistemological foundations of the basic Islamic sources of knowledge (i.e. Quran and Sunnah).

Human civilization is the object of inquiry for Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s historic investigations. Theory and “sociology” are basically intellectual corollaries of his new science of history. His methodology is fundamentally empiricist, but his empirical analysis is not detached from his religious particularity and his commitment to Islamic epistemology. It is obvious that his work “is deeply rooted in the traditional beliefs and convictions of Islam” (Rosenthal. 1988. p :84).

His epistemological reliance on Quran and Sunnah enables him to reconcile empiricism and tradition. The “naturalist scientific and empiricist” dimensions of the Imam’s thought have unfortunately been over emphasized by Western professionals as a result of which have sought to discover a non existent secular aspect of the Imam’s socio-political theory and cultural anthropology.

On the other hand the essential role of the Quran and the Sunnah which provides the epistemological criterion for an objective analysis of socio-political structures has been totally ignored. The conception Asabiya (its constitution, its role in the establishment and disintegration of a dynasty), the Imam’s political theory, his conceptions of history etc.) are sought to be understood by abstracting them from the epistemological framework of the Quran and the Sunnah. Rosenthal acknowledges that “Ibn-e-Khaldun’s empiricism manifest in his “new science” is matched by his traditionalism. His traditionalism is epistemologically grounded in Fiqh and tafsir⁷ (Rosenthal. 1988. p :84).

According to the Imam the state is the natural culmination of the power struggle between different collectivities. He argues that the state is necessary for the socio-political survival of any civilization and the constitution of

⁷ فقه و تفسیر

“Asabiya” is inevitable for the emergence of the state, i.e. it provides an essential foundation of the state. Religion provides a criterion to judge every socio-political transformation and also the direction of that transformation. The Imam acknowledges that although the weakening of religious commitment enhanced the strength and domination of the Khilafa but this deviation, “inevitably lead to its transformation into absolute monarchy in the form of the mulk (Rosenthal .1988 .p: 96).

He thinks that the strength of Asabiya and that of religion complement each other, Asabiya provides an initial and very strong basis for the bending of like minded people which presumes ties of kinship and blood. The unification of like minded people for socio-political domination will be actualized in the form of the state. But the dynasty which emerges requires political association “ijtima”⁸ and can not survive without it (on the basis of his genealogical analysis the Imam claims that, it falls within three generations).

“The term of life of a dynasty does not normally exceed three generations (of 40 years each). For in the first generation are still preserved the characteristic features of rough, uncivilized rural life (badawa), such as hard conditions of life, ferocity and partnership on authority (majd.⁹). Therefore the strength of the ‘Asabiya is maintained ... and men submit to their domination. In the second generation their condition has changed, under the influence of the rule (mulk¹⁰) ... from rural to city-life, from a hard struggle to ease and abundance, from partnership in authority to autocracy Wherefore the strength of the ‘Asabiya is partly broken ... The third generation has forgotten the time of badawa ... as if it had never existed – unlike the second generation which lives on the memory of the first – and loses the sweetness of force and ‘Asabiya because they are in possession of power. Ease reaches its peak under them because they become used to a pleasant and abundant life ... the ‘Asabiya collapses completely, and they forget about defence, attack and pursuit (of the enemy)” (Rosenthal .1988 .p :88).

⁸ اجتماع

⁹ مجد

¹⁰ ملكى

There are different factors which the Imam thinks explain the disintegration of political order. Two of the most important are :

1. the antagonistic relation between rural and urban life style.
2. the internal rivalry and discord leading to the disintegration of Asabiya.

It is important to note that both causes are the unintended consequences of the culmination within the State, of the internal contradiction between the “badawa”¹¹ (a life of simplicity, and courage) and “hadara”¹² (a life of ease, luxury and pleasure). This conflict undermines the strength of the state and its capacity to sustain order within the dynasty and to defend or protect it against external threats. On the other hand internal rivalries weaken natural ties and undermine Asabiya’s capacity for state self-preservation and domination.

The Imam believes that “religion by prophecy or by a call (da’wa¹³) to its truth, is the (only) source from which great empires spring (Rosenthal. 1988. p :96). State or political order without “telos” (which can transcend the naturally constituted desires or objectives of “hadara” loses its capacity to sustain and survive. The internal cohesion of Asabiya is also not necessarily invincible, and the Imam thus stresses the necessary limits of ethno-centric collectivity.

Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s political theory is influenced by his historical analysis of the socio-political history of Berber¹⁴ tribes (Almorvides and Almohad¹⁵). Their transformation from rural to urban life and the stages of socio-political “development sketched by him in the Muqaddima and Kitab-al-Libas¹⁶, which no doubt is a purely empirical naturalistic approach for the understanding of socio-political order. Khaldun himself was the product of his own period.

But his epistemological commitment is reflected in his reconciliation of empiricist naturalism with Islamic traditionalism, “Khaldun acknowledges

¹¹ بدو (ا)

¹² حضر (ا)

¹³ دعوى

¹⁴ البربر

¹⁵ المرابطين و الموحدين

¹⁶ كتاب لباس

again and again that the dominion is as necessary as the will to power and domination as natural Power cannot be gained and without the call of religion” (Rosenthal 1988 .p :96). But if the emergence of state domination is natural, its decline is also natural because of the disintegration of Asabiya due to rivalry, discord and antagonism between urban and rural life. The Imam acknowledges that it is religion alone which “unites the hearts, replaces the desire for the vanity of the world and turns men to God seeking right and truth in union” (Rosenthal .1988 .p :96).

Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun argues that socio-political order can be established through taghallub¹⁷ (subjugation) and Qahr¹⁸ (force) but such domination is only temporal and leads to disaster. He thinks that the spiritual factor if not the only cause is certainly one of the most important causes of state survival and strength.

He believes that religion provides the telos which transcends culturally specific and historically determined political ideals of Asabiya. Religion not only reconciles the natural dichotomy between rural and urban life but it also reinforces the natural strength of Asabiya because the “call to religion increases the force of the Asabiya” (Rosenthal .1988. p :97).

The Imam argues that ethnic particularity is not directly in conflict with Islam. It is complementary to it. He claims that, the religious call (dawa) is not complete (and effective) without Asabiya and there is no contradiction involved in ethnic particularity and religious universality, “he quotes in his support the Hadith, “Allah did not send a prophet without the protection of his tribe” (Rosenthal. 1988. p :97).

The role of religion is teleological. Religion plays a role in the determination of the meaning of ethnic collectivity and the spiritual justification of this particularity. The Asabiya is not only the natural agent of political domination, but its equation with religious conviction, “determines the nature and purpose of the Khalafa¹⁹ which Ibn Khaldun so, deeply recognized” (Rosenthal .1988

¹⁷ تغلب

¹⁸ قهر

¹⁹ خلفا

.p: 97). The religious dimension not only provides the teleological basis of a collectivity but it also provides the spiritual basis of political hegemony because in the institution of the Khilafat,²⁰ “the spiritual and temporal powers are united in the Imam” (Rosenthal .1988 .p: 97).

It is important to note that the complementary role of Asabiya in Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s framework reveals that “Khuruj”²¹ is possible only with the support of Asabiya, “only a strong attack, backed by the Asabiya of tribes and clans, can remove rulers and destroy the edifice of these states which are firmly established” (Rosenthal .1988. p: 96). If such Asabiya does not exist Khuruj is not regarded as obligatory on Muslims by Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun.

The strength of Asabiya not only helps to establish political domination but can also be used as a catalyst in the realization of religiously determined telos even against the will of the mulk. Being a realistic thinker the Imam acknowledges “that a “mulk” (i.e. Kings) is capable of looking after the welfare of man in this world, (but) even this is achieved more perfectly with the aid of (the) law of the Sharia²² since the prophetic lawgiver knows best what is to man’s advantage both in mundane and religious matters” (Rosenthal. 1988. p: 76).

The Imam acknowledges that tribal and ethnic particularity provides a natural basis for establishing political order but stresses that it is the revelation and Sunnah which provides the epistemological basis for domination. In this sense Sharia provides a mechanism which not only justifies the teleological dimension of political domination but also represents a basis for evaluating the conceptions of the good which emerge from the tribal ethnic particularities of Asabiya. The source of Sharia is Quran and Sunnah which is essentially a-historical and transcends cultural and ethnic particularities.

It provides an epistemological ground to circumscribe Asabiya. For instance “know that the whole world... is for the Law-giver but a way to the hereafter,

²⁰ خلافتہ

²¹ الخروج

²² شریعہ

for he who has no animal to ride on does not reach his goal. His {the law-giver's} intention is not to forbid or blame man's deeds ... or to destroy the forces altogether which produce them, but rather to change their direction towards the aims of truth as far as possible, so that all intensions become right and the direction of man's desires and plans a single one namely, to Allah and the hereafter" (Rosenthal .1988. p ; 99).

This means that the epistemological significance of the Sharia has not only been recognized by Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun, he also acknowledges that Sharia and its epistemological power provides a criterion to judge the direction of the socio-political process and its natural growth and consequences. According to Rosenthal, "there can be no doubt that Ibn Khaldun gives religion (that is, in practice, the Sharia of Islam) if not the first at least a very important place in the existing state" (Rosenthal .1988. p: 99).

On the basis of the above analysis we may argue that in the Imam's methodological framework, the epistemological priority of the Quran and the Sunnah set the ideal standard not only for the political process and the legitimacy of state structure but for the historical process as a whole. However due to the realist and empirical orientation of his analysis "his inquiry into Islamic history and his experience of the temporary Muslim states in the Maghrib²³ taught him that there is always a gap between the ideal demands of Sharia and political reality" (Rosenthal. 1988. p :99).

But although the Imam acknowledges that the socio-political realities in the context of changing historical conditions do not confirm to the Sharia determined ideals and norms the epistemological priority of "Sharia, its theoretical validity and overruling authority have never been (epistemologically) questioned" (Rosenthal. 1988 .p :99).

The Quran and Sunnah²⁴ provide a universal rationality despite the fact that they have been revealed and practiced in a particular history. The Sharia is thus essentially a-historical. It provides a meta-historical criterion to judge, assess and normatively evaluate existing socio-political institutions which are the

²³ الغرب (مغرب)

²⁴ القرآن و السنة

product of specific historical processes. Rosenthal acknowledges that the epistemological priority of the Quran and the Sunnah in classical Muslim “jurists, like Al-Mawardi, Ibn Jama’a and Ibn-Taymiya,²⁵ strove to maintain the purity of the law and showed what government ought to be in accordance with its provisions” (Rosenthal. 1988. p :100). Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s work validates and develops this classical tradition.

Imam Ibn-e-Khaldun’s distinction between Siyasa diniya (government based on God’s revealed law), and Siyasa aqliya²⁶ (government based on political laws made by rational man) is also important in understanding the epistemological priority of the Quran and the Sunnah over human rationality in his system. Rosenthal acknowledges that, “Ibn Khaldun leaves no doubt that the law of the prophetic lawgiver is best and is superior to that of the human lawgiver, who is guided only by his reason” (Rosenthal .1988. p :100).

The epistemological priority of Siyasa diniya²⁷ is that “this world alone is not man’s goal, for it is altogether useless and vain, since its end is death and destruction. God says; “Do you think that we created you for sport?” (Sura XXIII, 117). What is intended of man is his religion, which lets him attain happiness in the hereafter as the way of God.... “The laws came which placed an obligation upon him in all his affairs, like service of God, trade and commerce, including rule (mulk) which is natural for human association, so that they (the laws) lead the rule towards the ways of God and everything is within the reach and range of the Sharia” (Rosenthal. 1988. p ;101).

²⁵ الامام الماوردي، الامام الجماعة و امام ابن التيمية الحراني.

²⁶ سياسته العقلية

²⁷ سياسته الدينية

III CONCLUSION

Post modernism denies the possibility of meta-history because of the inherent incapacity Enlightenment discourse about rationality to provide absolute, objective, universal and a-historical criterion. In the Post modern discourse there are no epistemological grounds for the evaluation of history.

We are thus left with a stark choice. We can either accept the anti-foundationalist, non-essentialist post-modern ungroundedness of human being, who's rational capacity is historically specific and culturally determined. The epistemological corollary of this conception of reason (which lacks ultimate objectivity is to accept the world as it is. Post modernism cannot provide a basis for confronting oppression and injustice for Post modernism offers no arguments, no critical resources or validating grounds for perceiving anything as inherently unjust and oppressive.

On the other hand we can revert to the anti modern epistemological domain of revelational authority. Khaldunian analysis reveals that cultural specific historically determined socio-political realities and institutions, their worth, strength and functionality, can objectively be assessed on the basis of the epistemology underlying the Sharia.

This epistemology is a-historical and has the potential to act as a meta-historical criterion till the end of time. It is generally transcendental. Wittgenstein acknowledges that, “ the sense of the world must lie out side the world. In the world, everything is as it is and happens as it does happen, in it there is no value and if there were it would be of no value. If there is a value which is of value, it must lie out side all happening and being so. For all happening and being so is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise it would be accidental. It must lie outside the world (Wittgenstein. 1961 .p: 41).

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Right without Choice :and the Future of Bioethics Discourse in Post-Colonial Society.

Abstract :

The future bioethics paradigm of post-colonial underdeveloped societies like Pakistan oscillates between right-based-health-care and aetiological medicalization of life-world. The contemporary discourse of bioethics presumes a delicate distinction between right-based health-care and institutionally determined medicalization of life-world.

The former considers the health care as a fundamental right of an individual, whereas the later emerges from the institutionalization of scientific methodological studies i.e. a never ending process of excavating the causes of diseases and reasons of their spread, which is the result of the compartmentalization of knowledge to actualize modern dream of transcendental standard of ideal human life.

In this paper both paradigms of bioethics will be evaluated critically with reference to healthcare. It will be argued that both these bioethics paradigms provide a passive resistance to the moral foundations of traditional societies. They also have a potential to disintegrate communal particularities of such communities. The paper will be divided into two sections. In the first section it will be argued that right-based health care paradigm presumes an antagonistic relation with local moral foundations which are rested upon the priority of Good over right.

In the second section we will argue that medicalization of life-world either determined by state apparatus or by market driven mechanism will eventually facilitate the process of modern discursive practices. In the conclusion we will try to establish that both paradigms are complementary to each other and the institutionalization of right-based-health care is directly proportional to the positivistic scienticization of traditional life-world.

Section 1:

Post-colonial bio-ethical discourse and the trajectory of irony.

The Contemporary bio-ethical issues prevailing in post colonial societies like Pakistan cannot be understood without contextualizing these issues in the gradual process of progress and development. This technologically driven transformation of the life world from pre-scientific traditional life to modern scientific ways of living is being under way, institutionalized and idealized.

The process of modernization is not only defining the traditional, pre-industrial culture as irrational and claimed to rested upon arbitrary backward authoritative mechanisms but most importantly it also questions the legitimacy of the values and their corresponding belief structures i.e. religious-cum traditional value system as an obstacle in the realization of scientific enlightenment. The gradual revaluation and cultural transformation is presumed to be the unconditional imperative of the age “the only remaining alternative is that of intelligent, voluntary acceptance of the industrial ways of life and values that go with it”.¹

The data has been referred in the paper is taken from the sources of planning and development division, government of Pakistan.²

Country	Life Expectancy 2011	Mortality Rate under 5 per 1000 2010	Infant Mortality Rate per 1000 2011	Population Growth Rate (%) 2011
Pakistan	65.99	86.5	63.26	2.03
India	66.80	62.7	47.57	1.34
China	74.68	18.4	16.06	0.49
Indonesia	71.33	35.3	27.95	1.07
Bangladesh	69.75	47.8	50.73	1.57
Sri Lanka	75.73	16.5	9.70	0.93
Malaysia	73.79	6.3	15.02	1.58
Nepal	66.16	49.5	44.54	1.60
Thailand	73.60	13.0	16.39	0.57
Philippines	71.66	29.4	19.34	1.90

Source: World Development Report 2011


Fiscal Years	Public Sector Expenditure (Federal and Provincial)			Percentage Change	Health Expenditure as % of GDP
	Total Health Expenditures	Development Expenditure	Current Expenditure		
2000-01	24.28	5.94	18.34	9.9	0.72
2001-02	25.41	6.69	18.72	4.7	0.59
2002-03	28.81	6.61	22.21	13.4	0.58
2003-04	32.81	8.50	24.31	13.8	0.57
2004-05	38.00	11.00	27.00	15.8	0.57
2005-06	40.00	16.00	24.00	5.3	0.51
2006-07	50.00	20.00	30.00	25.0	0.57
2007-08	60.00	27.22	32.67	20.0	0.57
2008-09	74.00	33.00	41.10	23.0	0.56
2009-10	79.00	38.00	41.00	7.0	0.54
2010-11	42.00	19.00	23.00	(-)47	0.23
2011-12	55.12	26.25	28.87	31.24	0.27

Source: Planning & Development Division

The data reveals that although the state is not successful enough to provide health care facilities compatible with the universally acknowledged standards of health care available in the advanced industrial societies. However it is also obvious that the justification of the non-contestable idealization of the model of health care is not other than medicalization of life form as a fundamental moral imperative for both state and society.

The data is also helpful to understand the gravity of the belated consciousness i.e. consciousness of being left behind³ felt by the people regarding the unavailability as well as inaccessibility to the available health care apparatus in the country.

The commitment with modern ways of life is not just of political or an institutional nature rather it has specific ontologically determined teleological foundations. In post colonial societies the prevailing life form of advanced postindustrial societies is presumed to be the “natural culmination of the potential already existing in Neolithic man”.⁴



Healthcare Facilities

Health Manpower	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12
Registered Doctors	139,555	144,901	149,201
Registered Dentists	9,822	10,508	10,958
Registered Nurses	69,313	73,244	76,244
Population per Doctor	1183	1,222	1,206
Population per Dentist	16914	16,854	16,426
Population per Bed	1592	1,701	1,665

Source: Planning & Development Division

This presumed metaphysical assumption has conceptually transformed the process of modernization from a historical process to a natural evolutionary phenomenon. The pursuit of progress and development has substantively been interpreted within the theoretical parameters of modern enlightenment thought and its corresponding institutions. There is no doubt that in post colonial societies “modern man is defined by progress”.⁵

The claim that people in the western world are “living in the golden age of scientific enlightenment and artistic achievement”⁶ has very well received by the post colonial societies. It is an acknowledged fact that at national and state

level there is no doubt that science should be consider as state subject. The cost of this epistemological as well as methodological prioritization will be beard because the inevitability of profound cultural change is empirically evident but every body assumes that “the rewards are considerable.”⁷

The scientific methodological prioritization has not been confined to specific task oriented projects and endeavors pursued by state apparatus or local industrial complex. Rather it has been interpreted as an objective epistemological criterion to judge the credibility of traditional religious and of course historical foundations of post colonial epistemological tradition.

Vaccine/dose.	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011(R)
B.C.G.	5,070,031	4,777,166	5,114,865	4,862,494	5,203,061	5,364,136	5,790,371	5,884,435	6,133,378	5,924,868	5,924,868
POLIO											
0	1,734,707	1,842,279	2,132,474	2,352,552	2,625,604	2,846,229	3,098,116	3,428,749	3,650,026	3,773,055	3,773,055
I	4,583,673	4,543,243	4,819,735	4,512,848	4,858,592	5,250,568	5,645,107	5,556,128	5,884,871	5,852,612	5,852,612
II	4,079,328	4,014,687	4,281,717	4,098,187	4,387,392	4,869,878	5,178,706	5,034,410	5,402,701	5,526,671	5,526,671
III	4,023,674	3,780,170	4,035,457	3,916,351	4,159,987	4,738,953	5,070,490	4,819,065	5,277,352	5,422,439	5,422,439
IV	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BR	226,529	138,207	105,640	77,721	49,428	33,007	46,615	60,917	35,842	81,322	81,323
COMBO											
I	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,999,759	5,071,729			
II	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,720,089	4,612,518			
III	-	-	-	-	-	-	3,656,495	4,356,169			
D.P.T											
I	4,688,768	4,558,086	4,768,665	4,427,751	4,581,347	5,275,075	1,710,723	-	-	-	-
II	4,175,545	4,038,630	4,227,754	4,025,465	4,126,599	4,886,576	1,523,243	-	-	-	-
III	4,112,538	3,795,573	3,982,974	3,839,571	3,918,794	4,756,441	1,479,364	-	-	-	-
BR	46,518	22,626	5,959	2,418	105	284	55	-	-	-	-
H.B.V											
I	-	1,772,217	4,482,628	4,212,720	4,458,183	5,053,306	1,617,799	-	-	-	-
II	-	1,290,550	3,892,582	3,879,701	4,065,343	4,692,279	1,441,447	-	-	-	-
III	-	965,850	3,576,321	3,616,543	3,840,703	4,571,006	1,401,189	-	-	-	-
Pentavalent											
I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,924,991	5,862,892	5,862,892
II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,461,294	5,555,135	5,555,135
III	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,338,521	5,407,251	5,407,251
T.T											
I	4,179,310	4,678,265	3,590,786	3,391,488	4,539,131	4,069,365	3,877,897	4,307,085	4,919,757	5,050,174	5,050,174
II	3,286,376	3,539,711	2,969,663	2,649,564	2,857,932	3,133,454	3,048,345	3,384,967	3,791,733	4,065,119	4,065,119
III	868,820	1,278,078	1,423,277	765,268	793,128	894,639	810,023	865,694	937,769	897,008	897,008
IV	310,995	310,448	337,968	292,941	519,086	286,368	239,055	279,024	284,879	268,213	268,213
V	163,747	159,402	163,699	131,888	157,382	176,530	141,288	152,080	168,861	164,970	164,970
MEASLES	4,546,632	4,105,614	4,163,032	4,124,958	4,387,211	5,050,347	5,386,101	5,277,766	5,297,362	5,299,641	5,299,641
II	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,806,309	2,799,723	2,799,723

- not available

Source: Ministry of Health

B.C.G. Bacillus+Calamus+Guerin

D.P.T Diphtheria+Perussia+Tetanus

T.T Tetanus Toxoid

Note: The DPT from the year 2007 onward has discontinued and is replaced by Combo - a combination of DPT and HBV

R: Repeated

This gradual but remarkable shift in the epistemological paradigm of post colonial societies has questioned rather delegitimized their historically derived identity consciousness and its corresponding values and normative stances.

On the one hand, this prioritization opens up a new domain of reformation of traditional and religious epistemological claims in compatibility with modern scientific discourse on the other hand it opens up a gradual process of “making modern self identity”.⁸

If we try to understand the phenomena of progress in the context of post-colonial cultural specific particularities, it reveals a historically determined relation between progress and modern self identity. “To modern man and to those who want to share his identity, rejecting faith in progress is unbearable”.⁹

The grand narrative of modern discourse compels post colonial intelligentsia to consider scientifically driven technological progress and development as non contestable imperative. It is because of this reason it is claimed that “the third world had to develop first before even think about real progress”.¹⁰

Therefore progress particularly scientific progress is not just a state policy rather a moral imperative which compels the post colonial intelligentsia to reinterpret whole human history from the spectacles of “purely western genealogy of history”.¹¹

It is quite ironic to critically evaluate the theoretical foundations of the process of medicalization in a society where the availability of physician per 1000 people is around 0.74. The total spending on health care sector has never raised to 2.5% of the over all GDP of the country in its entire history. It will be better to provide a statistical representation of the available health care apparatus in the country. This statistical representation provides an opportunity to the reader to understand the how difficult is to critically evaluate the theoretical limitations of the medicalization process in a postcolonial socio-cultural context where people are comparing the available health care apparatus to the universally acknowledged standards of health care which are derived from the process of medicalization in it self.

Year	Registered Doctors ***	Registered Dentists ***	Registered Nurses ***	Registered Mid- wives	Registered Lady Health Visitors	Population per		Expenditure(Mn. Rs)**	
						Doctor	Dentist	Develop- ment	Non-Deve- lopment
1963	1,049	17	..	..	..	46,615	..	34.55	80.00
1964	1,325	81	..	..	..	37,970	..	75.22	78.00
1965	1,591	151	..	..	..	32,533	..	46.47	84.00
1966	2,008	195	..	..	..	26,524	..	35.31	86.00
1967	2,588	233	..	..	..	21,170	..	70.80	92.00
1968	2,668	273	..	..	..	21,128	..	59.79	99.00
1969	3,322	332	..	..	..	17,459	..	67.99	128.00
1970	3,913	384	..	..	..	15,256	155,468	61.70	151.00
1971	4,287	446	..	..	..	14,343	137,870	57.62	141.10
1972	4,802	511	..	..	..	13,190	123,953	95.55	171.90
1973	5,138	549	..	..	..	12,824	120,018	175.67	210.10
1974	5,582	610	946	522	51	12,164	111,311	363.00	278.00
1975	6,018	650	1,985	1,201	118	11,628	107,661	629.10	360.64
1976	6,478	706	2,526	1,637	197	11,133	102,153	540.00	439.20
1977	7,232	733	3,204	2,577	246	10,278	101,405	512.00	558.60
1978	9,142	781	3,892	3,106	341	9,526	98,079	569.00	641.60
1979	10,167	846	4,552	3,594	453	8,695	93,309	717.00	661.89
1980	11,860	928	5,336	4,200	547	7,549	87,672	942.00	794.82
1981	14,996	1,018	6,110	4,846	718	6,101	83,369	1037.00	993.10
1982	18,256	1,121	6,832	5,482	928	5,087	77,948	1183.00	1207.00
1983	21,942	1,222	7,348	6,031	1,144	4,308	73,560	1526.00	1564.00
1984	26,700	1,349	8,280	7,078	1,374	3,605	68,490	1587.00	1785.12
1985	31,107	1,416	10,529	8,133	1,574	3,160	67,041	1881.50	2393.81
1986	35,102	1,558	12,014	10,315	2,144	2,865	62,580	2615.00	3270.00
1987	39,639	1,636	13,002	11,505	2,384	2,594	61,180	3114.41	4064.00
1988	43,921	1,772	14,015	12,866	2,697	2,396	57,963	2802.00	4519.00
1989	48,342	1,918	15,861	13,779	2,917	2,228	54,927	2681.00	4537.00
1990	52,935	2,068	16,948	15,009	3,106	2,082	52,017	2741.00	4997.00
1991	56,616	2,184	18,150	16,299	3,463	1,993	50,519	2402.00	6129.65
1992	61,081	2,269	19,389	17,678	3,796	1,892	49,850	2152.31	7452.31
1993	64,038	2,394	20,245	18,641	3,920	1,848	48,508	2875.00	7680.00
1994	67,224	2,584	21,419	19,759	4,107	1,803	46,114	3589.73	8501.00
1995	71,718	2,747	22,299	20,910	4,185	1,455	44,478	5741.07	10613.75
1996	75,239	2,933	24,776	21,662	4,407	1,689	42,675	6485.40	11857.43
1997	79,474	3,154	28,661	21,840	4,589	1,636	40,652	6076.60	13586.91
1998	83,696	3,434	32,938	22,103	4,959	1,590	38,185	5491.81	15315.86
1999	88,117	3,857	35,979	22,401	5,299	1,578	35,557	5887.00	16190.00
2000	92,838	4,165	37,528	22,525	5,443	1,529	33,629	5944.00	18337.00
2001	97,260	4,612	40,019	22,711	5,669	1,516	31,579	6688.00	18717.00
2002	102,644	5,058	44,520	23,084	6,397	1,466	29,405	6609.00	22205.0
2003	108,164	5,531	46,331	23,318	6,599	1,404	27,414	8500.00	24305.00
2004	113,309	6,128	48,446	23,559	6,741	1,359	25,107	11000.00	27000.00
2005	118,113	6,734	51,270	23,897	7,073	1,310	25,297	16000.00	24000.00
2006	123,146	7,438	57,646	24,692	8,405	1,254	20,839	20000.00	30000.00
2007	128,042	8,215	62,651	25,261	9,302	1,245	19,417	27228.00	32670.00
2008	133,925	9,012	65,387	25,534	10,002	1,212	18,010	32700.00	41100.00
2009	139,488	9,822	69,313	26,225	10,731	1,184	16,814	37860.00	41000.00
2010	144,901	10,508	73,244	27,153	11,510	1,222	16,854	18706.00	23382.00
2011	149,201	10,958	76,244	27,153(R)	11,510(R)	1,206	16,426	26248.00	28873.00

R : Repeated

.. : Not available

Source : Ministry of Health, Planning & Development Division

** : Expenditure figures are for respective financial years 2011 = 2011-12

*** : Registered with Pakistan Medical and Dental Council and Pakistan Nursing Council.

Note: Data regarding registered number of Doctors/Dentists is vulnerable to few changes as it is affected by change of province or if there is any change in registration status from time to time

Date for medical personnel for the year 2011 is estimated by adding the output actually achieved during the year to the medical manpower in 2010.

There is no doubt that these statistics show that people of Pakistan are surviving without appropriate health care apparatus and the most valuable moral contribution one can make is to provide best available techno-scientific facilities in health care sector to the people of this country.

Therefore it seems quite unrealistic to raise moral questions against the institutionalization of scientific methodological studies to address actual as well as potential problems faced by the people concerning health care sector even run by the public sector or managed by the private sector.

Because in the contemporary social order of such post colonial life form establishing health care unit i.e. Hospital is in it self presumed to be “non

contestable” good which guarantees the emancipation from pain, suffering, actual or potential abnormalities, and in extreme cases from painful death. The hospital i.e. techno-scientifically driven institutional apparatus presumed to be the most efficient mechanism available to ensure healing, compassionate care, counter physical or psychological threats or sharing burden of sickness, life time abnormalities, terminal illnesses and dreadful experience of dying love ones.

In pre-modern, under-developed post-colonial societies all these miseries, sufferings and traumatic experiences etc. either caused by diseases, abnormalities (both physical and psychological) or casualties etc. are generally faced and countered although inappropriately by the families of the affected one, due to the unavailability of modern techno-scientifically driven health care institutions. Therefore it is an acknowledged fact that making these institutional apparatus available to combat this evil of disease, pain and abnormalities is the ultimate, non contestable moral imperative.

All kinds of resources including public welfare funds, religious charities, corporate social benefit funds, philanthropic activities made by celebrities, sports men and retired professional are used to accelerate this process of medicalization and to gain cultural capital. The only moral cum political problem identified, discussed and critically evaluated is the issue of the accessibility of the general public to the health care institutional order which is derived embryonically from the scientific industrial complex. It is quite fashionable for both the educated underprivileged middle class intelligentsia and foreign qualified bourgeois social activist to condemn state apparatus for not providing appropriate resources to make facilities of modern health care available.

The most popular moral argument used in contemporary literature of bioethics discourse in our part of the world regarding health care issues is to ensure the right to medical care to every citizen of the country.

The fundamental principles of bioethics particularly the principle of autonomy and principle of justice are explicitly being interpreted in the context of the priority the right over good. Therefore the availability of health care facility is not just a fundamental moral imperative rather it is also presumed to be a fundamental political objective to develop free democratic order. The autonomy and self determination of an individual which is guaranteed by the constitution of the country will be meaningless if the psychosomatic freedom of the individual is not realizable due to the unavailable or inappropriate health care apparatus.

This right of the individual is also protected under the covenant of Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 25:1. Therefore the state is not only answerable to the people of the country rather it is also answerable to the international community, under the conditions of United Nations and its corresponding transnational bureaucratic order.

The individual right of self determination is presumed to be the fundamental condition of self respect therefore the lack of proper health care facility or inaccessibility to the health care units will be interpreted as a violation of individual psychosomatic freedom, hence undermines the possibility of self respect and consequently social well being of individual this may lead to class antagonism and social unrest.

It is very important note that protection of health care as fundamental right has also been supplement in article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights thus the right to health is not just presumed to be a natural or moral right of an individual rather it has been presented as one of the fundamental obligation of a given system of justice corresponding to the international system of justice.

In the western world it was presumed to be inconceivable to consider gradual process of medicalization as some thing problematic till the 1960s.¹²

Medicalization process was generally interpreted as mechanization to counter the morbidity. It was presumed to be reasonable to invest on this process of medicalization because it will not only reduce the possible morbidity but it will eventually decrease the cost of health care. Thus the excessive process of medicalization and its corresponding discourse has created a hermeneutical circle which establishes an inverse relational between the growing competence of health care and the tolerance of diseases or abnormalities.

The formalization of the health care apparatus has redefined the status of physician. The de-professionalized method to interpreted diseases, handle patient, manufacturing and use of medicine has been considered as a sign of ignorant, regressive, obscurantist, unhealthy and sick minded criminal offence.

Unlike the traditional conception of medicine which was rested upon a foundationalists or essentialist conception of human being and presumes an

instrumental role of medicine to enhance the imbedded immunity potential individual has to combat diseases.

This traditional conception of medicine has been repudiated by the gradual process of medicalization. It was not just the issue of reducing morbidity rather the issue to improve health level and new standards of health and body efficiency have been idealized through effective medical interventions. It was believed that “health levels will improve with the amount spent on medical service, that more medical interventions would be better and that doctors know best what there service should be”.¹³

The conception of human “isness” has been transformed due to the gradual victories against epidemic diseases. The transition from being to becoming has gradually been substantiated and trust on the non-contestable telos i.e progress has been established. “Everywhere the belief on unlimited progress was still unshaken and progress in medicine meant the persist effort to improve human health, abolish pain, eradicate sickness and extend the life span by using ever new engineering intervention”.¹⁴

The trust on the transition from actual to possible human being is the unintended corollary of the institutional penetration of medicalization process and its capacity to make medical intervention. Thus transcendence from actual to potential human existence is the ultimate objective of this process. For instance, genetic, engineering, cloning, abortion, genetic mutation, gender transformation stem cell methodologies etc. are all not presumed to be the fears any more rather the expectations of what the process of medicalization is intended to realize.

Section 2:

What is wrong with Medicalization

The overall process of progress and development has made technological revolution possible but at the same time there are voices emerged against the unintended consequences of this ruthless thirst to dominate reality by virtue of scientifically driven mechanism of progress.

“Science the greatest creation of the rational mind has turned out to be a specter of doom, posing the greatest threat to our natural environment and our human existence. If there has been any progress since western man rebelled against God and deified himself in ‘the age of Enlightenment’ it has been in the sphere of human suffering, greed and oppression”.¹⁵

It is very interesting to note that the phenomena of medicalization which is in itself one of the manifestation of the scientific enlightenment progress has been reinforced by the general critique on environmental deterioration. It was claimed that environmental degradation, poisonous pesticides, gas-chambers, weapons of mass destruction etc. are not the only threats caused by the scientific progress, rather health damages (both actual and potential) caused by this over all process of progress and development demands more comprehensive mechanism of health care.

There is no doubt that medicalization is in itself an ongoing process of excavating the causes of diseases and reasons of their spread. But at the same time it not easy to identify the status of physician in the whole process of medicalization what actually their role is? The protectors, repairers or the architects of future humans?.

The popular literature in our part of the world acknowledges the central role of the physician in this whole process of medicalization. However it has been argued that what actual role physician should perform substantively.

“Do they maintain health?” “Do they repair health?” “Do they protect health?” Despite this fact that what actually the core concern of the process of medicalization i.e. maintenance, repair or protection from the possible future threats to human health either caused by external factors or by internal genetic,

congenital or hereditary factors. The role of physician is presumed to be inevitable to counter the actual and possible threats to human health.

The health policy framework either designed by the politicians or technocrats they always consult the specialists of the concerned discipline of knowledge. But thanks to the modern epistemological discourse the compartmentalization of knowledge has created obstacles to develop a uniform policy framework to address the core concern of human health because of their imbedded antagonistic relation with each other.

Its never-ending Iatrogenesis process has made human health as intrinsically an unstable state of existence. Iatrogenesis is actually a three dimensional process ;

- a) Defining diseases .
- b) Search for their cures .
- c) Redefining the diseases which are the result of medical treatment i.e side effect

It means that the iatrogenesis process is not only cynically vicious circle but it is also a growing and extending area of control.

It is making things medical which were not supposed to be the part of the realm of medical. In critical sense medicalization is a process of over medicalization.¹⁶

The process of medicalization and its relation with the problem of social control has been identified in social scientific discourse of 1970s. Since then significant work has been done in this regard which reveals the multi-dimensional capacity of social control that has been exhibited by the gradual process of medicalization. For instance the works of “Conrad (1975) on hyperactivity in children, Scull (1975) on mental illness Pfohl (1977) on child abuse and Schneider (1978) on alcoholisms as a disease” have problematized the issue of medicalization regarding its potential of social control.

Unlike the above mentioned case studies regarding the medicalization of social deviance as well as the normative predication of the process of medicalization have also been problematized, the “studies analyzed changes from non medical to medical definition and treatments... e.g. Foucault 1965, Gusfield 1967, Wertz

and Wertz 1989, Illich 1976 ” all have identified and critically evaluated this overwhelming mechanism of discipline, control and its over all impact on the meaning and the sense of one’s existence.

Zola’s definition of medicalization incorporate both aspects of medicalization i.e. pathological and socio-cultural, “medicalization is a process where by and more of everyday life has come under medical domain, influence and supervision”. Conrad has elucidated three different levels of medicalization to understand the scope of this process :

- a) The conceptual level .
- b) The institutional level .
- c) The interactional level .

The conceptual level deals with the creation of terminologies and linguistically derived jargon to understand order and explicate the problems to which health care professionals are or will be confronting with. The institutional level is the formalization of the terminologies, vocabulary and models, medical professionals i.e. specialist have conceptualized or theorized to address the given problem, within the parameters of the organization’s prescribed manual.

In this sense physician works within the formal structure of a given health care apparatus. Thus “physician may function as gatekeepers for benefits that are only legitimate in organization that adopt a medical definition and approach to a problem”.¹⁷

The interactional level has relatively far more important sociological, cultural and axiological implications then the rest of the two levels. The patients/physician interaction demands comprehensive re-evaluation as well as the revaluation of the matrix in which the patient has been situated. The disease carrier i.e. patient and the disease interpreter i.e. physician have substantively different vocabularies, hermeneutical perspectives, and risk/stakes associated with their mutual relation etc. all these factors directly or indirectly affect their mutual interactive space and its corresponding outcomes.

The identification of the problem either as pathological or psychological or other form of social deviance by the concerned health care authorities is not just redefine individual as a patient rather redefines the whole matrix in which the patient has been situated. The strength and socio-cultural legitimacy of this

authoritative status derived from the institutional recognition of the conceptual formation previously made by the specific discipline of knowledge and its corresponding practices in a given health care unit.

Therefore this medical form of treatment is not just specific to the body of the patient concerned rather it has far reaching sociological, cultural and axiological implications for both patient and his family. It is important to note that this re-evaluation and revaluation capacity of the medicalization process is relative to the level of modernization and its corresponding institutional order.

According to Cornwell (1984) “subcultures, groups, or individual may vary in their readiness to apply, accept, or reject medicalized definitions”.¹⁸ The dominant role of the physician regarding the legitimate execution of bio-power is directly proportional and functional to the intensification of the process of medicalization. However, this soft expression of bio-power regarding the redefinition of human being or becoming human i.e. actual or potential existence of concerned individual is relative to the scope and the institutional penetration of the process of medicalization.

It is very interesting to note that the under the burden of so-called positivism “medicalization researches are much more interested in the etiology of definitions than the etiology of the behavior or conditions”.¹⁹ The cause of this redefinition process might be positivistic but its effects are never morally neutral. This actually leads to comprehensive shift in the spectacles of socio-cultural understanding which is the result of gradual replacement of religious or social model of human understanding to medical model. The work of Whalen and Henkes 1977 in this regard is important.²⁰

This replacement of model although has not been substantiated in post-colonial, pre-modern societies like Pakistan but the theoretical idealization of medicalization reveals that it will eventually the intended or unintended consequence of the overall process of progress and development. The most interesting aspect of medicalization process is that it addresses both aspect of individual existence i.e. natural life processes which include “sexuality childbirth, child development menstrual discomfort (PSM), menopause, aging and death, etc.”²¹

where as the socially deviant behaviors for instance, “alcoholism, homosexuality, eating problems from over eating (obesity) to under eating (anorexia), child abuse, compulsive gambling, infertility and transsexualism”²² etc. This all encompassing scope of medicalization process has extended the

capacity of social control and as well replacing the competing mechanism of control i.e. religious or traditional models from that of medical.

The domination and also the socialization of the medical model regarding the production of truth have been established by the health care unit (i.e. Hospital). The Hospital according to Foucault is “a place of investigation for a hidden truth and of testing for a truth to be produced”.²³ The hospital is a micro-unit to establish the discipline of bio-power under the conditions of truth produced by the discourse of bio-medical sciences.

The whole idea of Hospitalization presumes that “the sick person left at liberty in his ‘milieu’ in his family, in his circle of friends, with his regimen, his habits, his prejudices, his illusions could not help but be affected by a complex, mixed and tangled disease, a kind of unnatural illness that was both the blend of several diseases and the impediment preventing the true disease from being produced in the authenticity of its nature”.²⁴

According to Foucault, the history of ideas reveals a delicate relation between the manifestation and the production of truth. The understanding about the manifested disease, social deviance, meaning of crime, abnormality etc. is possible “within the limits of a manifestation of truth inside the norm of knowledge”.²⁵

The production of truth is primarily based upon its testifiability. However, the production of truth always derived its substantive justification from the manifestation of truth i.e. the norm of knowledge. In this sense the manifestation of truth and the production of truth are not only two different complementary processes but also can not be separated from each other. Secondly, it also reveals that constant production of truth in any specific discipline of knowledge, let’s say medicine establishes its justificatory capacity from the manifestation of truth.

Consequently it also determines the status and also antagonistic relation of such disciplines with other competing spheres of knowledge or mechanisms of control.

There is no doubt that enlightenment epistemological discourse has generated a most sophisticated mechanism of specialization which is the result of the compartmentalization of knowledge. This never-ending process of the compartmentalization of knowledge has initiated multiple dialectic of the production of truth. It implies that different structures of knowledge derived

from enlightenment discourse presume an antagonistic and competitive relation with each other.

Foucault believes that the crises emerges due to the clash of different disciplines of knowledge which seeks their justification from the same norm of knowledge, “the crises in these discipline does not simply call into question their limits or uncertainties in the sphere of knowledge it calls knowledge into question, the form of knowledge, the ‘subject-object norm’; it questions the relation between our society’s economic and political structure and knowledge (not in its true an untrue contents) but in its ‘power-knowledge function’”.²⁶

It is very important to note that the clash of different knowledge structures is not beanie rather aggressively malignant and in extreme cases intellectually oppressive. The structures of knowledge are intrinsically competitive, for instance the enlightenment epistemological discourse has dominated its rival discourse i.e. religious discourse regarding the determination of legitimate public sphere.

The structure of medicine along with the myth of naturalism and positivism associated with it and its complementary disciplines have contributed a lot in this regard. Under the illusionary burden of positivistically derived objectivity the organic relation between morality and epistemology was disentangled and the comprehensive replacement of religion not just as a legitimate epistemological paradigm but also a moral foundation has also been done, according to Zola medicine has “nudged aside”²⁷ the religion as medium of discipline. Turner has also acknowledged that religion has replaced²⁸ medicine as a legitimate mechanism of social control.

Foucault on the other hand has explicated the internal competitive relations between different knowledge structures derived from same epistemological norm. His analysis regarding the determination of the meaning is very important to understand the axiological and normative implications of medicalization process in post colonial socio-cultural context. According to his analysis genealogical understanding of abnormality reveals a direct relation between the extension of the area of control of medicine and the extension of the definitional scope of abnormality.

The definition of abnormal presumed these fundamental elements :

1. The human Monster.²⁹
2. The individual to be corrected.³⁰
3. The Onanist.³¹

The Human Monster is derived from the traditional mythological discourse the theoretical matrix of this idea is intrinsically legal but not just specific to social connotation of law rather in the context of “natural law as well”.³² According to Foucault, the intellectual traces of these kinds of abnormalities manifested in different courses of ancient, classical and medieval intellectual discourse. Foucault has discussed the human monster as an allegorical expression of abnormality to explicate the antagonistic relation between two different structures of knowledge regarding the imposition of their authority claims about the status of normality and the legal cost one has to pay from the deviation of established pattern of normal behavior. Foucault has referred the trial of hermaphrodite in which jurists and physicians clashed from the Rouen affair”.³³

Foucault has provided a detail historical account of the epistemological clashes between Christian jurists and medicine. The exposition of different cases, for instance, Anne Grandjean 1752, F.E. Cangiamila 1758, Henriette Cornier 1825, Antoine Leger 1824, Louis Auguste Papavine 1825.³⁴ Human to be corrected is another way to look and interpret abnormality according to Foucault.

How man should be presumes that those individuals who have deviated from the mechanism and standard of modern disciplinary power are abnormal but they can be normalized by effective use of the disciplinary techniques emerged from the modern myth of transcendental reasoning.

This shift in the attitude regarding the determination of the status of abnormal is the reflection of increasing methodological reliance on medicine and its capacity to correct human being in compatibility with the life world emerged from the modern discursive practices. The institutionalization of modern standard of disciplinary power in school, work place, families’, army and other socio-cultural and state apparatus provides functional standards of normality. In this sense the idea of normativity has explicitly been redefined from the enlightenment epistemological discourse.

It reveals that normality has not just pathological foundations but individual’s capacity to harmonize with any given order of discipline is also needed to address clinically. This systematic realization has extended the scope of abnormality from pathological to socio-cultural. Thus abnormality as simply the deviation of the standard behavior Institutionalized by the modern disciplinary practices, is one of training the body, behavior and aptitudes open up the problem of who escape that normativity which no longer the sovereignty of the law.”³⁵

Considering the long term implications of such kind of deviation compels the power structure to increase the cost of such deviation to discourage the actual and the potential offenders of rising modern disciplinary order. At the first instance disqualification of the deviated person from the sphere of legal subject is the punishment of the violation of modern discipline. The immediate institutional impact or consequence of this disqualification is the suspension of all the rights guaranteed by the constitution.

The individual has to fulfill the manual behavior pattern prescribed by the ever extending process of medicalization, otherwise all the constitutional rights of the given individual will be taken away. The cost of being identified as abnormal in modern mechanism of disciplinary practices is unquestionably phenomenal. All these judicially imposed imperatives are rested upon the non-contestable authority of medicine. It is also interesting to note that the bio-power determines both the process i.e. the exclusion from the paradigm of normality by imposing a tag of abnormality on an individual who has failed to adjust in modern disciplinary order.

On the other hand, it has also developed a mechanism of correction to make the re-inclusion of those unfortunates who have been left behind.³⁶ “This juridical and negative frame will be partly filled partly replaced by a set of techniques and method by which the authorities will under take to train those who resist training and correct the incorrigibles.”³⁷

The third element of abnormality is defined in term of the misuse of one’s own body for sexual pleasure. The discourse of sexuality is according to Foucault is intrinsically a modern phenomena. Under the condition of overwhelming growth of industrialization the significance of the productive use body has dominated the mechanism of control “a process of repression linked to the new requirement of industrialization, the producing body as against the pleasure body”.³⁸

The discourse of the body and its use or misuse has developed a mechanism of discipline and control, it has opened a new realm of extensive medicalization of life. The scope of which extended from body to its legitimate and illegitimate, normal /abnormal function of desire, its suppression, repression, its linguisticality and its corresponding identity paradigms, “sexuality limitless etiological power at the level of bodies and diseases is one of the most constant theme not only in the text of that new medical ethics but also in the most serious works of pathology”.³⁹

The most important aspect which sustains this overwhelming medicalization of the life world irrespective of the fact that the damages caused by this iatrogenesis

process is far more greater than the decline in morbidity it caused. The internal paradigmatic incoherence of this aloes specific axiological process is derived from its comic apology. The rich men (who can afford all the burden of facilities made available by scientific industrial complex through the medicalization apparatus, consider themselves as unlucky and consider that the cause of their miseries is the will of the God.

The poor on the other hand consider themselves as deprived from their legitimate right of health care due to the inequitable distribution of resources. Thus it is presumed that although increased morbidity has made available by the medicalization process. However due to the inherent and structurally determined class discrimination or the violation of fundamental right of health care has made unavailability of decent living conditions impossible.

Concluding remarks :

The traditional bioethical approaches, i.e. Good-based ethical theories, which are rested upon essentialist foundations and absolutist conceptions of human being are not consistent with a contemporary dynamic of ever changing dialectical process of iatrogenesis. The ontologically essentialist conception of human nature has been institutionally compromised by the process of medicalization.

If we look at the contemporary approaches of medical sciences toward the understanding of human beings it is obvious that they are not focusing on the “is ness” of human being rather than that of becoming of human. The whole discourse of cloning, genetic mutation, stem, cell methodologies, innumerable possibilities of vaccinations, transplantation etc. are predominantly futuristic and teleologically harmonized with a grand mechanism to engineer a super human being i.e. Ubermench. The emergence of techno-sciences has opened a new realm of technological development particularly in the field of biotechnology, robotics, nanotechnology, pharmacology, artificial intelligence etc. to become more human as compared to our previous generations.

This attempt of transition from human being to human becoming is not just theorized by the enlightenment intellectual discourse rather it has substantively been practiced and institutionalized by the scientific industrial complex. It appears that this process will lead to never ending rather never achieving transcendental standard of ideal man i.e. Ubermench.

In our part of the world the nature of bioethics discourse is predominantly traditional. The traditional applicatory ethics undermines the complexity of the process of medicalization because it is just the application of traditional normative ethical principles like, utilitarianism, virtue theory, religions authoritarianism, cultural relativism or right based moral principles.

The result of this application of moral/ethical principles without questioning the legitimacy of the system in itself makes the applicatory ethics as intrinsically procedural. It means that without questioning the legitimacy of the dominant medical scientific discourse and its corresponding institutional procedural mechanism, bioethics is just the accommodation of whatever possibility techno-scientific model has explored.

It is important to understand that the contemporary techno-scientific mechanism is not in the search of understanding or discovering facts about human body it is actually in process of creating reality and trying to impose

human will on the reality to stretch the possibility of possibilities. Therefore the techno scientifically driven process of medicalization is interpreting human as not being rather becoming. It is because of this reason it is reasonable to claim that the fundamental problem of contemporary bioethics is intrinsically existential and without addressing the ontological foundations of contemporary process of medicalization bio-ethical discourse will be just the management of the findings, discoveries, inventions, distortions and instillation of techno-scientific model of medicalization.

The maximum potential this bioethics discourse has, to make power structure realize that health care is a fundamental right and it is the responsibility of the state, civil society and of course market forces to provide common people an opportunity to realize this fundamental right, i.e. free or subsidized access-to-health-care.

It is important to note that due to this overriding process of a etiological medicalization the scope as well as the cost of health care has remarkably increased. For instance due to excessive scientific development many issues which were not presumed to be the part of the realm of medicalization, and are now very much being consider as a part of it, like vaccination, transplantation etc.

are now claimed to be a right of the individual which is to be available by the state, international health care associations or charity organizations. As the time passes the list of rights will be extended dramatically, for instance the right of, abortion, cloning, genetic mutation, gender transformation stern cell treatment etc. The guarantee of right, or the availability of right either by market forces or state apparatus legitimizes that the ongoing mechanism of medicalization and quest to become supermen, constant struggle of stretching the possibility of possibilities is in itself logically coherent and morally consistent? Which is obviously required an ontological leap other wise it will be an ironic end.

End Notes:

¹ 57 Ayers C.E., “The Theory of economic progress”: A study of the fundamentals of economic development and cultural change, New York, Schocken Books. 1962 P. xxiv-xxv .

² See Ejaz S. Wasti, Pakistan Economic Survey 2011-2012, chapter 11 copy right ministry of finance Govt. of Pakistan. P.152-154. www.finance.gov.pk.

³ See Suri W.A. “ What is living and what is dead in Iqbal: The incommensurable hermeneutical circle prevail in Iqbal thought, in in Revisioning Iqbal: As poet and Muslim Political Thinker. (ed) Gita Dharampal-Frick, Ali Usman, Katia Rosteller, Heidelberg, Published by Oxford University Press Pakistan Lahore 2011.

⁴ Estava Gustavo, “Development” in Wolfgang Saches (ed.), The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power, Johannesburg University Press. 1995 p.9 .

⁵ Ibid.,p.16.

⁶ Ayers C.E., “The Theory of Economic Progress”: A Study of the Fundamentals of Economic Development and Cultural Change. Op.cite. p.xxv.

⁷ Ibid., p. xxv.

⁸ Taylor C. Sources of Self: The making of modern self identity, Cambridge, Cambridge university press,1989, p.25.

⁹ Jose Maria Sbert, “ Progress” in Wolfgang Saches (ed.), The development dictionary: A guide to knowledge as power, op.cite. p.195 .

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Estava Gustavo, “Development” in Wolfgang Saches (ed.), The development dictionary: A guide to knowledge as power, op.cite.p.9.

¹² Illich Ivan “ The medicalization of life”, Journal of Medical Ethics, 1975 p.74.

¹³ Strickland, Stephen P. , US health care: What’s wrong and what’ right, NY universe Books,1972 p. 127, quoted in “ The medicalization of life” by Ivan Illich, Journal of Medical Ethics, 1975 p. 74.

¹⁴ Illich Ivan “The medicalization of life”, Journal of Medical Ethics, 1975 p. 74.

¹⁵ Manzoor S. Pervez, “A Fetish on trial”, in Progress, vol.-5, no. 1 London Jan.1988. p.1

¹⁶ Conrad Peter, Medicalization and social control, in Annual Review of Sociology, vol.18 1992 p.210.

¹⁷ Ibid., p.211.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ See Conrad, Medicalization, Etiology and Hyperactivity: Reply to Whalen and Henker. Soc. Probl. 24:596-98. quoted in Ibid.p.212.

²⁰ See Whalen ,C.K., and Henker, B., The Pitfalls of Politicization: Response to Conrad's "The Discovery of Hyperkinesis: Note on The Medicalization of Deviant Behavior", Soc.Probl. 24:583-95.

²¹ Conrad P., "Medicalization and Social Control" op.cite. p.213.

²² Ibid.

²³ Foucault M., "Psychiatric Power" in M. Foucault Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (ed.) Paul Rabinow vol.1 NY, The New Press, 1994 p.39.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid., p.17.

²⁷ See Zola, I.k. "Medicine as Institution of Social Control." Social. Rev. 1972 ,20: 487-504.

²⁸ Turner, B.S. The Body and Society, Oxford, Basil and Blackwell. 1984. p.280 .

²⁹ Foucault M. " Abnormals" in M. Foucault Ethics: Subjectivity And Truth (ed.) Paul Rabinow vol.1 NY, The New press,1994 p.51.

³⁰ Ibid., p.52.

³¹ Ibid., p. 53.

³² Ibid., p.51.

³³ Ibid.,51-52. In his foot not Foucault has provided the detail of the case as " This concern the case of Marie Le Marcis. Born in1581 and baptized as a girl, she eventually adopted men's dress and took the name of Marin, and undertook to marry a widow, Jeanne Le Febvre. Arrested, she was given death sentenced on May 4,1601, for the 'crime of sodomy.' The report by doctor Jacques Duvel saved her from being burned at stake .She was sentenced remain a girl."Ibid.,p.56 .

³⁴ See footnotes numbers 2,3,4. In which Foucault has mentioned these cases. Ibid., p.56.

³⁵ Foucault M "Abnormal" op.cite. p.52.

³⁶ This model of exclusion and inclusion can also be used to understand the prevailing antagonism between fundamentalism and modernism, traditionalism and feminism, Islam and West,etc.

³⁷ Foucault M. "Abnormal" op.cite. p.52.

³⁸ Ibid..

³⁹ Ibid., p.54.

Liberal principles of Justice and Emerging Trend of Economic Liberalization: Lesson from Rawlsian Scheme of Distributive Justice

Abstract :

We are living in the age of so-called economic liberalization. Markets are expanding and States are voluntarily limiting their legitimate right as the only redistributing authority of resources. The money market has globalized in such a manner that state has almost lost its capacity to hold its redistributive function.

Economic liberalization is one of the most dominating policy frame work which is to be pursued and institutionally concretized in many of the post-colonial societies as the legitimate and only viable alternative mechanism to regulate the distribution of resources. It has been claimed that the market is relatively far more just mechanism to distribute the legitimate share of recourses under the principle of efficiency.

It is very interesting to note that the principle of efficiency has been presented in post-colonial societies as the only way to realize the principle of freedom. Because any attempt to counter the so-called policy of economic liberalization is presented as anti-liberal.

However in Rawlsian frame work the principle of freedom is prior to the principle of efficiency. In this article it will be argued that in liberal conception of justice expounded by Rawls, the principle of liberty is prior to the principle of efficiency, and the distribution of resources through the myth of efficient-market-mechanism i.e. independent of State intervention and governance as redistributive authority is against the principle of liberty according to Rawls. Thus the so called economic liberalization and principle of liberty are mutually incompatible.

Keywords :Distribution of Resources, Economic-liberalization, Liberalism, Market, Rawls, State.

1. Introduction:

The contemporary process of economic liberalizaion is generally being presented as liberal policy framework. The globalization and economic liberalizaion are the two faces of a same coin. The process of globalizaion is presumed to be the universalizaion of two disinct tendencies i.e. the universalizaion ofliberal cosmopolitanism and free market capitalism according to Peter Gowan.(Gowan, Leo Panitch and Martin Shaw 2001. P.4).

This emerging world order which is apparently “spreading across the whole globe liberal democratic values and regimes”(Ibid) reveals the political side of globalization and identified itself as liberal cosmopolitanism. This new political order insists on the institutional guarantee of the legal protection of citizens’ human rights and democratic rights.

The compelling world order has conditioned the legitimacy of non-liberal statecraft with the acknowledgment and formalization of liberal rights i.e. minimal human rights and democratic rights, otherwise the so called international community which is a coalition of liberal West European states, USA and Japan will take away, the sovereignty license of “the delinquent state.”(Ibid. p.5) In short, we can say that the rise of unilateral so called liberal order has questioned the sovereignty of nation state under the slogan of liberal cosmopolitanism.

On the other hand the economic globalization is actually the internationalization of economy due to the globalization of financial markets, “a globalized market which dominates all the national economic parts. And so each national economy now subordinated to the logic of global market.” (Ibid p.6).

Thus the redistributing capacity of nation state has almost become insignificant in contemporary domination of global financial market. And market has been acknowledged as the legitimate mechanism for the distribution of resources. Thus it is actually the age of the re-construction of nation state as per rational of the global financial capital.

The hierarchy of state apparatus is also dominated by those who are “more closely associated with the forces of international capital, treasuries, central banks and so, forth were increasing their status at the cabinet table” (Panitch 2001p.10) according to Leo Panitch. He believes that this rising trend of free market capitalism which is promoted and protected by liberal cosmopolitan order is actually weakening the political sovereignty and redistributing capacity of nation state.

He claims that an interesting phenomenon of internationalization of state has been manifested. The process of internationalization of state is the process, in which “each domestic state increasingly not only take responsibility in the evolution of its economic and other policies for managing its domestic economy but for contributing to managing the global economy”. (Ibid.p.11).

Leo Panitch believes that the emergence of particular kind of internationalized community within a given state compels state apparatus to incline more towards outside of state i.e. capitalistic dynamics rather than inside. This is what similar to Ellul notion (See Ellul 1964) globalization i.e. always think globally to act locally.

(See Wincharles 2013). The internationalized community plays a fundamental role in the justification and codification of state’s constitution as per rational of global free market economy. This process of neo-liberal constitutionalization according to Panitch is actually the incorporation of “set of legal codes that makes it difficult not impossible but difficult to break with the disciplinary financial order, free trade provisions and above all the free capital mobility provisions that are the essence of economic globalization.” (Gowan, Leo Panitch and Martin Shaw 2001. P.12).

This brief exposition of contemporary dynamics of globalization in general and economic liberalization in particular which is protected and controlled by liberal political order provides us an opportunity to analyze this process in the light of establish liberal thinkers like Rawls so that we can understand the future dynamics and limitations of liberal order.

It is obvious that this process of globalization has questioned the redistributing capacity of a sovereign state which has been identified by Rawls as one of the fundamental condition of liberal political order. In the next section we will comprehensively discuss the significance of redistributive process in the realization and sustenance of liberal political order so that we can understand the rising internal crisis of liberal cosmopolitanism that it is gradually opposing the cause which produces it.

In Rawlsian framework, there is a delicate relationship between rules, Institutions and basic structure of a society. Rawls believes that it is possible for rules to be unjust while institutions are just .On the other hand, “institution may be unjust¹ although the social system as a whole is not” (Rawls 1971 p. 57). The institutional side of Rawlsian conception of justice is basically three-dimensional:

- i) The institutionalization of equal liberty.
- ii) The institutionalization of the distributive scheme.
- iii) The problem of civil duty and its institutional ramifications.

However in this article we will only focus on the institutionalization of distributive principle of Rawlsian theory of justice. The first section provides an initial exposition of Rawlsian principles of justice so that we can understand the organic link between Rawlsian liberty principle and his difference principle for the sustenance of liberal socio-political order.

In second section it will be argued that how Rawlsian reconciliation of private property economy i.e. interventionist-capitalist-economy and constitutional democracy through the institutionalization of second principle of justice in general and distributive principle in particular guarantees liberal system of justice. Through this analysis it will be argued that there is no necessary link between contemporary economic liberalization and principle of liberty rather it is contradictory to Rawlsian notion of liberal order.

¹ It is important to note that in Rawlsian framework “just order” simply mean liberal order or the order of freedom. We are interested in the analysis of conceptual deviation of the prevailing liberal order under the domination of market rationality. Therefore, in this article “Just” will be used in specific Rawlsian semantics or in other words Rawlsian use of the term

Section 1 :

Rawlsian contribution in the revitalization of liberalism not just as a philosophical thought but as a whole socio-political theory is more than obvious. He provides a firm basis for the advancement in political philosophy. A theory of justice is the refined version of liberalism explicating its moral and political stances. He “revives the English tradition of Hume and Adam Smith, of Bentham and of John Stuart Mill, which insists on relating its political speculation to fundamental research in moral psychology and political economy”.(Dworkin 1971).

A theory of justice not only revives the liberal tradition of moral and political philosophy but it also provides a legitimate realm for meaningful interdisciplinary discourses. “The specification of Rawls’s conception of justice is a paradigmatically interdisciplinary enterprise.”(Pogge 1989 p.7). This cross fertilizing quality of Rawlsian analysis is appreciated not just by the academicians but the popular press as well(Dworkin 1972).

It is an acknowledged fact that 1960s were a hard time for liberalism. On the one hand the socio-political conditions particularly in the United States, “the civil rights and black liberation movement, followed by the anti-Vietnam war movement, brought millions of people into conflict with existing political institutions”(Daniel 1989 p.xxxv).

These adverse circumstances were brought into question the authenticity of liberal socio-political institutions. The intellectual animosity towards liberalism was ignited because, “liberal moral and political judgments were pitted against liberal political institutions, and these institutions were in turn defended by the liberal political arrangement”(Ibid.).

On the other hand, existentialist and post-modernist critique along, with the prevailing positivism of analytic tradition play their role in the solemnization of its collapse. Rawls restates the liberal argument at a time when liberalism was becoming unfashionable. Against the positivistic and new-left critique, Rawls provides a comprehensive and sophisticated statement regarding the actual liberal position (in its most diluted and acceptable form) and saves it from total ideological bankruptcy.

“Logical positivism and the analytical approach seemed to abandon crucial issues of right and wrong in favor of technical questions about the emotive

function of moral language and the meanings of moral and political terms” (Ibid.p.xxxi). Rawlsian analysis plays a decisive role in the emancipation of moral and political discourse from mere semantic or linguistic analysis.

The Rawlsian conception of society is that of a contractually structured association of mutually self-interested individuals. The self-sufficient association presumes certain rules for the distribution of material resources among the members of this association. Since individuals are essentially self-interested therefore the possibility of conflict (regarding the distributive share of material resources) is organically embedded in such a society.

There is a need for a just and systematic socio-political and economic arrangement for the determination of fair distribution. Rawls believes that the principles behind such socio-political organization are the principles of social justice. The elementary function of these principles is to “... assign rights and duties in the basic institutions of society”(Rawls 1971. p.4).

The Rawlsian notion of a well-ordered society presumes two conditions: firstly, everyone believes that the other members accept the same principles of justice; secondly the basic socio-political institutions generally satisfy and are known to satisfy these principles. The theoretical corollaries of the Rawlsian conditions for the existence of a well-ordered society are:

- a. the social contract takes place among free, rational and self interested individuals (Individual’s freedom and rationality are considered as the structural preconditions of their (self-interested individuals) associations).
- b. the fundamental principles provide the foundations for the constitution and interpretations of further principles and consociational ventures.
- c. the essential concern of these principles, is to determine the sphere of basic rights, duties and the just distribution of material welfare.

Rawlsian derivation of liberal principles of justice is in itself a complex issue to understand the deontological dynamics of his principles of justice. The hypothetical conditions of original position in which liberal principles of justice have been discovered behind the veil of ignorance is in itself intellectually challenging but here we are interested in his difference principle to understand the nature of redistributive function it demands for the sustenance of liberal order. Therefore we are just referring to his liberal principles of justice which are stated as follows:

1.1. Two principles of justice The two principles of justice which Rawls put forward as likely to be chosen are:

First Principle :

“Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive system of basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberties for all”(Ibid.p.302).

Second Principle :

“Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both :

- a. to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.
- b. attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of equality of opportunity” (Ibid.p.302-303).

These principles of justice, derived by the formal contractors, are claimed to be the best possible attempt to reconcile the paradoxical co-existence of the issue of equality and liberty. The two principles assimilate liberty related aspects as well as equality related aspects of liberalism in a single socio-political framework.

However, in the establishment of his institutional structure, liberty has lexical priority over equality. Rawls explicitly states that, the first principle is prior to the second, because he believes that liberty can only be constrained for the sake of liberty itself. The conditions he presumes for the justification of his restricted conception of liberty are;

1. “a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all;
2. a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with lesser liberty” (Ibid.p.302).

This means that Rawlsian conception of liberty is not an anarchic conception. Its political predication legitimizes certain constraints. Rawls optimistically believes that these political constraints eventually yield a better political environment for the enhancement of the freedom of the individual.

In the second principle, part “b” is lexically prior to the part “a” (See Rawls 1999). This reveals that in order to sustain the equal system of liberty, Rawls gives priority to fair opportunity over the distribution of material resources.

This means that he is not willing to accept any scheme in which welfare of the least advantaged increases but as a result of this the liberty of conscience, personal property and political participation is constrained.

Rawls considers inequalities as natural because individuals are different in their mental and physical abilities and also in their natural endowments. He accepts that they have not determined their social location rather they have been unequally placed in different families, races, environment and social position.²

The second principle is concerned with the equality-related aspect of the theory. It is derived on the basis of the abstraction of the knowledge about the material resource one has or his social position. Before analyzing the first part of Rawls second principle, which he usually calls as difference principle Rawls presumes a social structure in which the first principle and the second part of the second principle i.e. equal freedom for all, and equal opportunity to compete are already being realized.

This means that “there is one class of equal citizens which defines a common status for all” (Rawls 1993 p. 144). The Rawlsian system presumes formal equality, i.e. a system of rights which treats every citizen equally before law. This means that before taking substantive inequalities (i.e. socio-economic inequalities) into consideration, formal equality is presumed to be established through the lexical priority of the first principle over second principle.

The substantive inequalities are the result of an unequal distribution of income, power, wealth and authority. Rawls believes that the inequalities of these primary goods are “just if and only if they are the part of a larger system in which they work out to the advantage of the most unfortunate representative man” (Ibid.).

Rawlsian distributive scheme is based on certain assumptions; firstly the inequalities of socio-economic system are chain-connected, which means that the rise in the expectations of the least income group eventually raises the expectations of all social positions.²

Secondly Rawls presumes that the inequalities of the social structure are also close-knit. This means that it is not possible to raise the expectations of one

² Rawlsian position regarding the prioritization of first principle over second principle and opportunity principle over difference principle is consistent in revised version of A Theory of Justice .revised edition, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University press 1999.

social group in isolation. The rise and fall of the expectations of different social groups are directly proportional to each other. Lastly the inequalities are such that there is no loose – jointedness (see Ibid. p.144-146). This means that there is no social position which remains unaffected with the rise and fall in the expectation of one social position in the chain.

However he acknowledges that there are certain cases in which the middle group remains unaffected but the possibility of such cases in a democratic society is negligible. Thus on the basis of these assumptions Rawls claims that “everyone benefits from an inequality which satisfies the difference principle” (Ibid. p.147).

Rawls has defended the priority of his principles of justice at two different levels:

- a. At the level of original position .
- b. At the level of institution .

His defence at institutional level is purely consequential because he thinks that the validity of the principles of justice can be tested by working out “their consequences for institutions and note their implications for fundamental social policy” Rawls 1971. p.152).

However his defence from the stand point of original position is relatively deductive while from the stand point of original position he considers principles of justice “as the maximum solution to the problem of social justice”(Ibid.).

The term “maximum” simply mean “maximum minimorum” (Ibid.p.154) . The maximum rule helps “to rank alternatives by the worst possible outcomes” (Ibid. p. 152). Thus the maximum rule provides a methodology to choose such a “choice the worst outcome of which is superior to the worst outcome of the other”(Ibid. p. 153).

The adoption of maximum rule in original position is attractive due the peculiar constraints imposed in the structure of original position. The choice of the two principles of justice seems to be rational in uncertain conditions of original position (from the stand point of the least advantaged group).

The maximum rule directs the attention of the contractors to the worst social existence (i.e. least advantaged group) that can be possible and encourages

them to minimize the cost of being in that worst condition and to decide in the context of that unfortunate situation.

Thus the self interested and mutually disinterested individuals accept the second principle which apparently constrains their absolute freedom, which is acknowledged in the first principle. So the lesser freedom is acceptable for such mutually disinterested contractors if the anti-egalitarian consequences maximize the benefits of the least advantaged group.

It is obvious that the max-min principle offers constraints on to the right of property or accumulation, which naturally restricts individual freedom. The question arises why do the contractors necessarily choose the second principle in the original position? One possible answer is that since the individual is ignorant about his own social position in the upcoming society, therefore being rational and self-interested he legitimately withdraws from his absolute right of accumulation.

The contractor accepts that the greatest benefit should go to the least advantaged section of the society. This sort of derivation reveals Rawls' preconceived notion of rationality. The rationale of the original position presumes two principles which have not been chosen but presumed by the contractors in the original position. They determine the parameters of the hypothetical choice situation³. The principles are:

- a. The principle of "rational choice".
- b. The principle of "deliberative rationality" .

The principle of rational choice justifies the derivation of the two principles of justice, whereas deliberative rationality provides the justification of the individual's pursuit of one's own conception of the good and also the ordering of one's own preferences and desires. There is a harmony between the principles of rational choice and that of deliberative rationality. In the Rawlsian framework deliberative rationalization must be "consistent with the counting principles and other principles of rational choice" Rawls (1971 p. 417).

It is important to note that the rationale of the original position presumes certain constraints which make the principles of justice culturally acceptable and compatible with the prevailing convictions about justice.

In an uncertain condition the rational behavior of an individual is based on:

- i) Knowledge of his wants.
- ii) Knowledge of the shape of his (convex) utility function.
- iii) Quest for the maximization of satisfaction subject to the constraint of risk aversion.

Although in the original position individuals are ignorant about their own specific conceptions of the good they know how to act rationally. They know that they must sustain their capacity to revise their conceptions of the good in an uncertain condition in which they do not even know their own specific conceptions of the good.

rational behaviour is that by which individuals try to maximize satisfaction while averting risk, and thus they choose the principles of justice. Rawls believes that being rational persons they must choose the first principle in order to sustain their capacity to frame, revise and pursue their own specific conceptions of the good of which they are ignorant.

On the other hand they must choose second principle because being rational the contractors maximize their opportunities in the worst condition and minimize the cost of being in that worst condition. A re-distributive mechanism (governed by the difference principle) of primary goods is to improve the capacities of those unfortunates who are left behind by cultivating their natural abilities (which are necessary to cope with the demand of competitive societies) at the cost of fortunate sections of society. Rawls acknowledges that apparently “difference principle” contradicts the lexical priority of the first principle, because the least advantaged section of a society is subsidized at the cost of the fortunate group (most advantaged group).

So that difference principle limits the sphere of freedom of fortunate group. In his defense however Rawls claims that since in the original position individuals are ignorant about their own social position therefore being rational individuals, “they will find it to their interest to agree to a principle”(Ibid. p.146) which apparently maximizes the living standard of least advantaged at the cost of upper income groups.

The difference principle does not negate the efficiency principle in absolute sense, but it is argued that the subsidization of one group cannot be possible without taxing the upper income groups. Since the natural abilities and talents of individuals are unequally distributed therefore it is generally argued that claim of equality of opportunity” is fictitious. It is further argued that those who belong to higher income groups cultivate their crud abilities or skills due to the availability of better resources, services and socio-cultural environment therefore the institutional assurance of equality of opportunity is meaningless among unequally equipped individuals.

In justice as fairness “the two principles of justice define distributive shares in a way compatible with efficiency” (Ibid.). The subsidization of the least advantaged at the cost of the most efficient group is not the rejection of efficiency principle rather he presumes that “when the difference principle is perfectly satisfied, the basic structure is optimal by the efficiency principle”(Ibid.).

The second principle also legitimizes the priority of the right over the good. Justice as fairness rejects the criterion of distribution according to moral desert. Rawls believes that it is difficult to “distinguish between moral desert and legitimate expectations” (Rawls 1984.p.44). However in Rawlsian procedural conception of justice the individuals can claim “fair shares” of resources according to the rights given to them and the compatibility of their claims to the existing socio-political arrangement. In a well-ordered society the distributive share of the individual should not be dependent on the moral worth of a particular conception of the good which he chooses in his private life.

This means that in theory there is no one to one correspondence between the distributive mechanism and moral preference of the individuals. Rawls believes that in order to sustain the mechanism of justice as fairness it is necessary to emancipate the distributive function from the moral desert principle. Because there is no direct relationship between the moral worth of an individual and his productive capability, therefore Rawlsian distributive mechanism remains neutral regarding the moral states of an individual.

Since justice as fairness remains neutral regarding the question of good, thus the issue of the distribution of primary goods is resolved on the basis of the body of rights, which has been prioritized over individual’s conceptions of good. It is important to note that this distributive mechanism presumes a well-ordered society, the society in which the socio-political institutions “are just (and are also) publicly recognized as just” (Ibid. p.45).

Since this distributive mechanism reflects the public conception of justice, it means that, it cannot be a-moral, but Rawls believes that the moral worth of the presumed conception of the good by the individual has trivial significance. The co-relation between moral worth and distributive shares can also be interpreted within the context of the “retributive” conception of justice. This presumes that those who belong to well-off sections of society must possess superior moral claims.

This moral superiority provides them greater opportunity to increase their distributive shares against those who violate the laws of the just society and are justly punished by deprivation. This argument confuses morality with legality, most of the times it happens that morality and legality does not match. This is one of the reasons that the rationale of justice as fairness does not allow an interpretation of the distributive principle in the retributive conception of justice.

The individual’s conception of the good is determined by “what is for him the most rational-long-term plan of life given reasonably-favorable circumstance”(Ibid. p.93). The primary goods according to Rawls are necessary instruments for actualizing any rational desire. Since different people have different conceptions of the good therefore the distribution of primary social goods is a core concern of justice as fairness. The contractors in the original position bargain about the possession of the fair share of these primary social goods.

So Rawls explains the prioritization of primary goods in the context of his “thin theory of the good”. The thin theory presumes that the knowledge of the, “thin conception of the good” is not blocked by the veil of ignorance. Therefore the process of bargain (in original position) presumes primary good index as a substantive criterion that qualifies the legitimate distributive shares according to the patterns of expectations of different social groups.

Rawls argues that since individuals are different in their abilities, capacities and potentialities therefore, their plan of life also differs but he believes that “primary goods are necessary means (to realize any system of ends)”(Ibid.). The determination of the weightage of these primary goods is a problematic issue but he argues that the lexical order of the principles of justice simplifies this problem.

Rawls believes that the weightage of the primary social goods and their (distributive) proportional combination is known by us intuitively.³ This implies that the rational ordering (of primary goods) of the representative individual of the least advantaged group can only be known by “our intuitive capacities” (Ibid.p.94), although “self-respect” is lower in the priority list of social good, it is important to note that the priority of this social good is not determined by the second principle rather by the first.

“Rawls appeals extensively to self-respect in support of his first principle and its lexical priority”(Ibid.). However he acknowledges that the protection of formal equality of basic liberties is not the ultimate guarantee for the sustenance of the individual’s sense of self-respect, because economic inequalities eventually generate a consciousness, which negates the possibility of self-respect.

Rawls has also tackled the problem of the individual’s “criterion of expectation” through the distribution of primary goods. He rejects the utilitarian criterion of individual expectations. In his perspective the expectations of individual should be defined in terms of the primary social goods rather than in term of pleasure or satisfaction. It appears that the distribution of these primary goods is the concern of equality related aspect of his theory of justice, because primary social goods are the legitimate instrument to actualize substantive conception of the good presumed by formal, rational and self-interested individuals.

But we cannot ignore the organic relation between primary goods and the liberty-related aspect of the theory of justice, because if individuals do not possess the primary social goods then the claim “to be free” is fictitious. To be free in the real sense is the ability to accumulate these primary goods. The primary goods are the concrete form of freedom and one can never realize one’s freedom except through the accumulation of these goods. Rawls claims that “it is rational to want those goods whatever else is wanted. Since, they are in general necessary for framing and the execution of a rational plan of life” (Rawls 1971.p. 433). In reality these are the pre-conditions for freedom. Thus if we provide an equitable distribution of these primary goods then what we are promoting is freedom.

In the light of above discussion we can say that conception of justice which emerges from Rawlsian principles of justice is essentially a liberal conception of justice. In his framework the individual alone determines what is (privately)

³ It is a problematic side of his formulation because the criterion is shifted from rational choice to ethical intuitionism see Ibid p. 94-97.

good for him, subject to the constraint that the only public good is freedom. Rawls'

emphasis on the issue of distribution creates an illusion that he is more committed with equality than liberty.

In his framework the distribution of material resources becomes the fundamental question because his theory of justice is concerned with the allocation of primary goods as the only means to realize freedom. He tries to reinterpret the meaning of the individual's substantive conception of the good. If one rejects the right of self-determination regarding the autonomous pursuit of the substantive conception of the good, then the issue of distribution becomes irrelevant.

The prioritization of distributive justice is based on the right of self-determination. This is so because if the individual is free to pursue his own (private) conception of the good, he can only operationalize his freedom on the basis of primary social goods. Thus the distributive principle becomes the fundamental principle of a liberal society because it ensures the concrete manifestation of the right of self-determination.

Rawls believes that the institutionalization of the two principles of justice is possible only in a private property economy and constitutional democracy. In our next section we will focus on the institutional implications of the second principle of justice.

Section 2 :

The Institutionalization of Second principle of justice:

The distributive side of the theory of justice comes under the heading of second principle. Rawls provides the scheme of the institutional arrangement (regarding the distribution of material welfare) necessary for the constitution of a modern liberal statecraft. The principles of justice in general and second principle in particular provide the basis of “a doctrine of political economy” (Ibid. p.258). Rawls consciously avoids the term “welfare” because of its linguistic identification with utilitarianism.

He rather prefers to use the phrase “social choice” to identify the object of distribution. He believes that any doctrine of political economy presumes a particular conception of the “public good” which serves as an evaluative criterion to judge the socio-economic policies. The legalization of socio-economic phenomena, according to Rawls, directly affects the basic structure of the society, social system, and structures of desires, aspirations and preference of its citizens.

On the other hand, economic structure provides the institutional framework to satisfy their desires, wants and needs. The economic structure not only satisfies the existing needs and wants of its citizens but it also provides a “way of creating and fashioning wants in the future.”(Ibid. p.259). The choice of these socio-economic arrangements is determined by the conception of “human good” and the “institutions”,

which are designed to realize those ends. Rawls acknowledges that the social cooperation without any conception of “human good” is not possible. He claims that justice as fairness provides a framework in which any interpretation of human good (i.e. political, moral, aesthetical, and economic) is realizable which is not in conflict with the prioritized principles of justice in general and ‘will to freedom’ in particular.

The issue of “public good” is central as far as the issue of distribution is concerned :therefore Rawls tries to justify the authenticity of “contract theory” in the derivation of a public conception of the good. He specifically claims that

the superiority of contract doctrine as an alternative to ethical intuitionism and moral perfectionism. Traditionally, it was believed that there is no “Archimedean position” other than ethical intuitionism & moral perfectionism to judge the “real aim” or “public good”.

Rawls claims that his conception of original position and derivation of the principles of justice is a unique alternative to judge the most abstract and highly general human social good that “men are presumed to want whatever else they want”(Ibid. p.260). He acknowledges that the list of these identified “primary social goods is may be based on psychological premises and these may prove incorrect” but he emphasizes that the identified goods are necessary to pursue any rational plan of life. He believes that theory of justice does presume a theory of good, but the theoretical as well as institutional nomenclature of the theory of justice are so, flexible⁴ that the conception of the good does not affect the pursuit or “choices” of individuals to plan their life according to their own will. In short it is a purely secular framework in which any conception of good is realizable ⁵except one which contradicts the public good i.e. equal freedom.

According to Rawls, the “contract doctrine” presumed by theory of justice offers certain constraints on the conception of good, which serves two purposes simultaneously:

- a. It establishes the priority of “justice” over “efficiency” because people are naturally unequal in their efficiencies but even than they are all equally human and have equal right to be treated justly.
- b. It also ensures the priority of individual freedom over social and economic advantages, because the precedence of liberty over all other conceptions of good is necessary to sustain the secular framework.

⁴ See Ibid page 260, the reason of his deceptive flexibility is that Rawls prioritizes ‘right’ over the “good” in the constitution of just socio-political order and “good” has trivial significance in constitution of just socio-political order.

⁵ See page 258-62. It is theoretically claimed that in such political procedure any conception of good is realizable but in actuality it is not the case, because the conception of good which is organically linked with the Rawlsian conception of Justice is such, which de-construct any particular conception of good, form of life, communal bond etc. which reject absolute priority of “individual freedom” as an only legitimate public good

Any desire or plan of life, which violates the ultimate priority of justice, would be considered as illegitimate. The Rawlsian condition regarding the legitimacy of the desires or plans of life is presumed to be an “institutional criterion” to judge the legitimacy of desires and also discourage those desires which are in conflict with the principles of justice. Therefore, there is a need to construct an institutional framework which performs two functions:

- i. Promote the virtues of justice as fairness .
- ii. Discourage those desires or plans of life, which are in conflict with the virtues of justice as fairness.

In this way Rawls implicates a criterion of how a citizen should be. That is to say that through the principle of justice he provides “a partial ideal of the person which social and economic arrangement must respect”(Ibid. p.261). Moreover, through the institutionalization of the principles of justice, Rawls establishes an Archimedean position to assess the long-term interests of society “irrespective of the particular desires and needs of its present members”(Ibid.).

The nature of the principles of justice is such that it presumes certain institutional structures. These Institutions offer certain constraints on individual's desire or plans of life, which are incompatible with justice as fairness. So there is a resemblance between perfectionism and justice as fairness, as both offers certain constrains on immediate pursuit of the existing desires, which are incompatible with the ideal of the person presumed by these theories.

Rawls acknowledges that utilitarianism also provides a ground for choosing among different ideals of the person i.e. “greatest happiness for greatest numbers” but the problem lies in the institutional application of the principle of utility. In utilitarian perspective, “initial conditions (i.e. existing desires and present circumstances) may heavily influence the conception of human good that should be encouraged”(Ibid. p.262).

So utilitarianism collapses into vulgar consequentialism. However Rawls believes that the ideal of person or the fundamental criterion of social structure is purely a-consequential in justice as fairness and perfectionism Justice as fairness is embrionically an individualistic approach but at the same time it is not purely subjective regarding the issue of human good at the public level. Rawlsian principles of justice provide objective institutional standards to differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate desires, wants and aspirations. The contractarian basis of justice as fairness provides an alternative to

perfectionist or a priori principles regarding the attainment of the vantage position to judge the mechanism of fair social order.

Rawls believes that in a contractually structural society the general desire of primary social goods provides the basis of agreement among self-interestedly-motivated individuals. The framework of the original position sustains:

- i. Neutrality and the fairness of agreement.
- ii. The objectivity of the general desires of primary social goods.
- iii. The list of the primary social goods.
- iv. Unanimity of the agreement (among equally free rational and self interested individuals), because Rawls believes that, “the deliberation of any one person is typical of all”(Ibid.p.263).
- v. Equal sense of justice.

According to Rawls, the idea of unanimity presumed in the theory of justice must not be confused with the political philosophy of idealism. The basis of general consensus is contractarian in nature therefore “there is nothing characteristically idealistic about the supposition of unanimity”(Ibid.). The derivation of consensus is the byproduct of a bargaining process among self-interested individuals.

Thus, the idea of homogeneity has also been derived by Rawls from the idea of unanimity. According to him, the idea of unanimity has been interpreted differently in traditional moral philosophy, which provides the basis and legitimacy of the structural formation of political order. With reference to his idea of unanimity justice as fairness prioritizes a-social individualism but the importance of community (by community he simply means contractually structured collectivity) is not being ignored and has properly been accommodated by Rawls in his idea of unanimity.

The role of community in the derivation of human good is central. It also provides the initial basis of contractual association among self-interestedly motivated individuals. The distributive scheme of Rawlsian procedural conception of justice presumes a particular conception of public order which characterizes the features, values, convictions and moral intuitions of a society. If we take a glance of the background institutions of his distributive mechanism we can realize that he tries to institutionally ensure all those

aspects of social constitution which are necessary to sustain liberal public order.

2.1. The Background Institutions for Distributive Justice.

It seems that for Rawls the basic structure of a society is an organic whole. The major socio-political institutions are the binding agency, which sustains that structure. On the other hand, the principles of justice provide an evaluative criterion of social justice. Rawls believes that central problem of distributive justice, “is the choice of a social system”(Ibid. p.274) which is compatible with the principles of justice.

Rawls believes that social and economic process should properly be channeled by the political and legal institutions. This, on the one hand, implies that Rawls prioritizes politics over economics and on the other hand, social justice in general and distributive justice in particular both are impossible in the absence of fair, efficient and neutral legal institutional structure compatible with the principles of justice.

Rawls has divided the background institutions of government into four different branches:

- I. The allocation branch .
- II. The stabilization branch.
- III. The transfer branch .
- IV. The distributive branch .

According to him, each branch has its own domain of activities and consists of various supporting agencies according to the demand of specific socio-economic conditions. The allocation branch is responsible to keep price system competitive and sustains its workability against unhealthy market tactics. The allocation branch controls market function, for instance maintains competitive system of price. The allocation branch is also responsible to identify or to correct different sections of economy, which are needed to be subsidized or taxed. Furthermore, it is also responsible to define or (in most cases) redefine property right, (if necessary) for the realization of the principles of justice.

The stabilization branch resolves the problems, which emerge due to the economic process, for instance problem of unemployment, inflation, free choice of occupation and also money supply and sustains effective mechanism of demand /supply. The major function of this branch is to stabilize the economic system. The assessment and evaluation of needs (or an appropriate standard of life) is addressed and compensated by transfer branch. According

to him, “transfer branch guaranteed a certain level of well-being and honors the claims of need”(Ibid.p.276).

The basic function of these branches is to associate different precepts with specific institutions. The different precepts are judged and balanced on the basis of their compatibility with the principles of justice. The role of transfer is very crucial because it provides the minimum standard of well-being. Therefore, Rawls believes that after maintaining the minimum standard of well-being of the citizens it would be “perfectly fair that the rest of the total income be settled by the price system” by presuming that the major cause of monopolistic exploitation and “unreasonable externalities have been eliminated”(Ibid. p.277).

Lastly, Rawls mentions the function of the fourth branch, i.e. distributive branch. Rawls believes that preservation of the approximate justice in distributive share is the core concern of the distributive branch. In concrete sense the regulation of the system of taxation along with the reasonable adjustment in property right (subject to the constraint that the adjustment does not violate the principles of justice) is the major function of this branch.

Rawls divides the distributive branch into two parts, both of which correspond to each principle of justice respectively. One aspect of this branch limits the concentration of capital / power, and at the same time controls the factors, which do effect the realization of “fair political liberty and fair equality of opportunity”(Ibid.). The other aspect of this branch is responsible to generate capital (revenues) necessary for the governmental expenditures regarding the distribution of public good.

Rawls precisely claims that each dimension of distributive branch corresponds to the two principles of justice. The institutionalization of taxation, redefinition of property right etc. are the institutional strategies to protect the legitimacy of those political institutions which ensure fair equality of liberty (i.e. first principle).

On the other hand, the collected revenue from taxation finances the public good which at the same time subsidizes the least advantaged section of the society as well as ensures the fair equality of opportunity. Thus, the second principle is institutionally realized.

The problem of distribution could be tackled either by the regulation of income structure i.e. by setting out the standards of minimum wages or by the satisfaction of the claims of basic needs, that is, the satisfaction of the minimum standards of well-being. Rawls considers the later approach towards

the establishment of social justice as much more effective than that of the former. There are two major reasons behind this as follows:

- a. The standardization of the “claims of need”, i.e., the minimum standard of well-being is not the realm of market. There must be a need of extra-market or supra-market arrangement, i.e., of state which determines the criterion of “social minimum”. This legitimizes the priority of politics over economics (Ibid.p.276).
- b. In Rawlsian distributive scheme, the division of the different branches is basically the division of different tasks. The nature of the tasks assigned to each branch is at the same time claimed to be:
 - i. Compatible and reinforces the task of the other branches.
 - ii. Consistent with the spirit of the justice as fairness in general and principle of justice in particular.

The above mentioned background institutions of government reveal a paradoxical relation between state and market. The state / market relationship (derives from Rawlsian distributive scheme) provides the basis of economic theory and political economy. But in theory of justice Rawls is not directly concerned with the explanation or analysis of economic theory. He focuses on the problems of political economy only pertaining to the question of social justice.

2.2. Distributive justice and state/market relationship.

Rawls claims that the purpose of discussions about economic theory is to substantiate the implications and scope of his principles of justice (Ibid.p.265). He wants to analyze the practicality of difference principle in the context of contemporary ideas of political economy. He analyzes the issues of political economy from the perspective of a “citizen who is trying to organize his judgment concerning the justice of economic institutions.”(Ibid.) Generally, an economic system is defined by six core factors namely (1) Production, (2) Means of production, (3) Consumption and the nature of consumer, (4) Labor contribution, (5) Role of saving and investment of social resources and (6) Provision of public goods. (Ibid.p.266)

According to Rawls: ideally all these factors “should be arranged in ways that satisfy the two principles of justice.”(Ibid.). The core concern of distributive

justice is the equitable distribution of public goods. The size of the public sector is very crucial in the institutionalization of the distributive justice. Rawls acknowledges that the size of the public sector in capitalist economy, or in Rawlsian term “private property economy,” is very small as compared to that of socialist economy (in which all means of productions are owned by the state). However, in private property economy state acts as an entrepreneur along with other private enterprises. It is because of this reason “the number of publicly owned firms is presumably small and in any event limited to special cases such as public utilities and transportation” (Ibid.).

It would be better to discuss the essential qualities of a public good before discussing the institutions, which make the equitable distribution of public good possible.

There are two essential qualities of a public good namely :

(1) indivisibility and (2) Publicness.

By “indivisibility” Rawls means that the good is equally enjoyed by all citizens and cannot be divided privately and purchased according to one’s preferences. However, he acknowledges that the degree of indivisibility varies, due to which the public goods are of various kinds “depending upon their degree of indivisibility and the size of the relevant public.”(Ibid.) . On the other hand provision of the public good is the realm of the state and not that of the market.

Rawls believes that :“public goods must be arranged for through the political process and not through the market.”(Ibid. p.267) . The derivation and systematic institutionalization of the distribution of public goods are the major concerns of justice as fairness otherwise the system of social cooperation will collapse. As a result, mutually disinterested individuals lose their commitment with system which is conditional to the possibility of the realization of their self-interests.

Rawls identifies two major problems, which are associated with the idea of public good :

- a. The problem of collective actions.
- b. The problem of assurance of collective agreements.

The above problems are organically linked with each other and secondly both problems are resolved by a single agency i.e. state. The production, protection and promotion of public goods are financed by the revenue collected from the general public. The problem is that the contribution of particular individuals in the overall collection (revenue) is negligibly trivial.

This triviality of the individual's contribution (in the promotion /production of public good) ignites a "temptation for each person to try to avoid doing his share."(Ibid.). When people realize that other members of the society are not equally contributing in the production of public good then they start losing their confidence in the system. The lack of assurance (regarding the equal contribution of the other members) makes people skeptical about the fairness of the institutional structure of society.

The public willingness regarding the payment of their fair share is necessarily conditioned with the institutional assurance of collective agreement. This implies that the collective agreement and its institutional assurance are the core issues of distributive justice according to Rawls.

In order to resolve both problems Rawls depends on the "state" as a legitimate agency to provide a legal / institutional framework which on the one hand forces individuals to contribute their fair share and, on the other hand, provides institutional assurances regarding the enforcement of binding rules. The enforcement of binding rules through statecraft eventually negates individual freedom but generally the coercion is presumed to be perfectly rational (in the Rawlsian sense) and legitimate because "the public good is everyone's advantage and one that all would agree to arrange for."(Ibid) .

Like all others liberals Rawls also appreciates the realization of the principle of efficiency and liberty through market mechanism. But at the same the egalitarian temperament of Rawls urges to counter the anti-egalitarian consequences caused by the market, i.e., income disparities or inequalities, capital concentration which threatens the positive aspects of market.

The conception of state derived from Rawls theory of justice is essentially interventionist state, which counters the monopoly of market and avoids mafia capitalism. He thinks that interventionist role of state is necessary for the realization of the principles of efficiency and freedom through market mechanism. Rawls acknowledges that market essentially increases the initial advantages of those who already belong to advantaged group.

This increase in initial advantages undermines the significance of efficiency and individuals' freedom. The income disparities and meaninglessness of the opportunity principle eventually disenchant the least advantaged group and encourage them to challenge the liberal socio-political system. Rawls' conception of state protects the class based society or market society by restraining the market exploitation and monopoly through state intervention.

Rawls differentiates between the ideal theory of justice from non-ideal theory of justice. He believes that the ideal theory provides a criterion to identify the nearest possible actualization of theory under given circumstances. Rawls opines that the two principles of justice are the preambles (i.e. ideal) of a constitution for the state but the constitution must be formulated according to the "natural circumstances and resources, its level of economic advance and political culture and so on." (Ibid.p.197).

It implies that principles are ideal but their institutionalization must be compatible with existing conditions, for instance, in the light of ground realities and given circumstance the equal liberties may be restricted for the maximization of greater equal liberty. Similarly, the difference principle undermines first principle for the maximization of greater equal liberties in future.

The justification of state intervention provided by Rawls is that the state is the only legitimate agency which assures the just distributive mechanism. He believes that "the indivisibility and the publicness of certain essential goods, and the externalities and temptation to which they give rise, necessitate collective agreements organized and enforced by the state." (Ibid.p.268) .

There is no agency other than state which can provide assurance that the other citizens are doing their part. There are different arguments regarding the organic relation between the legitimacy of state intervention and assurance problem of the state. Most of the people argue that why not the assurance problem "was handled within the framework of customary practice and personal allegiance." (Fisk 2000. p.246).

The political framework which Rawls is to deal with presumes constitutional democracy and private property economy. The society emerges from such institutional setup is a civil society in which traditional allegiance and collectivities (religion, tribal and kinship eventually disintegrate). The social atomization presumes self-interestedly motivated and marketized relationship among citizens as the basis of social order. The individuals make their existence meaningful in various market roles.

Therefore they have to rely on a coercive power of state as a lender of the last resort. Rawls believes that market cannot provide such assurance because it lacks coercive administrative structure or executive power. Rawls takes a clear anti-monopolistic stance and considers monopoly as a social evil.

It is obvious that monopoly is the unintended consequence of market mechanism which is needed to be counter through active state intervention (i.e. equitable income distribution, allocation of resources, subsidization and taxation etc.). Rawls believes that the monopolies result concentration of capital and primary social goods. So there is a need of coercive state structure to incorporate those who are left behind due to their inefficiency.

Rawls acknowledges that a competitive market is desirable because of actualization of individual's freedom and efficiency but he claims that market institutions are needed to be harmonized with the socio-political institutions through state intervention. It implies that he does not consider market mechanism as self-sufficient.

His dependence on state as a re-distributive agency is of pragmatic nature because he believes that "competitive market is not sufficient for the job of stabilization." (Ibid. p.249). Justice as fairness provides a conception of state which complements market mechanism. The state performs two functions simultaneously:

firstly, it counteracts the monopoly of market forces through price control mechanism, system of taxation and subsidization and investment (as an independent entrepreneur). Secondly it reduces the tendencies which are inherently linked with competitive market mechanism (i.e. concentration of capital, income disparities, Inequalities etc.) through the redistribution of primary social goods.

It implies that in principle Rawls is not against competitive market but he considers state as supportive agency of market. For instance the market cannot

insure that competition begins from equal positions, similarly, in case of market failures the market cannot sustain it-self autonomously:

it necessarily looks towards state as a last resort. Rawls believes that principles of justice in general and difference principle in particular preserve the market mechanism and through a redistributive function it keeps the work force intact with the system. Rawls opines that without active state intervention the market mechanism does not remain competitive.

It implies that justice as fairness presumes a market society and tries to make it competitive through active state intervention. Thus unlike libertarian the competitive market mechanism cannot be governed and stabilized by invisible hand rather active state intervention is necessary to ensure competitive and stable market. The interesting aspect of this relationship between market and state is that Rawls provides rationale for class based society.

He thinks that classlessness is not the necessary condition of the fairness of just social order. It may be argued that what is the justification of this coercive state intervention if the citizens already have a sense of justice? And they are the participants of a well-ordered society. The answer is simple: Rawls's sense of justice does not prevent people from invading one another through exploitation."(Ibid.p.255).


Conclusion :

We can summarize our discussion as follows:

1. Politics is the domain of citizenship where as market is the realm of capital. Since Rawls believes in the autonomy of self. He considers individual as autonomous law giver, therefore he legitimizes the sovereignty of individual over that of market. In this context the role of state presumed by Rawls is decisive.

In Rawlsian framework state is the only legitimate institution which sustains the individual's sovereignty, autonomy and his capacity to master his destiny. It seems that Rawls believes that there are certain extra-market spaces in which extra-market relations can be developed. Secondly it also seems that he believes that state is the only legitimate agency to enforce any conception of good (derived by the overlapping consensus of interlocutors) for the general welfare of the people (although Rawls is very suspicious about this term of welfare).

2. In the end we can say that contemporary discourse of economic liberalization is the deviation from the theoretical as well as institutional foundations of liberalism provided by Rawls and the result of this deviation is that the domination of market over state has been established.
3. Lastly the domination of the rational of capital reveals the internal crises of liberalism that in absence of any alternative framework like socialism etc. order of freedom and the order of capital are synonymous. And liberal discourse is just an instrument to establish the sovereignty of global capital.




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
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PART : 2



SOME CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY

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Despite the fact that we are confronted with the phenomenon of the "Inflation of democracy", at the intellectual level, voter turnout rate is decreasing all over the world. Hobsbawm notes that people are legitimately withdrawing from citizenship. "The state's powers and functions have been undermined by the size of supranational and infranational forces,...this can best be described as the withdrawal of its inhabitants from citizenship" (1996 p. 73). The weakening of the state is accompanied by the increased dominance of market forces. This domination of the circuit of capital over the circuit of citizenship is a manifestation of what I call "the internal contradiction of capitalist democracy".

What are the reasons behind this withdrawal from the sphere of citizenships. Has the enlightenment's claim of anthropocentricity and the sanctity of the right of self-determination become irrelevant for the new generation? What are the underpinning factors behind this legitimate withdrawal from the sphere of citizenship?

When we look at the present western political system in global perspective, two important tendencies are evident.

- (a) *Successful accumulation of capital is not of a domestic nature rather it is intrinsically global. That also leads to an increase in the concentration of capital.*
- (b) *Political and cultural communities are disintegrating throughout the western world. Political theorists believe that these tendencies be countered by the development of "civil society".*

The idea of civil society contrasts itself from that of religious society. Civil society is supposed to emerge due to the establishment of a contract among equally rational, free and self-interested individuals. In such a society individuals are "held together by impersonal bonds of interest rather than ties of kin and blood" (Ignateiff 1995 p. 130), or faith. Civil society provides a fair procedure which helps individuals to pursue their own conception of the good. It presumes the existence of a self-sustaining mechanism, ordered by an efficient and systematically organised legal framework. It provides "...a self-correcting mechanism in which the selfish actions of myriad individuals brought together only by the rule of law, manages to produce an orderly and dynamic accumulation of prosperity unprecedented in human history" (Ignateiff p. 130). The paradigm of the market is constantly expanding. "The economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behaviours". (Escobar 1995 p. 151) Becker's work on population represents all social and personal relationships as capable of marketisation. In modern political economy, the sole criteria for the determination of what ought to be and what

ought not to be is that of the market. Modern political economy presumes market activity to be self-justificatory. The state is not expected to play any part in the determination of value.

Civil society and free market economy reinforce each other. "Even as a welfare agency the state does not work against the market" (Berthoval 1955 p. 73). The presumption behind "this neo-liberal frame work is that economic growth without any redistribution at all should allow us to solve the dramatic problem of poverty throughout the world without the smallest contribution imposed upon the rich" (Berthoval p. 73). Gellner considers civil society as "a profane society, a society that explicitly sought to put the lowest of human desires to productive uses". Mandeville acknowledges that, in such a society, "private vices make public virtues. The profane is purified by demonstrating that capitalist individuals are more likely to promote the public good when they looked exclusively to their private interest (both quoted in & Ignatieff 1995 p. 130). In a nutshell, we can say that it is presumed that the market can produce an equitable and just redistributive system and civil society could also be a moral order spontaneously and unintentionally generated by the operation of market forces.

But the accumulation of global capital has historically depended upon the strengthening of the nation state. Today, this nation state is being weakened through decentralisation. Hobsbawm identifies three basic reasons for the decentralisation of nation states.

"First, the creation of a supranational (or rather transnational) economy, whose transactions are largely uncontrolled or even uncontrollable by states, restricts the capacity of states to direct national economies...Second, the state has been weakened by the rise of regional or global institutions such as the European Union and the international banking institutions...Third, territorial borders have been made largely irrelevant by the technological revolution in transport and communications" (1996 p. 272).

Decentralisation is being promoted globally. Small communities are actually performing two functions, one is intentional and the other which is more important and disastrous is unintentional.

Firstly, the international function is to sustain the sphere of citizenship which is shrinking because of the individual's legitimate voluntary withdrawal from the sphere of citizenship at the national level. "the decline in ideological mass parties, politically mobilising electoral machines or other organisations for mass civic activity (such as labour unions) is (an indication of this); another is the spread of the values of consumer individualism, in an age when the satisfactions of rising consumption are both widely available and constantly advertised". (Hobsbawm 1996 p. 273) Civil society is basically a capitalist institution of instrumental nature. Its functions is to sustain liberal public order which is disintegrating, because of the politically and socially dangerous growth of inequality between regions and individuals. That free market policies, uncorrected by public redistribution create social inequalities needs no proof after the dramatic increase in the inequality of income since the 1980s. (Hobsbawm 1996 p. 275), We observe that the economic concessions (social benefits and welfare) granted previously have no justification in current liberal thought. The claim that the state must prevent the least privileged from incurring losses has now become obsolete. And the situations is that: about 300 million people in the third world were unemployed or under-employed in the late

1970s', as were about 22 million people in the industrialised capitalist countries. By 2000, it is estimated that well over one billion people will be seeking employment in the third world alone (Gursoy 1998 p. 4). Due to the incapacity of the state, the liberal promoters of civil society are providing support to non-governmental organisations and trying to delegitimise the state's social interventions. It is important to note that civil society presumes a free market economy, but the inevitable consequence of the flourishing of the market mechanism is that the state gets weaker and weaker. Thus a strong civil society creates a weak state.

Secondly, the unintentional consequence of decentralisation is that, it legitimates capital accumulation and concentration. The only instrument which a modern political economy has to counter the hegemony of capital, is the nation state. But because of the development of the free market economy and civil society the state gets weaker and weaker so that the possibility of the performance of the redistribute function becomes increasingly difficult.

The basic category of the liberal state is citizenship, and such a state is basically a representative of the citizen, but who is a citizen? In principle (according to classical liberal political theory) the citizen is the sovereign and he has a divine right. Since he has divine right, he is free to choose whatever he wants, or whatever he wills. In this context the state is an instrument through which he can realise or actualise his desires and wants which are necessarily legitimate because he is sovereign, rational and free. Thus the liberal conception of citizenship presumes every individual to be equally free and rational that is why on the one hand at the private level everybody has a right to pursue his own conception of the good. On the other hand, everybody has equal right of vote, irrespective of his religious, social, cultural, political, educational upbringing. The vote is an abstract form of freedom. Since the citizen legitimately surrenders his sovereignty to the state therefore it is necessary for the state to legitimise that relinquishment. The state must effectively and honestly perform a redistributive function so that even disadvantaged citizens can realise their desires. The redistributive function of the nation state is in actuality an important instrument which sustains the sphere of liberal citizenship. Otherwise the commitment of the people to the state in principle become illegitimate. This reveals an important aspect of the relation between liberal socio-political theory and the idea of citizenship.

The market is basically the sphere of non-citizenship. In the market we are not equal individuals, or in other words we are not citizens, nor are we men, or women, or black, or white or Hindu or Muslim. We are consumers or producers or labourers or managers. In short the market is not subordinate to political democratic morality. It is not just a moral but immoral. In *Social Limits to Growth* (1976) Fred Hirsch dealt at length with what he called "the depleting moral legacy of capitalism". He argued that the market undermines the moral values that are its own essential underpinnings, values that have been inherited from preceding socio economic moral orders, specifically Christianity.

Thus the market is the sphere of oppression and selfishness. The rationale of the market is purely consequentialist, "the seductive power of the market is so powerful today that aid is no longer viewed as a moral policy. With the failure of the centralised planning model and the rise of the new market mentality, aid is quite explicitly designed in purely utilitarian terms". (Berthoin 1995 p. 731). The market is not the sphere of

citizenship it is that of capital. Capital is the surplus extracted out of the circuit of production. Capital is something which is constantly searching for itself. This is one of the reasons that in a capitalist economy the goods market is superseded by the money market, and the real evaluative centres of the economy are the financial markets. The objective of all economic activity is accumulation for its own sake, the amassment of pure quantity. The driving force behind financial markets is normally speculation and not investment for the satisfaction of human needs. In the market capital compels individuals to accumulate for the sake of accumulation.

Thus, according to liberal political theory the market is the sphere of capital while the state is the sphere of citizenship. In the realm of citizenship, the individual is sovereign. He has the divine right to desire what ever he wants, whereas in the sphere of capital all one can desire, is capital accumulation which is an end in itself. The dilemma of liberal theory is, that these different spheres of sovereignties normally clash with each other.

The sovereignty of the citizen clashes with the sovereignty of capital. The question arises as to why this happens? What is the justification of this confrontation? The enlightenment claim of anthropocentricity presumes the project of the enhancement of freedom. When this project is concretised in political, economic discourse, we find two aspects of the realisation of freedom.

- (a) *The abstract form of freedom = vote (circuit of citizenship)*
- (b) *The concrete form of freedom = capital (circuit of capital)*

Theoretically the individual is free to desire, anything he desires. But the irony is that the only desire he must have is the desire for capital accumulation because capital is the concrete form of freedom. In a capitalist economy, the individual is compelled to accept the sovereignty of capital because he does not have any instrument other than capital through which he can realise his freedom (remember Rawl's primary goods). Because of this internal contradiction of liberal political theory, we are experiencing the legitimate withdrawal from the sphere of citizenship and the extension of the circuit of capital. This withdrawal from the sphere of citizenship puts democracy at risk. But a threat to democracy is also a threat to capitalism for the pursuits of enlightened self-interest requires commitment to the ideology of antecedent individuality and the divine right of the citizen.

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
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Rise of Fundamentalist Discourse and the Reassertion of Modern Ethos

"The wound is the place, where the light enters you". (Rumi)

*Abdul Wahab Suri**

Abstract

[The religious resurgence in the contemporary world has generally been described as a threat to global peace in general and to the axiological centrality of humanist values i.e. autonomy and self-determination, in particular. This threat presumes an oversimplified version of fundamentalism which is not only predominantly modernistic but also views religious reservations against modern life-world in abstraction to postmodern critique on the colonization of modern discursive practices. Islamic discourse determines the limit of modernity in the non-Western, post-colonial world; on the other hand, it provides substantive theoretical resistance to anti-foundationalist, contingent and relativistic postmodernism prevailing in Eurocentric cultures. In this way, Islamic discourse naturally performs two functions simultaneously which has the potential to be instrumentalised for the sustenance of modern institutional order. – *Author.*]

Introduction

The objective of this paper is to explicate that how the struggle for the resurgence of Islamic order is being instrumentalised by the dominant modern discourse. The emergence of multiple narratives about Islam, for instance, Modern Islam, Fundamentalist Islam, Moderate Islam, Liberal Islam, Democratic Islam, Illiberal Islam, Cosmopolitan Islam etc. are all different narratives to counter the contemporary religious resurgence. In this paper only the fundamentalist discourse will be analysed. This analysis of the phenomena of Islamic fundamentalist discourse from the modern spectacles will be useful for the Islamists, to reconsider their theoretical framework to address their European audience, and to develop strategies to protect Islam from being instrumentalised. Another important concern of this paper is to emphasize the significance of the antagonistic relation between the dominant discourse i.e. modern, with its competing discourses i.e. Islamic fundamentalist and postmodern discourses.

Lastly, it is an attempt to realise that the real change is actually the change of the discourse and any change within the dominant discourse will complement it and its corresponding institutions rather than challenging it in a substantive manner.

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It is important to differentiate fundamentalism from fundamentalist discourse. Although it is difficult to make such differentiation, an attempt will be made to make this differentiation possible. Discourse should not be confused with the medium of communication or "synonymous to the language as such."¹ Discourse rather, determines the condition of meanings. It provides the matrix in which people make sense of their expressions, explications and even the meaning of one's existence. It is important to note that there is no one-to-one correspondence between reality and the discourse of reality. This means that, discourse is a "way of producing that something real, as identifiable, classifiable, knowable and therefore meaningful".² Thus engaging in a discourse does not mean that one is confronting with reality as such; rather it is a process of "making and remaking of meaningful conditions of existence"³. Therefore it is actually an act as spectacle and substantive participation in a given discourse. It simply means to acknowledge the conditions of meaning which are embedded in the overall matrix of a given discourse.

It is very important to differentiate Islamic fundamentalism from other manifestations of fundamentalism, for instance Christian, Judaic, Hindu or any other pagan or natural forms of fundamentalism),

Dogmatic disputes about "foundations" and "fundamentals" are not solely the purview of religious activists but also capture an aspect of ostensibly secular debates where the sacred text in question is, say, a constitution."

particularly when we try to study the phenomena of Islamic fundamentalist discourse in Europe. Islamic fundamentalism will never be interpreted as an insistence of a specific religious community for the public recognition of certain fundamental principles necessary to win the appreciation of God or an insistence on legal or constitutional acknowledgement for practicing certain rituals or cultural practices in a public sphere which is intrinsically secular. Although in an academic sense, fundamentalism is not necessarily a religious phenomenon rather "fundamentalism is a way that

leaves open possibility that dogmatic disputes about "foundations" and "fundamentals" are not solely the purview of religious activists but also capture an aspect of ostensibly secular debates where the sacred text in

¹Jim George, *Discourse of Global Politics: A Critical (re)introduction of International Relations* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 29.

²Klein Bradley, *Strategic Discourse and its alternatives* (New York: Center on Violence and Human Survival, 1987), 4.

³Ibid.

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question, is say; a constitution."⁴ But this theoretical elucidation of fundamentalism as just an insistence on certain sacred or secular principles will undermine the complexities which are intrinsically attached to the phenomena of Islamic fundamentalism in Europe.

Islamic fundamentalism will overwhelmingly be interpreted under the burden of a history of violence, invasion, domination, slavery, ethnic cleansing, plundering, colonisation, gender discrimination, spectacles of cultural superiority and nostalgia of the glorious past.

Historically, Islam has been introduced to the Western world twice as a comprehensive threat or an unbearable alternative to the Western life-world and its values and corresponding institutions under the burden of an anti-Islamic discourse. "West's comprehensive idea of Islam persisted intact and essentially unchanged thrived, even-over the course of one thousand years"⁵. This implies that the basic features of Islam in the eyes of Europeans have not been changed substantively before and after the 'Enlightenment'. The threat of Islam has a privilege to be sustained in European spectacles from the Dark Ages to the Enlightenment and post-enlightenment. It has generally been argued that the root cause of the West's hostility towards the Islam is innately imbedded in the nomenclature of Islam. For the last thousand years or so, Islam has been presented as one offensive source of violence and darkness which has, interestingly, persisted from the Dark Ages to the Enlightenment. The substantive changes that have occurred in the Western world have not changed the eleventh century "anti-Islam discourse, which to the present day defines and explains Islam and regulates what it is, that we hear and see of the Muslims."⁶

Historically, Islam has been introduced to the Western world twice as a comprehensive threat or an unbearable alternative to the Western life-world.

A substantive threat to the Western civilization irrespective of its religious (i.e. Christian or Jewish), or secular (i.e. modernistic) manifestations, Islam has not just claimed as an Abrahamic religion rather it claims "to have completed the cycle of Abrahamic revelation"⁷. This implies that Christian theological foundations and their corresponding institutions are not enough to understand the ontological

⁴Roxanne Leslie Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), xii.

⁵Jonathan Lyons, *Islam through Western Eyes: From the Crusade to the War against Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 5.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibrahim Kalin, "Roots of Misconception Euro-American Perceptions of Islam Before and After 9/11," in *Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition*, ed. Joseph E. B. Lombard (USA: World Wisdom, Inc., 2009), 145.

and teleological dynamics of the will of the God, because the message of the God conveyed in previous revelations must be interpreted in the light of the Quran and Sunnah. Therefore, the nature of tension between Islam and Christianity is not similar to rivalry between two empires fighting for territorial gains and to establish political hegemony. Rather it is a cosmic, theological, ontological as well as epistemological opposition.

The most ironic aspect of this contradistinction between Islam and Christianity is that many claims of the Quran and Sunnah are often "concurring with and sometimes diverging from the biblical account."⁸ Therefore the authenticity and the authority of Christianity's theological claims are always under threat in the presence of Islamic epistemological tradition. The problem is that Islam is not just another religion rather "the message of Islam was (is) too similar to both Judaism and Christianity in its essential outlook."⁹ The differences based on similarities between Islam and Christianity have provided grounds for both theological, as well as, polemical dissent.

The second reason to understand the antagonistic relation between Islam and Christianity is the rapid spread of Islam in Christian lands. Within one century, Islam has spread from Mecca to North Africa and from the Caspian Sea to Spain. Many areas which were under Christian faith converted to Islam and the expansion of Islam in the world had questioned the legitimacy and universality of the Christian faith. Through the spectacles of Christian metaphysics, the spread of Islam has been interpreted as the demonification of a given life-world. The reasons they (many Christian sources) have provided were popular and polemical i.e. "The spread of religion by the sword and the Prophet's appealing to animal desires through polygamy and concubines."¹⁰

During the Dark Ages, Islam had been interpreted as an anti-Christian or anti-Judaic religious force, which intrinsically denied the very foundational legitimacy of these religions and considered them as distortion or deterioration from the fundamental teachings of Prophet Moses (Peace Be upon Him) and Prophet Jesus (Peace Be upon Him). In defense of Mary (Peace Be upon Her), the Quran relays Mary's conversation with her community, thus:

"Oh sister of Aaron! Thy father was not a wicked man nor was the mother harlot. Then she pointed to him (Hazrat Isah). They said: How can we talk to one who is in cradle, a young boy? He spoke: Lo! I am the slave of Allah. He hath given me the scripture and hath appointed me as a Prophet" (xix-Mary: 28, 29, 30. p.301).

⁸Ibid., 145.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., 146.

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Islam does insist on the centrality, as well as the availability of the definite text (word of the God) in the form of the Quran while neither the Jews nor Christians were able to protect the scriptures bestowed upon them as they had been revealed by the God. There is no doubt that Islam has an intrinsic competitive relationship with Christianity and Judaism. The antagonism is not just of a political nature, rather it has specific ontological, cosmological and epistemological foundations. The Quran denies the fundamental idea of Christian; that Jesus was the son of God. The Quran refers to Jesus' words:

"Peace on me the day I was born, and the day I die, and the day I shall be raised alive! Such was Jesus, son of Mary: (this is) a statement of the truth concerning which they doubt. It befitted not (the Majesty of) Allah that He should take unto Himself a son. Glory be to Him! When He decreeth a thing, He sayeth unto it only: Be! And it is. And Allah is my Lord and your Lord. So serve Him. That is the right path." (Xix Mary 33; 34; 35; 36, p.302)

If we try to understand these words of God under the conditions of anti-Islamic discourse, it will be obvious that how pre-understanding of the text and hermeneutical space available for indulging in any meaningful dialogical process regarding the truth claims about Islam has "no defense against the underlying fact that the entire conversation takes place almost entirely within the very confines of the discourse"¹¹. It is important to note that the even Pope Gregory who has been considered as the father of anti-Muslim Crusades¹², was either ignorant or confused about the actual claim of Islam irrespective of what the Muslims were

¹¹Lyons, *Islam through Western Eyes*, 7.

¹²Although Lyons has claimed that Pope Gregory was the father of anti-Muslim discourse (see, Lyons, *Islam through Western Eyes*, 46) in the West but there are other very authentic sources which reveal that this process of anti-Islamic and malignant interpretation of Islam, Prophet (P.B.U.H.) was being underway long before Pope Gregory for instance, St. John of Damascus (c 675-749) has been identified by Kalin as the father of anti-Islamic Polemics during eighth century. For instance St. John claims that "the founder of Islam is a false prophet" (De-Heresibus 764 B quoted in Daniel J Sahas, *John of Damascus on Islam: The Hersey of Ishmaelities* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), 73.

It is also important to note that unlike Pope Gregory St. John was very well equipped by the language and knowledge of Quran and Sunnah. He was the court official of the Umayyad caliphate in Syria" (Kalin, *Roots of Misconception*, 146).

Henry Stubbe's work in this regard is very revealing to understand the polemical, deceptive and malignant interpretations of Islam and Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) from the authentic Christian religious sources. The result of this polemical exposition is character assassination of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). The literature produced in the Western World was enough to be instrumental zed for launching any anti-Islam campaign against Muslims. (For further study see, Stubbe Henry, *An Account of the Rise and Progress of Mohometanism with the life of Mohomet: And a Vindication of him and his Religion from the Calumnies of the Christians*, Christ Church, Oxford from A Manuscript copied by Charles Hornby of Pipe office in 1705 Edited with introduction and Appendix by Hafiz Mahmud Khan Shairani, Afzal Chamber, McLeod Road, Lahore. 1911.

doing in Spain. He has not differentiated Pagans from Saracens and has not clearly identified the epistemological difference between the confronting enemy of Christendom and Christianity in itself. For example, he contended that the "Pagans" who ruled most of Spain in his days, were victims of "ignorance of God"¹³. In reality, Spain was conquered by believers of the God i.e. Muslims.

Let's come to the fundamental question; whether anti-Islamic discourse served the interests of the existing power players in Europe around the eleventh century. There were many challenges before the status quo, for instance, the Church was losing its institutional control over the determination of the legitimate public sphere. The Carolingian Empire (800-888) was gradually disintegrating after the death of Charles the Fat¹⁴. The significance of the Carolingian Empire is that at the coronation of Charles, the Great Pope Leo III referred to him as the Holy Roman Emperor. With the passage of time different regions of Europe including France and Germany, that were initially under the rule of the centralized Carolingian Empire, had initiated gradual efforts to emancipate themselves from the centralized sovereignty of the Holy Roman Emperor.

The rise of ethno-centric, nation-specific monarchies challenged the traditional universal authority of the Church regarding the determination of the legal space, and even, over the appointment of senior clerics. These appointed clerics performed two functions simultaneously; they were the spiritual heads of the community of the faithful; and secondly they

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nation-specific monarchies
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were "enormously rich and powerful local landlords".¹⁵ The gradual rise of monarchs (French, German, etc) did not just unfold the process of the decentralization of the political authority of the Emperor; rather by implication it also questioned the Papal Prerogative and legislative hegemony regarding the determination

of substantive political and economic affairs which had intrinsically been the purview of the monarch. The emerging monarchs were interested in having "centralized control over all aspects of social and economic life within their realm".¹⁶

¹³Ibid., 47.

¹⁴See, Goldberg, 2006.

¹⁵Lyons, *Islam through Western Eyes*, 44.

¹⁶Ibid.

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This implies that the eleventh century was a significant turning point in European history. The rising monarchies were in search of a new political identity, detachment from the dynastic, centralized control over socio-political and economic institutional structure along with comprehensive control of religious class were underway. The challenge before the existing status quo was not the rise of Islam in the East, rather, "the struggle between the church and the state for the final say over such matters became the dominant issue of eleventh-century Europe."¹⁷

The arrival of the Muslims and their successes, both militarily and religiously, were interpreted in such a mystifying manner that the Islamic threat appears as not just of territorial nature but of a spiritual and ontological nature too.

As the gulf between the sacred and secular has extended, the fundamental structural lacuna has been exposed i.e. dwindling executive power of the Church which it could use to enforce its claims in the public sphere as identified by the church authorities. The solution of this structural loop in a given power mechanism has been given by Pope Gregory as, "the creation of papal fighting force from among the warring European knights, the Militia of St. Peter, to combat heresy and enforce the church's claims against its secular rivals."¹⁸ The rise of the Papal army had no justification without identifying a rising global threat to the universal authority of the Christian faith. Otherwise this call for a Papal army would be interpreted as a counterforce against secular knights of the emerging monarchies. Islam, thus, has been identified as "a race of pagans [that] has strongly prevailed against the [Eastern] Christian empire."¹⁹

The causal foundation of the Papal army was intrinsically an internal issue of the bureaucratic imbalances between the sacred and secular power players in the Christian world. However, the legitimacy of the Papal army has been theorized in reference to the malignant interpretation of Islam, Prophet (PBUH) and the Muslims. The rise of Islam in the East has been identified as evil; the future of all of mankind is at stake at the behest of evil. The concrete manifestation of this evil is the "arrival of the Arabs and unexplained trouble in his native Northumbria"²⁰. It is important to note that the rise of Islam has not been presented as a dynastic problem or a political threat to the emerging monarchies. It has systematically been instrumentalised to revitalize the sacred discourse which was degenerating due to the rising trend of

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., 46.

²⁰Ibid., 51.

excavating new, secular, political foundations to justify political sovereignty. All those religious symbols which were losing their significance and hermeneutical potential to sustain the priority of the sacred over secular, were revitalized. All the connotations were interpreted under the conditions of anti-Islamic discourse. This discourse has revitalized the religious signs and symbols, for instance; good and evil, sin and abolition of sin, infidel and faithful, peace and brutality, etc. The holiness belongs to Christianity and Islam is not just considered a political alternative; rather it is seen as the perfect embodiment of evil; a comprehensive package of demonization.²¹

²¹The Depth of anti-Islamic discourse is not only specific to the theological dynamics of Christian clerical expressions. The literature which is ranging from theology to history, politics to art, literature and even to mysticism etc. reveal a serious well defined and all-encompassing attempt to systematic distortion of communicating apparatus of common man. The literature shows a serious attempt to provide deceptive, dehumanize, de-divinize and demonize picture of almost all the sources of Islam. Under the influence of such baseless and false prophesies, fears and deceptive superstitions Islam has been interpreted not just as political threat rather destructive force which rejects not just Christian values but values of humanity per-say; destruction of the totality of the human-life-world as such. For initial exposition of such understanding of Islam in Europe, see:

- i. *Ecclesiastical History of England and Normandy*, Vol. III, Bohn's edition, 1854.
- ii. *English History*, Vol. I, Bohn's edition, 1854.
- iii. *History of Magic* by Navdaeus, ch.xiv, 1657.
- iv. *History of Crusades* by T. Archer (History of the Nations series).
- v. *Roger of Wendover's, Flowers of History*, Vol. I Bohn 1849.
- vi. *Buckle's Civilization*, Vol. I.
- vii. *Chronicles Globe*, Edition 1899.
- viii. *A Notable History of the Saracens*, 1575.
- ix. *Froissart's Chronicles Globe* edition, 1899.
- x. *The Account of the Prophet in Lithgow's Travels 1634* (reprint 1906).
- xi. *Complete History of the Turks*, Vol. 2 1701.
- xii. *History of Charles the Great Ch. IV* translated by Th. Rodd 1812.
- xiii. *History and Literature of the Crusades* Ed. By Lady Duff Gordon ("The Universal Library).
- xiv. *York Plays*, Edited by Lucy T. Smith 1885.
- xv. *Towneley Plays IX Caesar Augustus* E.E. Text Society, 1897.
- xvi. *The Coventry Mysteries Play*, xxx Shak. Society, 1841.
- xvii. *Epics and Romances of Middle Ages* by Wagner edit by W.S.W. Anson 1883.
- xviii. *Mahomet in Boyle's Dictionary*, 1738.
- xix. *Dante in His Divine Comedy Place Prophet (P.B.U.H.) in to hell along with Hazrat Ali (M.R.I.P.)* see (23-31)
- xx. *Selected Poetry*, Chiefly devotional of the Reign of Queen Elizabeth part II Parker Society, 1845.
- xxi. *Bale's Selected Works*, Parker Society, 1849.
- xxii. "A Needful Caveat" appended to the translation of the *Alcoran of Mohamet* by Ross, 1649.
- xxiii. *A view of All Religions in the World* by A. Ross 3rd (edit) enlarged, 1658.
- xxiv. *A little description of the Great World* by Peter Heylyn, 6th Edition 1633.
- xxv. *The works of H. Smith* Vol. II (ed.) by J.C. Miller Nicholl's Series of Standard Divines, 1867.
- xxvi. *Apocalypses or the Revelation of Notorious Advances of Heresic* Translated by J.D. 1658.

Rise of Fundamentalist Discourse and the Reassertion of Modern Ethos

The arrival of the Muslims and their successes, both militarily and religiously, were interpreted in such a mystifying manner that it appears that the Islamic threat is not just of territorial nature but of a spiritual and ontological nature too. "In the year of one Lord 729, two comets appeared around the sun, striking terror into all who saw them".²² This appearance has been identified by Venerable Bede as a symbolic acknowledgement of the rising of evil i.e. the arrival of Muslims in Europe²³. It is obvious that since the threat is of a demonized nature and it has ontological and spiritual dynamics too, therefore the secular knights will be defenseless against this evil force. Therefore Christianity is inevitable to combat this evil challenge. Bede has further claimed that this menace will be defeated by *Christian knights*.²⁴

According to these prophecies, the rise of the Muslims is the rise of evil and, the discourse of evil eventually has revitalized the discourse of the sacred and holiness. The holy war has been identified with all those objectives which have no meanings without referring to the universal authority of the Church. Thus anti-Islamic discourse has performed three functions simultaneously:

- a) It legitimized the establishment of the Papal army which eventually reinforced Papal prerogatives in the public sphere rather than just as a theological interpreter of religion.
- b) The socialization of the sacred or spiritual ideals has eventually reflected in the mass recruitment of the faithful. The abolition of sins only be guaranteed for those "who battled in name of the papacy".²⁵
- c) The phenomenon of crusade has also been instrumentalised to contain the rising influence of the secular, monarchical ambitions which were directly in conflict with the ecclesiastical hegemony over socio-political order. The implications were obvious: these secular competitors to the sacred papacy "turned to the knights of the Christian West for assistance."²⁶

The most important aspect of Lyon's analysis is that the rise of Islam should be differentiated from the rise of the discourse about Islam. Secondly, he highlights how the confronting status quo has instrumentalised this anti-Islamic discourse to protect its own immediate and long-term interests; or in other words to keep the balance of power in its own hands.

It is very interesting to note that rise of the Enlightenment and the rise of anti-anti-Islamic discourse have simultaneously emerged in the Western world. This is due to the change in the spectacles of Western

²²Lyons, *Islam through Western Eyes*, 51.

²³Ibid., 51.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid., 45.

²⁶Ibid., 47.

mind. The priorities of the man-of-doubt were different than that of man-of-faith.

Although Kalin has mentioned Dante as one of the case studies to understand the shift in the perspective of Europeans regarding the

It is very interesting to note that rise of the Enlightenment and the rise of *anti-anti-Islamic* discourse have simultaneously emerged in the Western world.

appreciation of the secular aspect of Islam; and it is also true that Dante is not a man-of-doubt (i.e. philosopher) rather a medieval, classical artist but his intellectual acumen compelled him to appreciate the secular dynamics of Islamic culture and its philosophical expressions. However, under the burden of religious discourse which was predominantly anti-Islamic, he prioritized Ibn-e-Sina (Avicenna), Ibn-e-Rushed (Averroes) and even

Salah-uddin-Ayubi, who was the most distinguished enemy of the Crusaders, on Prophet (PBUH) and Hazrat Ali (May He Rest In Peace). In his *Divine Comedy*, Dante places "The Prophet (PBUH) and Ali (MRIP), his son-in-law and fourth caliph of Islam, in hell. By contrast, he places Salahuddin, Avicenna and Averroes in Limbo."²⁷

This selective abstraction of certain features of Islamic cultural and intellectualism minus its religious and divine identity, is one of the most important features of anti-anti-Islamic discourse. This was, and of course is, not as mature as anti-Islamic discourse; one can provide many references from Western sources that some features as well as some dynamics of Islamic culture were elaborated and appreciated by the Western intelligentsia. It is an acknowledged fact that "the attention paid by European scholars to Islamic culture minus its religion in eleventh and twelfth centuries contributed to what C.H. Haskins has called the 'Renaissance of twelfth century.'²⁸

The second aspect of this anti-anti-Islamic discourse is to reduce Islam from a universal religion of Abrahamic tradition into a specific, cultural expression which has rested upon a false religious belief. But despite this fact that it has an untruthful foundation, Islamic culture has contributed in the fields of aesthetics, philosophy, mathematics and science. The cultural exchange which took place in Andalusia (Spain) has also been acknowledged by many Western writers. This interesting "dual attitude of rejecting Islam as a religion while admiring its cultural achievements is clearly exemplified in Sandy's work."²⁹

²⁷Kalin, "Roots of Misconception," 150.

²⁸Ibid., 149.

²⁹Ibid., 153.

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Yet it is not just Sandy's work; according to Kalin rather, St. John of the Cross, Pascal, Peter Bayle, Stubbe, Swedenborg and Voltaire etc.³⁰, who although do not consider Islam as a true religion and Muhammad (PBUH.) as a true Prophet, but they do value Islam as a diverse culture. For instance, "Stubbe saw something different in the Prophet of Islam as a man of world. Divested of his claims to have received God's word, the Prophet Muhammad could be appreciated for what he had accomplished in history"³¹. The same line of argument is followed by P. Edward, George Sale, and Carlyle. Therefore one can claim that there are certain aspects of Islam which were attractive to the thinkers of the

One can claim that there are certain aspects of Islam which were attractive to the thinkers of the Enlightenment.

Enlightenment, despite the fact that these thinkers were equally skeptical about the authenticity and truth value of Islam as a revealed religion. It is important to note that the Quranic foundations of Islam were denied, however "human qualities of the Prophet of Islam were invoked by the humanist intellectuals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries."³² Carlyle's appreciation of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) reveals his anthropocentric cum secular predication, about the Prophet, as he wrote; "Let us try to understand what he meant with the world: what the world meant and means with him, will then be a more answerable question."³³

This anthropocentric exposition of Islam and the personality of Hazrat Muhammad (PBUH), serve different intellectual purposes:

- a) Identifying internal incoherencies of Christianity regarding the determination of legitimate public sphere.
- b) Limitations of Papal prerogatives and their antagonistic role in the development of an open society.
- c) "Simply to cherish their secular humanist philosophy of history."³⁴

II

From the Papal Colonization of Life-world to the Colonization of Discursive Reason: The trajectory from death of God to death of man.

"He who fights with monsters might take care lest he thereby become a monster. And if you gaze for long into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you."

Nietzsche, Friedrich

³⁰Ibid., 153-160.

³¹Ibid., 158.

³²Ibid., 159.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid.

"How man should be?" is one of the most fundamental questions of human existence. The history of ideas reveals that most intellectual efforts have been an attempt to answer this question. The traditional dichotomy between essentialism and anti-essentialism; foundationalism and anti-foundationalism; perfectionism and anti-perfectionism, etc. is the result of the ontological or teleological explications of "who we are"? Therefore consciously or unconsciously, we try to justify our normative stances with respect to our ontological or deontological accounts.

Religious communities, particularly the communities derived from revealed religions, are intrinsically essentialist, foundationalist and perfectionist. Their reliance on specific theological assumptions regarding the justification of their ontological and teleological accounts has philosophically been underestimated by the man of doubt i.e. philosophers. Therefore one of the traditional paradigms of intellectual antagonism has emerged from the theoretical divergence between the *man-of-faith* and *man-of-doubt* regarding the answer to the question; "how man should be"? The philosophical urge of the pre-supposition-less domain of understanding particularly in the context of modern thought is in itself rested upon the assumption that the realm of "apodictic evidence" is epistemologically possible. It is further presumed that on the basis of such a *Self-Evident-Evidence*, one can provide absolute, certain and universal answers to the questions concerning reality, knowledge, morality, values and beauty.

This assumption of the epistemological possibility of *Self-Evident-Evidence* has also been shared by some *men of faith*. It is important to note that the transcendental capacity of pure reason has not only been acknowledged by many of the scholars, both Christians and Islamists, (particularly *Mutazilites*) before the rise of the Enlightenment. They have also tried to provide an abstract answer to the metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, axiological and aesthetical questions raised by the human intellect. These intellectual efforts create an illusion that what has been revealed by the God can be accessible both in substance and in form through abstract pure reason.

The philosophical spirit that has been incarnated in the Christian thought via Aristotle and Plato has manifested itself in the form of the Enlightenment: "They questioned and scarified everything they esteemed until they examined God himself and found it impossible to believe in his providence. According to Nietzsche it was not skepticism but Christian probity that ultimately 'killed' God"³⁵

³⁵The 'death of God' is the symbolic acknowledgement of the intellectual defeat of Christian theology, See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche: The Will to Power as Art; Vol. II. The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. David Krell (New York: HarperCollins, 1961). Hafer and Raw 1979 quoted in Mark J. Lutz, "Socratic Virtue in Post-modernity: The importance of Philosophy for liberalism," *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 4 (1997): 1131.

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The modern dimension of the Enlightenment is intrinsically humanistic and has claimed to have absolute epistemological foundations, which not only answers to the question "who we are", but also "how we should be". The history of the modern theory and its corresponding socio-political institutions along with their organic relation with the self-aggrandizing mechanism of scientific industrial complex reveals that they have duly responded to the Nietzschean *Mad-Man* announcement and tried to fill the vacuum that has been created by the Death of God.

"This" reveals that contemporary Western civilization is intrinsically humanistic and secular. However, there is no doubt that religion is an important cultural component of Western life-world. But the role of religion in a given public order will be determined under the conditions of anthropocentric spectacles towards the understanding of reality. This refutation of the centrality of God or representative of God, i.e. the Pope, is derived from the historical experience of Europeans, and it has not been done by any foreign intruder. The refutation of Christian epistemological authority, its prerogative power, its moral authority regarding the determination of legitimate public sphere, and its corresponding institutions have not been done under the domination of the crescent, i.e. sword of Islam. Christendom and its corresponding values were slaughtered under their own knives, "God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murders of all murders? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives".³⁶

Western civilization is intrinsically humanistic and secular. However, there is no doubt that religion is an important cultural component of Western life-world.

This defeat of the sacred by the secular is not the result of a conspiracy against the people of faith, rather it is the result of the epistemological shifts that occurred during the Enlightenment period. This has not only changed the dynamics of the sacred and secular; rather it has also changed the order of etiological questions. One of the most important aspects of modern Enlightenment thought is that *epistemology took over ontology*. As a result of this shift, all the religious ontological claims were analyzed under modern epistemological conditions and all those claims which were epistemologically unsound have been eliminated from the sphere of knowledge. Therefore, secularization is not the result of the State-Church dichotomy but the emancipation of epistemology from the divinity of revelation as a condition of modern form of knowledge. The refutation of revelation as an ultimate source of

³⁶Ibid.

knowledge is the "death of the God" and the birth of modern man who is epistemologically determined by the universally valid reason. The modern man has filled the vacuum created by the so called "death of god" "who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festival of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? *Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appeal worthy of it?*"³⁷

There is no doubt that the Death of God is one of the most celebrated aspects of "Aufklärung"³⁸ because it is the Enlightenment thought which has actually questioned the Epistemological legitimacy of Christian authority regarding the determination of what ought to be or, how man should be. It is not only relevant to de-legitimize the epistemological authority of Christianity, but it is in fact the de-legitimation of any supra-human or non-human authority that transcends the domain of discursive reason. "Kant indicates right away that the "way out" that characterizes the Enlightenment, is a process that releases us from the status of "immaturity".³⁹ Self-surrender; self-relinquishment of human autonomy to any authority by virtue of any meta-rational telos is the vindication of one's immaturity⁴⁰. By "immaturity", he [Kant] means a certain state of our will which makes us accept someone else's authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for."⁴¹

The most celebrated idea of modernity was to discover the realm of "apodictic Evidence" as the foundation of universal civilization. The self-evident rational foundation will provide a pre-supposition less, unbiased, un-prejudiced, socio-political life-world in which every individual will be determined by his own autonomous will. The modern-enlightenment hope was "that human beings will shed their traditional allegiances and their local identities and units in a universal civilization grounded in generic humanity and a rationale morality".⁴²

³⁷Ibid. See also Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*, trans. Walter Kaufman, (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).

³⁸See, Immanuel Kant, *An Answer to the Question: 'What Is Enlightenment?* Translated by H. B. Nisbet (New York: Penguin Group USA, 2010) and also Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in *The Foucault Reader* edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984) in which they both try to answer this question that what exactly the meaning of *Aufklärung* i.e. Enlightenment is?

³⁹Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 305.

⁴⁰This criterion of maturity or the distinction between maturity and immaturity is needed to keep in mind whenever we try to defend Religion not just as an alternative way of life rather than a metaphysically grounded epistemologically viable, teleologically determined and all-encompassing domain of human existence which is intrinsically rested upon the assumption of Absolute, certain universal truth that has been revealed by the God, interpreted by the Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) practiced and prescribed by Suhaba (May rest in peace) and transferred by the Islamic scholars through the institution of 'Ijma-e-Ummat'.

⁴¹Ibid., 305.

⁴²John Gray, *Enlightenment Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of Modern Age* (London: New York Routledge, 1995), 2.

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The postmodern thought acknowledges that this hope is not realizable because it is rested upon an incoherent philosophical theorization. It has generated an oxymoronic institutional mechanism which theoretically justifies itself as the ultimate source of human-autonomy and self-determination. But contrary to this, the multiple forms of production and consumption, its corresponding social relations, political and economic institutions are derived from modern discursive reasons which abandon the possibility of human freedom. "Couldn't we conclude that the promise of Enlightenment of realizing freedom through the exercise of reason has been, on contrary subverted through the domination of reason itself, which increasingly usurps the place of freedom."⁴³

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It is an acknowledged fact, particularly in postmodern literature that the incoherent equation between freedom and universally valid reason is intrinsically problematic. Particularly, the Frankfurt School of Thought, post-structuralism, and de-constructionism have contributed a lot in this regard. Therefore, the universal non-contestability of the Enlightenment thought, particularly its modern instructional form, has been questioned. As a result of this rising postmodern discourse, it has been claimed that we are living in "an age distinguished by the collapse of the Enlightenment project on a world-historical scale."⁴⁴

There is no doubt that the defenders of modernism, for instance Habermas, consider the postmodern critique as a threat to the Enlightenment project and consider it nothing but a philosophical irrationalism⁴⁵. However, Foucault is not satisfied with this charge against people like Adorno, etc. He is considered a strong defender of existing modernism as well as the absolute rejectionists of the Enlightenment as the victims of the "black mail of Enlightenment"⁴⁶. What is problematic in this one-dimensional process of modernization, according to the critical theorists' perspective, is that the contemporary form of modern institutionalization has been presented as the only ultimate foundation of universal values of human autonomy and unprecedented progress by virtue of universally valid reason. Modernism is the dominating ideological framework for the determination of inter-state and intra-state

⁴³Michel Foucault, *Remarks on Marks*, trans. R. James Goldstein and James Cascatio (New York: Semio Text (e), 1991), 117-118.

⁴⁴John Gray, *Enlightenment Wake*, 2.

⁴⁵See Jürgen Habermas, "Introduction," to *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, Translated by F. Lawrence, (Cambridge MA: The MIT press, 1987).

⁴⁶Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1991), 314.

dynamics, the foreign policy framework, domestic or regional or international mode of production and exchange and the whole discourse of international relations and political economy. All those who believe in

Defenders of modernism, for instance Habermas, consider the postmodern critique as a threat to the Enlightenment project and consider it nothing but a philosophical irrationalism.

the non-contestability of modern discursive practices and their universal institutionalization are the victims of the black mail of Enlightenment because they presume that there is only one form of reason that has been expressed in the process of modernization. The life-world that has been derived from the expression and institutionalization of universally valid reason is the best possible expression of discursive reason. Adorno and Foucault both reject this assumption, i.e. there is only one "form of Reason" and any

rejection of this form of reason is the rejection of comprehensive Enlightenment project in its totality and its all possible manifestations. Both Foucault⁴⁷ and Adorno⁴⁸ accept the theoretical possibility of other forms or manifestations of reasons, other than institutionalized modern discursive practices.

This means that neither the postmodern critique on modernity and its corresponding socio-political institutionalization, nor critical theory which has been derived from the Frankfurt School of Thought; are the results of philosophical irrationalism, as it was claimed by many defenders of modernism. It is one of the major objectives of dominant modern discourse that either one has to accept the universality of modern institutionalization of discursive reason or else one would be considered as irrational. It means that the contemporary discourse of modernity is the victim of the counter Enlightenment tendency as through a dictatorial bureaucratic institutional order, it not only imposed specific "form of Reason" but most importantly, it has established that "rational critique of rationality impossible".⁴⁹

⁴⁷Ibid., 316.

⁴⁸Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *The Dialectics of Enlightenment*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 128-131.

⁴⁹David C. Hoy, "Conflicting Conceptions of Critique: Foucault versus Habermas," in *Critical Theory*, ed. David C. Hoy and McCarthy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 145.

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It is not just the postmodernists who are not satisfied with the presumed direct-proportional relationship between individual freedom and discursive reason, it is also Weber who believes that both manifestations of modern Enlightenment i.e. Capitalist liberalism and Socialism cannot be governed without comprehensive mechanism of bureaucratization. He claims that the institutional order which has emerged from the process of modernization is the mechanism of control and bureaucratic discipline which denies human subjectivity and autonomy. "Everywhere we find same thing the means of operation within the factory, the state administration, and the army and university departments are concentrated by means of bureaucratically structured human apparatus in the hands of the person who has command over (*beherrscht*) this human apparatus"⁵⁰. What it implies is that the possibility of individual freedom is just an illusion in this bureaucratically structured human apparatus. Secondly, and most importantly, the dream of human autonomy is not realizable in both (i.e. liberal capitalism and socialism) manifestations of modernity. In other words, if modernization and bureaucratization are organically linked with each other, then according to Weber, "it makes no difference whether the economic system is organized on capitalistic or socialistic basis"⁵¹.

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Human autonomy is the fundamental spirit of the Enlightenment that has survived even beyond the postmodern critique on modernity and its corresponding institutions. The acknowledgement of human capacity to determine its own destiny is such a modernist virtue that it has been acknowledged by the postmodernists as well. According to many postmodernist thinkers, the real spirit of the Enlightenment is a continuous process of "philosophical interrogation" which tries to stretch the limits of human intentionality and autonomy. According to Foucault "I have been seeking ..., to emphasize the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation – one that simultaneously problematizes man's relation to the present, man's historical mode of being and the constitution of self as an autonomous subject is rooted in Enlightenment".⁵²

The postmodernist thought acknowledges that there is no doubt that the modernist reliance on discursive reason as the only legitimate means to freedom eventually caged the human spirit into the iron cage

⁵⁰Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs, eds., *Weber, Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 281.

⁵¹Weber, *Economy and Society*, 223.

⁵²Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" 312.

of rationality. This adversely affected human capacity to give meaning to his life autonomously.

Under the yoke of modern instrumental reasoning, the autonomy of human subjectivity has overwhelmingly been dominated by the modern institutional order. The process of rationalization through modern bureaucratic order has undermined the significance of the process of modern subjectivization which is organically linked with the actualization of human autonomy, according to Klinger. She refers to Touraine that despite this fact that, "Modernity is not based upon one single principle... It is the result of a dialogue between Reason and Subjectivity".⁵³ The dilemma of modernity is that human autonomy has been interpreted differently from the perspective of rationalization and that of subjectivization, she stresses. For instance, according to her; "[autonomy] in the perspective of rationalization is defined along the lines of function, efficiency, expediency, economy and material utility without regard for any higher point of view for religious or moral prescriptions of any kind."⁵⁴ Whereas viewed from the perspective of human autonomy it "implies that human being are no longer assigned a position, rank, and place in a hierarchically structured eternal order, but are set free to find for themselves the meaning and essence of existence and determine its aims."⁵⁵

The modern history of ideas reveals that overwhelming process of rationalization has compromised the conception of autonomy consistent with the perspective of the subject, "[the] position of the subjectivity is hardened or, as Alain Touraine puts it, the subject gets locked in an obsession with identity, as the cleavage between rationality, the system and subjectivity individuality deepens to the detriment of both 'without Reason, the subject is trapped in an obsession with identity: without the subject, Reason becomes an instrument of might.'"⁵⁶ If someone argues that post modernity is actually the reassertion of modern subjectivity that has been overlooked by the "Colonization of modern discursive reason,"⁵⁷ then it won't be too unreasonable. There is no doubt that postmodern discourse has radicalized the process of subjectivization; which was initially a modern agenda, by replacing its foundationalist-cum-essentialist basis from anti-foundationalist, contingent and ever-changing unfolding of Dasein. It has been acknowledged that "all features attributed to the ideal postmodern, identity flexibility, reflexivity, fluidity, versatility, creativity, openness,

⁵³Touraine Alain, *Critique of Modernity*, trans. David Macey (Cambridge: Black Well, 1995), 6; Cornelia Klinger, "From Freedom without Choice to Choice without Freedom: The Trajectory of the Modern Subject," *Constellations* 11, no. 1 (2004), 121.

⁵⁴Cornelia, *From Freedom with Choice to Choice without Freedom*, 121.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Ibid., 132.

⁵⁷Habermas considers this domination of discursive reason as the colonization of life world, see, Jürgen Habermas, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society and Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1984 and 1987.

(self) irony are much less achievements of a more enlightened and liberal era that has at least freed the self from the confinement of essentialist subject hood".⁵⁸

The anti-Islamic discourse, the re-assertion of Modern Ethos and the poverty of Post-modernity: Muslims in the West Agent or Victim of Terror

"The social function of a religion is independent of its truth or falsity that religions which we think to be erroneous or even abused and repulsive, such as those of savage tribes may be important and effective parts of social machinery, and that without these "false" religious social revolution and the development of modern civilization would have been impossible."⁵⁹

This quotation is an excellent exposition to understand the modern spectacles through which one can see the intended complimentary role anti-Islamic narrative under the slogan of fundamentalist discourse is playing for the reassertion of modern ethos. Brown's social scientific explanation of the role of a religion, as a medium of modern social construction enables us to understand the unintended paradigmatic, complimentary function of Islamic fundamentalist discourse to re-justifying modern disciplinary mechanism as aesthetically more viable option for humans to make sense of their existence.

The threat of Islam' (i.e. fundamentalist Islam) under the condition of an anti-Islamic discourse in the West has provided theoretical content to substantively justify modernity as a far more reasonable alternative than: a. Violent, regressive, anti-humanist militant fascism i.e. fundamentalism. b. Philosophical irrationalism of post-modernism and deconstructionism.

The anti-modern tendency of fundamentalism has a potential to theoretically neutralize the postmodern critique on modern institutional mechanism. The rise of fundamentalist narrative has been presented as a global threat by the anti-Islamic discourse. Therefore, it's theoretical

⁵⁸Cornelia, *From Freedom with Choice to Choice without Freedom*, 133. It is important to note that Foucault's and other post-modernists commitment with Enlightenment project are unquestionable. It would be unreasonable to consider post-modern critique on modern disciplinary powers mechanisms or philosophical anarchism or irrationalism. It is just a matter of the hermeneutical disagreement regarding the understanding of Enlightenment project. For instance as a defender of modernity Habermas understands Enlightenment project by virtue of the pinnacle state of "Reason" and freedom will be the ultimate consequence of the institutionalization of reason. Foucault on the other hand, reconsiders the presumed relationship between reason and freedom. Foucault did not consider internal critique of modern disciplinary power and its corresponding institutional formations as a betrayal of Aufklärung, rather he thinks that it is actually the manifestation of the real spirit of Enlightenment project. The rational critique of Modern disciplinary power mechanism is the most serious attempt to stretch the possibility of possibilities.

⁵⁹ A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, *Religion and Society*. (Davidson and Rees-Mogg. 1991. P.185)

and also its corresponding institutional response should be of global nature. The presumption of the 'Global Threat of Fundamentalism' has unveiled the theoretical, as well as the institutional, in the capacity of the postmodern thought to appropriately respond to this presumed global threat. The postmodern critique against modern ethos might be a rational elucidation of incoherent theoretical and contradictory institutional apparatus to guarantee human autonomy, but the fundamental lacuna of postmodern political theory is that it does not have the potential to provide any substantive political procedure or institutional order beyond modern discursive practices to counter fundamentalist discourse in Europe which has been presented (by anti-Islamic discourse) as not only anti-modern, like post-modernists, but also anti-humanist, regressive, intolerant and anti-freedom political ideology.

The fundamentalist narrative cannot be intellectually countered by postmodern intellectualism in abstraction to modern institutional order because fundamentalist narrative has revitalized traditional philosophical issues of modernism i.e. the universality of the grand narrative, essentialism, foundationalism, absolutism, universal-objective moral standards and determination of the public order by virtue of a transcendental, non-human authority. There is no doubt that postmodernism rejects the universality of the modern grand narrative because according to it, every grand narrative is just a narrative; it does not mean that they will give the Islamic fundamentalist narrative an equal status as compared to the modern narrative.

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On the other hand, the disentanglement of the traditional organic relation between philosophy and politics is also a fundamental problem of postmodern political theory. The postmodern values of contingency, relativity and spontaneity without modern-discursive-institutional order eventually collapse into ironic pragmatism. The modern discourse has established that anti-foundationalist, postmodern internationalism cannot be translated into a workable policy framework to counter the presumed global threat of fundamentalism, both inside Europe and in the Muslim world.

The post-modern intellectualism is intrinsically parasitic because it cannot make sense or even survive without modernity. In other words, without scienticized and modernized life-world, the postmodern urge of autonomy, contingency and relativity will be meaningless.

Although postmodern thought established that a mechanism of discipline and punishment has developed over scienticization and

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modernization which has actually subverted the possibility of individual freedom and has abandoned the possibilities of other rational manifestations of human reason. However, under the conditions of anti-Islamic discourse, fundamentalism cannot be accepted by the postmodernist as one of the other "idiosyncratic fantasies"⁶⁰, because of its totalitarian and coercive tendencies as it has been claimed by the exponents of anti-Islamic discourse.

The fundamentalist commitment with the universalization of the will of the God is far more problematic for a postmodernist who may find some justifications to accept liberalism, under the condition, that "liberalism should not be scienticized so that everyone can realize his idiosyncratic fantasies"⁶¹. This shows its aesthetical prioritization of modern-liberal life-form which has substantively been challenged both inside and outside the Western world.

There is no doubt that postmodern relativism has been instrumentalised by many religious Muslims to counter the hegemony of modern disciplinary power, and has been identified as a threat to their free choices regarding the determination of what ought to be both inside and outside Western World. According to Haynes, the audience of postmodern thought is different in the Muslim world than in the West. In the Third World, post-modernism is the mobilizing ideology of the educated, disenchanted poor who are the victims of the "disenfranchisement and unfulfilled expectations that are endemic to modernization in late developing region"⁶². This is actually the constituency of fundamentalists according to Euben, whereas Haynes claims that "postmodernism is synonymous with poverty, leading poor especially receptive to fundamentalism arguments which supply the mobilizing ideology."⁶³ On the other hand, postmodernism is addressing the internal, existential vacuum in modern mind-set which has been created by the subjugation of the individual, spontaneous process of subjectivization under the conditions of modern disciplinary power. In this way, the contemporary form of fundamentalist narrative under the condition of anti-Islamic discourse performs many functions simultaneously.

It rejuvenates all the vocabulary which intrinsically represents the modern discourse in the Western World. For instance, the universality of values, the search of human fixed, absolute, universal, essence, or foundation, absolute moral standards to judge human; actions, conduct,

⁶⁰Richard Rorty, *Contingency Irony and Solidarity*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 53.

⁶¹Abdul Wahab Suri, "The Living Death of Modernity: The Poverty of Post-modernity in the time of Terror," *Pakistan Journal of International Relations* 2, no. II (2011), 136.

⁶²Roxanne Leslie Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 22.

⁶³Jeffrey Haynes, "Religion, Secularization and Politics: A Post-modern Conspectus," *Third World Quarterly* 18 (September 1997), 719.

desires and even imagination, on the basis of some ontologically grounded and teleological backed epistemological foundations, etc.

Secondly, through the modern spectacles, Islam has been presented as an unbearable alternative to modernism for the alienated, affluent postmodernist class in the West. There is no doubt that postmodern relativism can acknowledge Islam as one of the pluralistic expressions of Western culture, but minus its absolutist and universalistic interpretation.

Thirdly, and most importantly, it has made Muslims visible in the Western World. The millions of Muslims in Europe who are there to resolve the first question out of three identified by Smith H⁶⁴ i.e. how to win food and shelter? In the affluent West, the other two questions i.e. of social and religious ones have been resolved by many ordinary Muslims; mostly immigrants, in compatibility with the answer of the first question and its corresponding prerequisite.

The war against terror that has been initiated by the state-craft of the West against predominantly non-state actors in the Muslim world is normatively as well as structurally; modernistic.

The war against terror that has been initiated by the state-craft of the West against non-state actors in the predominantly Muslim world is normatively as well as structurally, modernistic. According to Haynes, Muslims in the West are in the process of replacing their traditional, ethno-centric networks to new solidarity matrixes⁶⁵. This so-called offensive strategy i.e. 9/11 that has been carried out by non-state actors among Muslims in the Western World has questioned the commitment and social legitimacy of Muslims and has provided a socio-political content to appreciate and celebrate the possible autonomy and self-determination provided by modern disciplinary power. Thus, revitalized rather redefined, the parameters of individual autonomy under the presumed global threat of Islamic fundamentalism. New meanings of privacy, encroachment, surveillance, confinements (Guantanamo Bay) and limitations of the nation state, and its corresponding constitutional guarantees, have emerged.

The existence of Muslim community that has been characterized and described by the social, electronic and print media as "irrational and backward, medieval "and fearful of modernity; Islam (their faith) is by

⁶⁴Smith has identified three questions which make sense of one's existence, the questions are: "How to win food and shelter? Secondly, how to get along with one and another? Thirdly, how to relate total scheme of things. "(Huston Smith, *Why Religion Matters*, New York: Harper San Francisco, 2001), 11. According to him first question is of natural second is of social nature and the third one is of religious nature.

⁶⁵ Haynes, *Religion, Secularization and Politics*, 56.

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nature fanatical; Muslims are sexually perverse, either lascivious, polygamists or repressive misogynists or both, they are anti-democratic and despise Western notion of civic freedom and finally they are caught up in a jealous rage at the Western World's failure to value them or their belief⁶⁶.

Under the condition of these presumed deceptions of Muslims, the reasonableness of modernity has been established and celebrated. The modern values of civic freedom, democracy, rationalistic way of life, backwardness of medieval thought and ideals of modernity as an evolutionary form of human socio-political existence etc. have been meaningfully rejuvenated in the popular literature and foreign and internal policy frameworks. The Muslim community has been identified and observed under the conditions of modern-discursive practices. Different debates about Islam and Muslims have been initiated. They have been identified as the anti-liberal community which limits the possibility of possibilities of all those individuals, both inside and outside the Muslim Community, who question the universality of their grand narrative. This community and its corresponding practices have been identified as illiberal and a threat to the liberty available in the Western World; as if the available civic freedom provided by the liberal, modern order is not only meaningful, but also ideal. In fact, the intellectual space of universalizing cosmopolitan liberalism has been widening, which was intellectually, not available in post-modern thought. It is now presumed to be reasonable to argue the coercive imposition of democratic liberal order through the foreign policy framework.

In antagonism with ill-equipped decentralized, unnecessarily violent presentation of the Islamic grand narrative by fundamentalist narrative, the modern grand narrative has been rejuvenated. Interestingly, under the condition of the resurgence of this modern grand narrative, the Muslim community in the West has been re-observed as a potential threat to the freedom available through modern discursive practices and their corresponding bureaucratic institutionalization. Different issues have been raised, for instance: the issue of mosques and minarets in Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, Greece, Bosnia etc. The social unacceptability of building religious premises in unified Germany. The problem of the exclusion and inclusion of the Muslim Community in Dutch society; referring to the issue of mosques in the Netherlands, the problem of Burqa or Hijab in France and the limits of multiculturalism in French society; the lack of political representation of Muslims and the problem of mosque constructions in Austria; the status of the Muslim community in post-London bombing scenario; and the limits of cosmopolitan Islam in British multiculturalism.⁶⁷

⁶⁶Lyons, *Islam through Western Eyes*, 3.

⁶⁷See, Stefano Allievi, ed., *Mosque in Europe: Why a Solution has been a Problem* (London: NEF Initiative on Religion and Democracy in Europe, 2010).

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Thus the artificial rise of the threat of fundamentalism along with different, incoherent, violent glimpses of their political ideology in the Western World has actually left only one reasonable option for Muslim immigrants' i.e. inclusive adoption of modern values and their corresponding institutions. In fact, Haynes acknowledges that, "Muslim Community organizations... often appear to rescue those who are drifting in the Urban milieu".⁶⁸ The respectable option Muslim community has is to actually act as Philanthropist and work for the unconditional sustenance of modern life-world.

Conclusion:

Although there is compatibility between fundamentalist and postmodern narratives, both are different critiques of modernism, but both critiques lead us to a paradoxical conclusion.

Interestingly, post-modernism in the European context, is the result of the comprehensive institutionalization of the modern-discursive reason. The fundamentalism is the result of the incoherent, incomplete, and misguided institutionalization of modern discursive practices in the Muslim world. It reveals that modernity is problematic; both in its comprehensive as well as its incomplete institutional manifestations.

However, the rise of fundamentalist narrative under the condition of anti-Islamic discourse in contemporary political dynamics has provided intellectual breeding grounds for modern intelligentsia to counter both postmodern critiques against the universalization of modern discursive reason and the so-called threat of fundamentalism. It helps modern intelligentsia to re-legitimize the universality of modern discursive practice, as a workable, reasonable, and sustainable alternative to postmodern irrationalism and coercive fundamentalism. Last but not the least Islam is Islam; it is neither fundamentalist nor modern or moderate, liberal nor cosmopolitan. It is what Allah has revealed and it should be presented as it has been revealed with patience and determination.

Patience is not just sitting and waiting it is foreseeing. It is looking at the night and seeing the day. Lovers are patient and they know that moon needs time to become full. (Rumi)

⁶⁸Jeffrey, "Religion, Secularization and Politics," 719.

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DECONSTRUCTING GENDER DISCOURSE: A REVEIW*

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Introduction

The work of Kant, Hegel Darwin, Marx, and Comte transformed the idea of material progress into a historical necessity. It has constantly been claimed that "industrial society is the most successful way of life mankind has ever known... our people eat better, sleep better, live in most comfortable dwellings, get around more in greater comfort, and live longer than they have ever done before" (Ayers xxiv). It is assumed that the existing life style of the developed Western nations is the manifestation of the "natural culmination of the potentials already existing in Neolithic man" (Gustavo p.9). The natural outcome of such an ontological account of human potential is that history has been reinterpreted in purely Western terms.

Material progress legitimises the west's global hegemony (Esteva p.9). This conception of progress presupposes certain values, lifestyle, conceptions of the good, gender, equality and freedom, which are historically determined and culturally specific. The medieval, religious and traditional non-western values are naturally in conflict with these western values and prejudices. Since this idea of progress and development is accepted as universal so, naturally non-western religious values are considered as irrational.

The negation of western values by the non-western world in general and the Islamic world in particular is considered as a reactionary posture, devoid of ontological and epistemological grounding. It is assumed that the dominance of western values lies in the epistemological superiority of western culture. Therefore, it is accepted both at political and intellectual level that "the third world had to develop first before it aruld even think about real progress" (Sbert p.195).

* Human Development In Asia 2000: the Gender Question Mahbub-ul-Haq Human Development Centre, Karachi Oxford University Press 2000.

This is the perspective in which the gender issue has been discussed in the Human Development Annual Report 2000. The methodology of the report is two dimensional;

- a) Descriptive
- b) Prescriptive

The first two chapters provide the framework for the subsequent discussion. The third and fourth chapters are of informative nature regarding the gender issue. The rest of the chapters except the fifth and the eighth are of descriptive nature. Chapter eight in general and chapter five in particular are the chapters in which the real prescriptive posture of this Report has been concretized. In this extended review we are more interested in the prescriptive dimension of the Report, along with the conceptual analysis of the basic assumptions regarding the issues of progress, development, equality, liberty and of course "priority of the right over the good." We have contextualised these issues within a framework through which the gender issues in South Asia may be analysed.

This review has been divided into three sections. In the first section, we have identified the major prescriptions of the report. In the second section, we identify the substantive theoretical framework, which is presumed by the Report. We have also identified the internal contradictions of this framework. In the third section we have specifically discussed the gender issue within the theoretical context which we have discussed in our second section.

I. Feminism's Prejudices

There are two major issues, which have been inter-connectedly discussed in this report: "Gender" and "Development". It is claimed that the major cause of under-development in South Asia is gender discrimination. It is also claimed that tendencies like male chauvinism and exploitation of women are reinforced by the traditional, religious, political, legal and social structures of South Asian countries. Due to the discriminatory attitude towards women, economic progress and development is retarded. However, on the basis of empirical data and statistical projection, it is claimed that now things are improving. The following are the different factors of change, which have been identified as root causes of women's emancipation:

- i) Technological advancement;
- ii) Internal dialectic of economic structural change;
- iii) Liberalization of information technology;
- iv) Development of the free market economy and the dismantling of national planning;
- v) The fragility of totalitarian state craft and the "inflation" of the phenomena of non-governmental organisation;
- vi) Repudiation of religious society by individuals and evolution of "contractually structured, civil society";
- vii) Cultural and corporate globalization;

It is claimed that the socio-political, economic and legal emancipation of women is the

necessary pre-condition for economic progress and prosperity. Moreover economic progress is the only legitimate political and social ideal. It is suggested that the state must play its role in the liberation of women as an instrument for the realization of the universally valid political agenda of progress.

Gender discrimination constructs social differences. The Report suggests that gender analysis opens up a new paradigm of discourse regarding the distribution of power and social interaction between the sexes. The Report in reality is a jumble of prejudices which are necessary to undertake such analysis.

These prejudices are:

- a) South Asian women are the most oppressed people in the world;
- b) A patriarchic social structure in South Asia controls;
 - i) Reproductive and sexual capabilities of women;
 - ii) Ownership and control over property;
 - iii) Female mobility;
 - iv) Opportunities of education and information;
- c) The self is basically antecedently individuated;
- d) The right has priority over the good;
- e) Secularisation of society is optional for human beings in general and for women in particular.
- f) Religious society is necessarily unjust and civil society ensures social justice.
- g) Liberty of an individual is defined in terms of economic independence of the individual.
- h) Contract is the only legitimate basis for the establishment a just relationship between individuals.

Within the hermeneutical circle of these (historically, epistemologically and culturally specific) prejudices the Report focuses on:

- a) Institutionalized "violence" against women;
- b) The constraints faced by women in;
 - i) The labour market;
 - ii) The judicial system;
 - iii) As entrepreneurs;
 - iv) In political representation.
- c) Gender blind policies regarding development. Traditionally the realization of the practical needs¹ or interests of women were equated to the well being of women. It is claimed in the Report that the strategic needs² of women are much more important than practical needs. It has also been claimed that stra-

tegic needs are consistently being ignored in South Asia. The reason for this is that strategic needs of women redefine the whole framework of rights and duties which challenges the existing balance of power. "In order to change women's position, we must address the way gender determines power, status, and control over resources" (March et al 1999 p. 82).

The UN declaration (Decade for Women 1975) was initially, focused on practical needs, of women WID (women in development) redefines women's role in "... the development process as reproductive, productive and community workers and emphasises the fulfillment of their *strategic needs through direct state intervention*" (Human Development in South Asia p. 28). The justification for active state intervention is that, the realization of strategic needs is not just a matter of economic maneuvering, it is a political issue.

This conception of women's strategic needs and its enervated justification of state intervention rests upon the following prejudices.

- a) The fulfillment of "strategic needs" are necessary for achieving the ultimate political end i.e. development progress;
- b) The strategic gender needs are correctly identified by post feminist theory and are universally valid;
- c) The strategic gender needs are intelligible and based on rational grounds (affirmed by universally valid reason);

The Report has chronologically described the systematic transformation in approaches and efforts which have been taken for the "emancipation" of women. The WID programme was initiated by the "equity approach" which defines women's role in the over all development process. Later on this approach was replaced by the "anti-poverty" approach which was focused on the practical interests of women in the overall production process. The anti-poverty approach was repudiated by the "efficiency approach". The "efficiency" approach considered women's time and energy as elastic.

The nature of equity, anti-poverty and efficiency approaches is basically instrumental (for the development of human beings in general and women in particular). The "empowerment approach" considers improving the social position of women as an end in itself rather than as a means to realize certain ends. The equity and empowerment approaches were labeled as GAD (gender and development) approaches because of their emphasis on the strategic needs of women.

Now a days the majority of the secularists focus their attention on the "right-based-approach". The rights based approach incorporates issues of "welfare, anti-poverty, equity and empowerment as facets of the rights of all people". (Human Development in South Asia 2000 p. 28).

The achievement of human rights (which is actually a political end and is based on Enlightenment ontology, metaphysics and cosmology) becomes the criterion for the realization of other ends like economic progress. It has been claimed that "human rights are the ultimate

objective of all development processes” (Human Development Report p. 29).

The Report acknowledges that human rights in general and women’s rights in particular have been hindered by “Asian values based upon community rights”. Further “countries with a strong religious tradition that is integrated into state administration and governance often perceive human rights as a secular ideology antagonistic to religious and cultural tradition” (Human Development p. 29).

It is claimed that the IIIrd and IVth world conferences on women in Nairobi and Beijing have established a consensus on “the social prioritisation of Human Rights” particularly the unqualified human rights to “freedom of conscience” and “religion”.

The rights based approach is politically backed by the imperialists. “This involves breaking down unequal relationships based on the socially – constructed hierarchies of gender, ... age, class, ethnicity, religious and other socio-economic factors – through a process of formalization of individual rights and institutional responsibility” (Human Development p. 76).

It is claimed that South Asian women are not enjoying legal equality irrespective of the constitutionally guaranteed equality. The Report suggests that realization of “legal equality” is not possible due to the internal contradiction of constitutions. The articles regarding the issue of “equality” are contradicted by:

- Individual laws
- Gaps in the legal framework
- The decision of parallel judiciaries most importantly the Shariat Courts
- Other constitutional articles and provision

The culturally and religiously governed specific laws are considered as the major obstacle to the realisation of the equal rights of women. In a nut shell, it is claimed that although in South Asian countries women’s legal equality is constitutionally guaranteed they are living as second class citizens. There are three major reasons for this legal inequality.

- a) Constitution contradiction.
- b) Constitutionally created, “Supra-constitutional bodies” like the Council of Islamic Ideology and the Federal Shariat Courts.
- c) Ambiguous articulation of constitutionally guaranteed rights provide room for misinterpretation or discrimination.

As far as problems (a) and (c) are concerned, it is clear that:

- i) These problems are not specific to South Asian constitutional framework because all constitutions are constituted by finite individuals rather than a Divine will. They are therefore necessarily incomplete, opaque and self contradictory.

- ii) Secondly, these problems are not specific to the “exploitation” of women rather we can explain any kind of “discriminatory legal practice” (against any sect, religion, race, community etc) on the basis of the misinterpretation of constitutionally, guaranteed right.

As far as problem (b) is concerned it requires a serious and careful analysis but at this stage we merely note that, between the lines the report suggests that *the creation of supra-constitutional bodies through the constitution is against the spirit of liberal secularism*. Supra-constitutional bodies actually contradict the autonomy of the human will and its sovereignty. The constitution is actually the concretization of human sovereignty. Supra-constitutional agency of any kind negates the absolute autonomy of the human being as autonomous “law giver”. We will excavate the philosophical foundation of this contradiction between constitution and constitutionally created supra-constitution agency in our next section.

In order to “emancipate” women from legal and political dominance of man, the Report suggests a practical strategy. It is suggested that already existing secular anti Islamic laws be consolidated by:

- a) Revitalizing constitutionally guaranteed secular civil codes.
- b) Considering imperialist sanctioned international woman rights treaties as the definite text to win legal battle in favor of women.

II. Feminism Capitalism’s Handmaiden

The Report suggests that over all “emancipation” of women is the necessary precondition of economic progress and development. It claims that the major cause of the economic backwardness of this part of the world is not economic. Social, political and religious structures are real causes of the underdevelopment of South Asia. It is also presumed that South Asian women are the most poor and oppressed sections of humanity and the reason of this religiously sanctioned oppression is the violation of universally valid human rights.

It is interesting to note that the remedy for this gender “oppression” “exploitation” “discrimination” provided by the Report is historically determined and culturally specific. The structural solution to women “suffering” in South Asia is the construction of a policy framework, which is:

- Politically liberal.
- Legally secular.
- Socially civil (contractually structured civil society).
- Economically capitalist (free market economy).

In this section we are going to critically analyse the

- i) Conception of self presumed by the Report
- ii) The authenticity of its prioritization of rights over the good

iii) Its advocacy of the secularization of law and associated political implications

The Report regards the right-based approach as the most profound, comprehensive and effective means for ending gender “discrimination”. Unlike other approaches, which are basically good-based the right-based approach focuses on the constitution of a framework of ‘rights’ which (in principle only) makes the pursuit of every particular conception of good possible.

Liberal theory considers “good” or “virtue” as trivial in the constitution of just principles. Therefore, liberals prioritize rights over the good and try to create a framework in which every body is free to pursue his own conception of the good. This prioritization of fundamental rights theoretically rejects every: legal policy, distributive scheme social constitution, religious expression and political frame work etc which negates individual human rights.

The right-based approach considers the individual as an end in himself. In order to sustain the autonomy of the self, the value of non interference is presumed to have lexical priority over substantive values. The right based liberal version “is grounded in the conception of a subject which is prior to its end, a concept held indispensable to our understanding of a freely choosing, autonomous being” (Mulhall and Swift p. 45)

The autonomy of the self is presumed, the “will” is not caused by its end. It is neither the “means” for the pursuit of some other ends, nor the by-product of some prior causes rather it is an end in itself.

The detachment of the self from its end justifies two things:

- a) The autonomy of the self.
- b) The priority of the right over its ends or the good.

Liberals do not consider freedom as an empirically determined end they regard it as the pre-condition of morality and social justice “the priority of right is ‘derived’ entirely from the concept of freedom in the mutual external relationship of human beings and has nothing to do with the end which all men have by nature or with the recognized means of attaining this end” (Sandel p. 1)

The prioritization of the right and the detachment of the self from its ends reflects the moral propensity of the liberals. It not only ignores the significance of the good, and of virtue in the constitution of self identity, it also rejects the role of “historically determined good” in the development of self-identity. According to the right based theorists free and autonomous expression (irrespective of its consequences and ramifications) of “will” “... is most fundamental to the dignity and worth of human beings... it elevates them above the realm of causally determined nature” (Rawls p. 30). In the right based liberal paradigm there is no theoretical instrument which makes possible the objective ordering of the individual’s preferences so there is no possibility of self – interpretation and moral growth.

This means that the priority of individual liberty is considered to be the absolute "right" which cannot be overridden even for the general welfare of society. This sanctity of individual "right" was acknowledged by Mill, Locke and Kant. This prioritization of the right is the only fundamental "moral" category because, every body has a right to frame, revise and rationally pursue his own conception of the good.

The right based theorist claims that liberty (right) has precedence over the good. This prioritization is justified by the neutrality of right which every individual possesses (right of self-determination) by birth. Rawls believes that it is unjust to sacrifice freedom for the realization of any particular good or virtue.

The detachment of the self from its conception of the good, end and virtue justifies its antecedent individualization. The uncumbency of the self is in-itself considered to be the sole criterion for authenticity. The identity of this self is that it has not objectively been identified by anything other than itself, "... my values and ends do not define my identity. I must regard myself as the bearer of a self distinct from my values and ends whatever they may be." (Sandel p. 12).

On the basis of this, the right based liberals claim that the liberal agenda is basically universalist in nature. They believe that the highest order interest of individuals is always "self determination".

Since this highest order interest has been derived by "pure reason" and this abstraction is independent of the substantive values and cultural influences, therefore universally valid reason legitimises the universality of liberalism.

The social structure which legitimately in-cooperates this a-social individualism is that of civil society. In order to sustain such an antecedently individuated self, civil society performs two functions simultaneously:

- a) Repudiation of religious society
- b) Development of a self-sustaining mechanism by a systematically organized (imperialist sanctioned) legal frame work.

Unlike religious society, civil society assumes "contract" (among equally free, rational and mutually self-interested individuals) as a basis of social association. In such a contractually structured society equally free individuals are held together by the impersonal bonds of interests. The civil society frame work de-legitimizes any bases for social mobilization and cooperation other than self-interest. In civil society there is no role of religion in the public sphere, it is limited strictly to the private life of the individuals and thus trivialised. In a nutshell civil society contrasts itself from religious society. Civil society provides a frame work in which antecedently individuated a-religious, a-cultural, a-historical selves realize their freedom without threatening the autonomy of others.

The problem is that the maximization of freedom is not possible without the maximiza-

tion and accumulation of capital. *In contemporary political economy freedom takes the form of capital.* Capital is the concrete form of freedom. The problem is that the realm of capital is the market. It is because of this that in civil society, all relationships are inevitably marketized, “selling and buying” becomes the dominant rational content of human life. The market becomes the value giving agency. In short civil society is simply market society.

Civil society emphasizes the decentralization of state power along with the consolidation of private power. It assumes a “free” judiciary, media and market. In a nutshell, principally civil society presumes a weak state. *Civil society creates an illusion that individuals are free from state coercion, religious extremism and racial provincialism, but in reality it imposes the dominance and the sovereignty of capital over all other forms of human expression.*

The establishment of contractarian society and dominance of capital are ensured by a capitalist mode of economy. In short civil society is basically a capitalist institution which emerges to sustain a liberal public order, subject to the dominance of capital. *Human right discourse provides the theoretical legitimacy of such a social, political, legal and economic construction.*

The theoretical background of right based liberalism reveals that:

1. The worth of a “self” is not determined by its ends, virtue and conception of the good.
2. There is no role for religion, culture, history and language in the constitution of “self” identity.
3. Since the “rights” are not determined, with reference to my substantive conception of “good” (for instance obeying the will of God,) there is no justification for the existence of any supra-constitutional body. The constitution (in theory) is the concretisation of absolute human sovereignty. A supra-constitutional body of any kind negates the absolute autonomy of the human being, which is against the spirit of liberal constitution and its prioritization of the right over the good.
4. This means that the prioritization of “right” (right of self-determination) over “good” necessarily assumes a secular framework.
5. Secularism is not a-ideological, it resists any legal, social, political, cultural and religious institution which is incompatible with its own epistemology, ontology, metaphysics and axiology.
6. The right based liberal framework allows everyone to pursue his own conception of the good (at the individual level) subject to the constraint that the only public good is the “will to freedom” i.e. the maximisation of capital accumulation.

Let us critically evaluate this liberal strand in another perspective. In this conceptual analysis, we are going to focus on Charles Taylor’s argument regarding the possibility of “priority of right over the good” as a universally valid truth and its internal contradictions.

The human self is not to be treated as the object of scientific study. According to Taylor, man is a self-interpreting animal and there is no possibility of having an abstract realm of the self, which transcends historical specificity and a particular linguistic community. The self-interpreting capacity of the individual is the defining characteristic of human being, "human beings are self-interpreting animals, creatures whose identity as person depends upon their orientation and attachment to the conceptions of the good which derive from the matrix of their linguistic community" (Mulhall and Swift p. 2). This means that the constitution of the individual's identity depends upon the orientation and attachment, derived from the social matrix of a particular community and answers the questions which have emerged and are organically related to the ontological basis of that community. The Rawlsian self is antecedently individuated and independent of history and culture, because of this deontological temper self-interpretation is ontologically not possible within the Rawlsian framework. Taylor emphasizes that, self-interpretation is the defining characteristic of the human being but this self-interpretation is made possible by a bounded rationality, the "rationality" derived from the social matrix of a particular language community. Taylor believes that unincumbency of the self is not possible because historical specificity is inescapable. The self is ontologically incapable of escaping from the linguistic/moral space in which it has been situated. "To understand our predicament in terms of finding or losing orientation in moral space is to take the space which our frameworks seeks to define as ontologically basic" (Taylor p. 29). The moral space in which self-interpretation itself exists independently, is irrespective of the fact that whether it is considered as legitimate space for moral evaluation. The natural corollary of this is that the community exists independently and is ontologically prior to the individual. "Finding my bearings is something I do in space that exists independently both of me and my success or failure in orienting myself within it" (Mulhall and Swift p. 106).

Taylor's distinction between moral intuitions and instinctual intuitions is also very crucial in determining the role of community in the constitution of self-identity. He thinks that the rational elucidation or articulation of moral intuitions is possible on the basis of participation in a particular linguistic community. "Moral judgment and intuition are essentially capable of rational elucidation or articulation, a process that requires the invocation of fundamental and wide ranging evaluative frameworks also deriving from the community" (ibid p. 102). So the community is a structural precondition for the constitution of a moral self. On the other hand, the articulation of moral intuitions is possible only in a linguistic matrix, in which the self has been situated. The meaning of moral intuitions has not been derived at an "archemidian" position, it is contextually determined. This context actually provides an overarching category based on certain metaethical narratives which are ontologically grounded in a particular kind of historical specificity. The natural corollary of this metaphysical presumption is that man is condemned to interpret himself, subject to the constraint that the space of this self-interpretation is not being determined by the individual. "... there is no such thing as the structure of meaning for him independently of this interpretation of them; for one is woven into the other ... the text of our interpretation is not that heterogeneous from what is interpreted; for what is interpreted is itself an interpretation. (Taylor, "Interpretation and the Science of Man" p. 109).

The self has been situated in this hermeneutical circle and there is no transcendence from this hermeneutical space. It essentially negates the possibility of an Archemidian stand-

point. This means that the community is the theoretical precondition for the derivation of meaning. It provides the content of interpretation. There is a possibility of more than one interpretation, in a given community, every interpretation is authentic because it is the manifestation of the linguistic community in which the self has been situated, "... the relationship between a person's inner life and the vocabulary available to him for characterizing it is an intimate one (Mulhall and Swift p. 109).

Despite the fact that every interpretation is just an interpretation, it is bounded by the experience, which the self has had as a precipitant of the linguistic community which legitimately constitutes its self-identity. This means that there is no final meaning. Meaning is necessarily derived from interpretation. The content of these interpretations are provided by the language and history of a community.

It is important to note that interpretation by definition does not provide fixed meanings. In order to reach meaning we do not have any instrument other than interpretation. But there is the possibility to objectively evaluate and order these interpretations on the basis of the meta-ethical narratives, which provide the substance of rationality and are by themselves supra-rational. *For instance, liberalism communism, secularism, social welfarism, democracy, popular democracy etc. are all different interpretations which claim to objectify the meta-ethical narratives, which emerged during the particular course of European history.* In this way, Taylor has rejected the antecedently individuated self and has asserted that, it is not possible to derive abstract principles which are universally applicable. Since he presumed community as the ontological precondition for the constitution of self, this means that inter-subjective discourse is necessary for selfhood. Taylor rejects the possibility of the existence of an isolated self rather it is a "... self only in relation to certain interlocutors" (Taylor p. 360). Self-interpretation is possible only in the linguistic matrix, which is prior to the self. The individual is free to interpret but the medium is not derived from the self. This means that the derivation of meaning is a communal phenomena. In a more precise sense, goods, ends or virtues are communally derived by the self in relation to different interlocutors.

The self always has a virtue, which legitimizes its meaningful existence in the hermeneutical circle. It provides space for the culmination of inter-subjective consensus, in Taylor's words, the self always, finds itself in a "web of interlocutors" (Ibid p. 36).

On the basis of this conceptual analysis we can conclude:

1. The right based liberal conception of the self is not universal but historically determined and culturally specific.
2. There is no absolute, rational and epistemologically superior basis for the acceptance of liberal prioritization of right over good.
3. The self cannot detach itself from its end, its conception of good and virtues.
4. The right-based approach is not universally and cross culturally valid.

Human right discourse performs three dimensional functions: a) Development of civil society b) Establishment of the sovereignty of capital and c) Weakening the nation state.

The social form of “right based liberalism” is not compatible with any form of religious society. It assumes a ‘civil society’ in which the individuals are held together by the impersonal bonds of interest rather than the ties of faith. Civil society repudiates religious society and provides a social sphere which helps individuals to pursue their own conception of the good.

Civil society is basically a capitalist institution of instrumental nature. Its function is to sustain liberal public order, which is disintegrating, because of the politically and socially dangerous growth of inequalities between regions and individuals. Civil society and free market economy reinforce each other. Civil society demolishes any institution (social, political, religious, cultural) which hinders the process of capital accumulation. The market is the realm of capital. The accumulation of capital is not possible without the concentration of capital. The emergence of inequalities due to the concentration of capital is the natural corollary of market growth. Secondly people are naturally unequal in their capacity to accumulate capital therefore, unequal material status is necessary in market society. Thirdly in the market individuals lose their identity as man, or woman, black or white, Muslim or Kafir etc. In the market the identities individuals have are those of labourer, manager, consumer. *Thus each and every relation and identity is marketized and the issue of gender becomes irrelevant and fictitious. In reality the gender issue and human rights struggle in general are merely means to establish the sovereignty of capital.* The economic form of right-based society is capitalism.

- (a) Civil society provides the legitimate ground for the universalisation of capital accumulation for its own sake.
- (b) The concrete form of freedom is capital.
- (c) Maximization of capital is maximisation of freedom.
- (d) The discourse of human rights justifies maximization of capital accumulation for its own sake.

In a nutshell, “*human rights are the obverse of the duty to accumulate capital*”. And the justification of this “duty” is that the individual is compelled to accept the sovereignty of capital because he does not have any instrument other than capital through which he can realize his freedom. Theoretically the individual is free to have any conception of the good, to desire anything he wants but the contradiction is that in actuality the only desire, he can have is the desire to accumulate capital because capital is the only concrete form of freedom.

III. Feminism or Islam

Human Development Report 2000 provides a structural solution to the problem of gender “discrimination”. Gender discrimination is not seen as a cultural specific phenomena rather it is seen as a universal problem. However the perspective of the Report is anything, but universalist. It simply assumes that the western social ideological perspective and prejudices are universal and should provide a basis for evaluating all other prospector.

The structural solution, provided in this Report is not only culturally biased but also full of inherent contradictions. For instance the Report legitimizes capitalism. In its conceptual

framework the market itself becomes a value-giving agency. The Market does not respect gender differences. The Market treats male and female as equal contractors. In the Market the question of moral, social and ontological differences are meaningless. Gender difference is trivialised in the Market. The homogenisation of labour obscures this difference and obscures the particularity of womanhood. This tantamounts to destruction of the spiritual foundations of society for commodification of female labour makes love impossible: That is why feminism is in its essence a movement for defeminisation.

The mood of the Report is ostensibly ethical but it's ethical perspective is systematically backed by a particular epistemology and ontology. The problem is that the Report is presented as based on an universalist ethical perspective – where as in fact it represents merely the ethical practices and prejudices of the west. Abandoning the historical genealogical analysis required to situate gender discourse, the Report relies entirely on vulgar empiricism.

The major weakness of such empirical/statistical analysis is that, it is presented as value neutral i.e. scientific, rigorous and presuppositionless. In actuality the Report presumes a particular conception of human nature, purpose of life, and cosmological order. For instance the inherent presumptions of the Report are;

- i) The human being is homo-economicus.
- ii) The purpose of life is to maximize the discounted consumption stream over a given life time.
- iii) The world is eternal and ever lasting.

This gender issue opens up a new paradigm of discourse:

- i) It redefines women's role in accordance with the demands of the Market.
- ii) It provides a rationale for the accumulation of capital for its own sake – and woman is an equal of man essentially as an instrument of never ending capital accumulation.
- iii) It helps to constitute a body of rights/duties:
 - a) To transform the legal system (compatible with the imperialist sanctioned legal system) which establishes the hegemony of global capital and market rationality.
 - b) To widen the labour market and enhance the mobility of cheap (female) labour.
 - c) To transform the social system according to the demands of market globalization.

- iv) Human rights discourse in general and gender discourse in particular is an effective means to disintegrate collectivities (religious, communal, family). Capitalism systematically disintegrates any form of collectivity, which provides a public order for this system. It is because of this, that capitalism is self constitutionally crises ridden. It disintegrates any form of collectivity, which sustains or resists the process of capital accumulation. Religious, traditional, tribal communities naturally resist the process of capital accumulation, because they recognise and emphasise the spiritual basis of individual and collective life. (i.e. love, fear of God, blood, kinship etc). Human rights discourse performs three functions simultaneously.
 - a) It helps to disintegrate any form of collectivity, which resists the process of capital accumulation.
 - b) It provides ethical justification for social-atomization and a social-individualism.
 - c) It helps to constitute a new form of pseudo collectivity (civil society) in which individuals are held together by impersonal bonds of interest. This pseudo collectivity recognises individualist freedom as the only legitimate "collective good".

The role of women in the Islamic world is decisive in sustaining Islamic public order. Islamic public order is a natural rival to any conception of the good which ignores the question of life after death, and assumes the eternity of the world. Western cultural domination, expanding market globalization and rising consumerism are major causes of the identity crises of our generation. Today our family structure is successfully resisting the proliferation of western values. Our family structure promotes, sustains and reproduces our religious, historical and cultural values. Thus the role of women is decisive in the socio-cultural war against capitalism and imperialism. The Muslim woman alone can stop this culturally specific and imperialistically imposed dehumanization and de-feminization sponsored by capitalism. Gender discourse's ultimate purpose is to destroy the Islamic faith of Muslim women, disintegrate the family and make every woman a slave of universal, permanent capital.

Notes

¹ Practical needs are human needs according to their socially determined context.

² Strategic needs are the needs generated by the commitment to confrontation with existing social relationships between male and female.

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IDENTITY CRISIS AND THE DILEMMA OF PROGRESS

Abdul Wahab Soori

"Who are we?" "Do we belong to the Third World?" The answer of this question is obviously "Yes". The significance of this yes, might be factual or geographical but actually we are the "INHABITANTS" of the lost world. We have lost our identify; we don't have ideals with which we can identify ourselves, because most of the ideals, contradict each other, and thus, it becomes, a matter of choosing one or the other.

At present we are living in four centuries at a time. Our religious structure is about 1400 years old; our social infrastrature is like that of seventeenth eighteenth century; we are living in the 20th Century, and we have the information of 21st century. In this conglomerative situation we have totally lost our identity. When we look towards our intellectuals for the remedy of this identity crisis we procure nothing but confusion.

In order to describe and evaluate the "Identity crisis and the dilemma of progress", we have to consider Ayer's announcement, according to which:

"Since the technological revolution is itself irresistible, the arbitrary authority and irrational values of pre-scientific, pre-industrial cultures are doomed. Three alternatives confront the partisans of tribal values and beliefs. Resistance, if sufficiently effective, though it cannot save the tribal values, can bring on total revaluation. Or ineffective resistance may lead to sequestration like that of American Indians. The only remaining alternative is that of intelligent, voluntary acceptance of the industrial way of life and values that go with it.

We need no apology for recommending such a course. Industrial society is the most successful way of life mankind

has ever known. Not only do our people eat better, sleep better, live in more comfortable dwellings, get around more in far greater comfort, and --- live longer than man have ever done before. In addition to listening to radio and watching television, they read more books, see more pictures, and hear more music than any previous generation or any other people ever has. At the height of the technological revolution we are now living in a golden age of scientific enlightenment and artistic achievement. For all who achieve economic development, profound culture change is inevitable. But the rewards are considerable".¹

Thus as is evident from Ayer's statement, "Development" and "Progress" play key role in Identity crisis. According to Jose Maria Sbert,

"Revolution may not have killed the sleep of modern civilization, but it had certainly turned its dreams of progress into recurrent nightmares".²

And the problem is that we have shared that dream along with westerners.

The issue of progress has different significance for westerners and third world nations alike. Gustavo Esteva in his famous article "Development" used the term "Redevelopment" to express the hopelessness of Westerners that they want to progress more, because they are condemned to progress. According to Gustavo on the one hand, in countries like Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Poland, Britain etc. there is a general agreement at public level that socialized medicine, nuclear plants, steel production, polluting factors, poisonous pesticides etc.

"[May] be destroyed, dismantled, exported or substituted".³

But the problem for them is that they too must compete with others and survive in the modern economic infrastructure. Gustavo further illustrates:

"The obsession with competitiveness, for fear of being

left out of the race, compels acceptance of the destruction of whole sections of what was "developed" over the last 30 years. Sacrificed on the alter of redevelopment, these will instead in transnational designs consistent with world market demand".⁴

It means that they are condemned to develop their selves materially. Since the destiny of that development or progress is determined by market forces, they must fulfill the demand of economy, which basically is not their best choice but the best in worst.

On the other hand, he believes that in the underdeveloped countries there is a general agreement at public as well as intellectual level regarding development which is actually redevelopment because it implies the development of a maldeveloped and obsolete infrastructure.

Since the concept of progress and development is considered to be irresistible imperative of power, the progress is actually felt to be a matter of survival. In Jose Maria's words:

"Progress is more than just a journey or an ideal. It is modern destiny. To modern man, and to those who want to share his identity, rejecting faith in progress is unbearable. Modern man is defined by Progress. His self-esteem is rooted in it and it is his deepest justification for the ruthlessness he displays towards his fellow men and nature".⁵ Therefore in these circumstances we have to develop our selves.

Since the issue of progress is so critical, it is accepted that "The Third World had to develop first-before even think about REAL PROGRESS".⁶

According to one school of thought, the third world nations stand at a juncture where the west was 200 years ago. Thus the third world nations have to go through all the process experienced by the west. However, it might be stated that, in reality the condition is not so, simple.

When the west started its journey towards development and progress, the consequences of that development were not as evident to them as they are to us. S. Parvez Manzoor states that:

"Like all Promethean myths, the myth of progress has its sequel in human suffering. Dethroning providence and faith by progress and profanity, man on his own has known neither joy nor freedom. The enlightenment's offspring, a rational humanity liberated from the supersession of religion, has given us the nightmare, of apartheid, the gas-chambers, and the bomb. Science, the greatest creation of the rational mind, has turned out to be a specter of doom, posing the greatest threat to our natural environment and our human existence. If there's been any progress since Western man rebelled against God and deified himself in "The age of enlightenment", it has been in the spheres of human suffering, greed and oppression".⁷

No doubt that the material progress intensified human sufferings a lot but actually, Westerners are also unaware about the repulsive consequences caused by the decline of religious, social and moral institutions. They do have some doubts, fears rather dread about that journey but their increasing control on nature and technological advancement bestowed them enough confidence and they moved on and on. There was almost general consensus about the concept of progress at the intellectual level and we find that in the early stages of modernistic period; in their conception (Modernistic) of universe God was switched over by MAN and he become the author of his own development. The work of Darwin, Marx, Hegel, Kant and Comte etc., help in that transformation of progress or development as a historical necessity. Later on this conception got politicize by politicians and progress modified from history into program and unavoidable fate. The impact of that transformation in the conceptualization of development is that it is undoubtedly believed that this stage (developed form) of west the is: The, "[Natural] culmination of the potentials already existing in neolithic man"⁸ The consequences of this view is that. "History" was reformulated in Western Term"⁹ and "[Development] gave global hegemony to a purely western genealogy of history".¹⁰

Actually what I am trying to highlight is that in this journey of progress their religious, moral and of course family structure collapsed they did not consciously do so, but for the sake of material development they had to scarifice their religious, values, family structure. And for the past two hundred years defending material justification of human Existence, Westerners once again are turning towards spirituality, and are trying to revine their family structure, providing the pragmatic explanation of religion for social harmony etc.

Our criteria to substantiate the progress is similar to that of Westerners i.e. "Material Progress". Today we too examine the performance of our Govt. on the basis of G.N.P. rate or G.N.P. per capita, but when we expect our intellectuals to provide a legitimacy for this sort of progress and supplicate the recommendation for the Western model of development, they hesitate to do so because they do not have the answers to the questions which follow that sort of verification.

The Russian collapse is the collapse of communist.mode of economy and state structure and now capitalist rationality is considered to be as "*The rationality*". The intellectual position of the people who still reject capitalism is not more than utopian Anarchist because they don't have any alternative of free market Economy. It is an acknowledging fact that economic rationality of market has become the inevitable condition for survival and because of this.

The matter of survival in Economic Society is based on the economic interpretation of progress, thus progress and economic progress are considered to be synonymous.

And now the situation is that economic conflict perpetuates tension at social as well as state level. According to Gustavo:

"By equating education with diplomas, following the economic definition of learning. They lacked teachers and school....

After equating health with dependence on medical services, they lacked doctors, health centers, hospitals, drugs....

After equating with the technical activities of production and consumption, linked to the mediation of the market or state, they lacked income and suffered scarcity of food..."¹¹

As we all know that the political form of capitalism is *Liberalism* and the reason behind all that scenario is that we do not have any sound critique of liberalism.

We can roughly categorize our intellectuals by considering *liberalism* as a criterion. The possible categorization is as follows:

1. Orthodox Muslims (Ulmas/Molvies)
2. Liberal Islamists
3. Islamist Liberals.

The first group knows nothing about liberalism, (its effect and consequences) this is the reason that there is no direct confrontation between liberalism and *ulmas* but if we look at the relation between them we find a sort of passive resistance offered by *ulmas* to liberalism. But that group, infact, has no potential to provide an intellectual threat to liberalism and we know that any society which considers "*Freedom*" as THE criterion of "goodness and badness" then religion cannot stand there any longer.

The claim of second group is very interesting, because they believe that, the values of liberalism are infact the values of Islam, actually Islam and liberalism are the two sides of the same coin, but it is a historical objectivity that whenever liberalism proliferates in any society the first institution that collapses in that society is that of religion. And it is a fact that to overthrow religion is one of the defining characteristic of liberalism.

The third group suggests the unity at the name of MUSLIM, like German, French etc. In other words it tries to provide the concept of muslim nationalism and then, on the basis of general agreement adopt, any kind of political, economic and social model. This is the group which is not ready to accept any bargain at the name of progress. This group legitimizes any kind of western model which amplifies the rate of progress or development and their interpretation of development or progress is purely like that of western-

ers i.e. material.

The motivational forces of such progress are lust, routh, greed, self-interestedness which are never acceptable for any religion, particularly to Islam, which provides the lesson of *Sabar, Sukker, Faqhar and Ghina*. Thus the tussle between religion and economics is obvious. According Jose Maria Sberts:

"Leniency bordering on approval towards such a sin, greed which is now perceived as the veritable psychological engine of material progress".¹²

She further argues that, it is presumed that:

"Greed and arrogance in individual turn into prosperity and justice for nations and all mankind.... an invisible hand, a cunning reason that will do him humanity good even if its members indulge in evil".¹³

That is the reason why religious or traditional moral institutions offers a sort of resistance to the expansion of market industry and modern state. The problem of identity crisis raised on the one hand when we try to measure progress in Western way (as I already explained the historical transformation of the conceptualization of progress and western concept of progress being considered as "THE" concept of progress) and on the other hand we don't want to be like Westerners and want to conserve or secure our moral, religious, cultural and traditional structures' (Here I don't mean to secure Feudalism) because the consequences of that development are also evident to us in there most repulsive form, we also noticed that self-interestedness, anxiety, despair, selfishness and individuality are the defining characteristic of Western consciousness which is the inevitable gift of that material progress, we are also aware about the social problems of that society and their struggle to revive their traditional structures.

According to Marcuse:

"A comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress".¹⁴

As we know that, struggle of development and the rationality behind that progress made the highest brutality possible. Marcuse accepted that:

"We submit to the peaceful production of the means of destruction, to the perfection of waste, to being educated for a defence which deforms the defenders, and that which they defend".¹⁵

The capitalist claim of free competition in a free market economy is just an illusion.

Marcuse wrote:

"[The] regulation of free competition among unequally equipped economic subjects".¹⁶

Modernity claimed to provide a civil society. The society in which people have the assurance of civil rights. As we know that western interpretation of civil right is unavoidably material but the problem is that, even after attaining immense material development the dream of a civil society is still a utopia for the west.

According to Marcuse:

"Contemporary industrial civilization demonstrate that it has reached the stage at which, "The free society" can no longer be adequately defined in the traditional terms of economic, political, and intellectual liberties not because these liberties have become insignificant, but because they are too significant to be confined within the traditional form".¹⁷

He unveiled the westerns claims of economic, political and intellectual freedom, and for other alternative Marcuse stated:

"Economic freedom would mean freedom from the economy from being controlled by economic forces and relationships; freedom from daily struggle for existence, from earning a living. Political freedom would mean liberation of the individual from politics over which they have no effective control. Similarly, intellectual freedom

would mean the restoration of individual thought now absorbed by mass communication and indoctrination, abolition of "public opinion" together with its makers."¹⁸

Keeping all these aspects of Western society in our mind, when we ask our intellectuals that in order to attain that level of progress do we also have to sacrifice our moral, cultural, social, religious values? then they claim that we need modernization and at the same time, we want to conserve our values, their argument is that:

Since the values are not static, rather dynamic in nature thus there is always a possibility of compatibility between the progress and value structure. But the problem is not that the western society is devoid of values, it does, but in the realm of consumerism the basic determinant of all values is the relation of selling and buying. The question in consideration now is that, whether we ready to accept that value system or not? In the journey of material progress which we are trying to attain there is only one rationality left and that is "selling and buying."

Western development is the product of gradual progress. In this systematic progress the change which occurred in their society was also gradual. They also had some adjustment problems in that process but slowly and gradually society become liberal, however as soon as liberalism proliferated in society, religion and other structures like family lost their significance but that process took hundred of years. And when the last institution of their society collapsed i.e. "family" there were almost 100% literacy rate and they had developed a strong political and economic infrastructure. In Western civilization we find a compatibility between liberalism and progress, that is why they are able to survive in a literally dead society.

Now they are living on the basis of legal relations, there are no human relations possible in that society but as the collapse of human relations took more then 200 years in the mean time they able to developed a strong legal structure on the basis of which they are surviving.

The problem for us is that human relations, in our society are

frequently getting weaker and weaker and we don't have institutions like that of West to sustain morally corrupt society. The last institution in the "Arena" is our family structure which is infact very strong and effectively working but, irony is that in the name of progress and development we are smashing this last instituion, and in that conscious smashing strategy mass media is contributing a lot.

The devastating situation is that we are aware about the problems of Post-Industrial era in Pre-Industrial age that situation is at once blessing and curse, on the one hand it expands our perspective but on the other hand makes us skeptic (at intellectual level) about the concept of progress. In this complex situation we have lost our ability to decide what we ought to do and actually what is happening is that, we are doing nothing.

And are stuck with

"Never ending confrontation with all things foreign beliefs, ideas, weapons, even disease".¹⁹

We are intellectually paralysed by this flow of material progress and actually we have let our selves free in that flow of progress, by accepting the view that,


"The third world had to develop first before even think about REAL PROGRESS"²⁰

Factually we consider our selves as a developing country but actually we are neither developed nor developing rather "progress obsessed" (Taraqqi Zada).

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IS HISTORY A HERMENEUTICAL ACTIVITY

Abdul Wahab Soori

History is basically a human phenomenon and the temporal prediction of history is inevitably connected with human affairs. According to Heidegger, it is the horizon of time, which makes understanding of being (human) possible and in fact reveals its meaning.

“ The horizon which makes it possible for us to understand being as being, is itself the meaning of being. What is this horizon? It is...time ”. (1)

History is not just the cluster of past events but it is an active reconsideration of the past with references to the present and for a better future. History cannot move itself. It is the language which makes history a pure human enterprise. At this stage one might argue that there is a possibility of history of rocks, history of trees, history of production, history of genetics etc. The answer is simple that all these manifestations of history are the expressions of a particular kind of human consciousness and all these are the human interpretations of rock, trees, productions or genetics. Language is the medium through which history proceeds ; most of the people believe that,

“ A proposition reflects reality but it is not reality in itself. ”

Due to this dichotomy between reality and the linguistic expression of reality there is always a possibility of disagreement and it is an acknowledging fact that pure objectivity in historical explanation is not possible, because pure objective statements about the past are not possible. According to Heidegger,

“ Being is essentially directed towards the *future*...resolve understands from it the *past* so as to present the concrete situation. For its circumspect action. The *past* originates from the *future* so as to engender the present.....”

Since history is selective in nature, historical statements are actually selection and summary of events that have occurred in the past. So there is a possibility of (conscious or unconscious) biased selection according to one's moral, political, religious, racial and cultural inclinations. What happened in the past is necessarily influenced by the historian's present. That is why I believe that,

“ We cannot change the past but we can change history.”

We find extreme disagreements among historians about the same phenomenon, that is, Catholic / Protestant, Liberals / Communitarians, Male / Female, Black /

White, etc. The historical truth is dependent on the selection of historical events in an explanation; as the selection is not a purely objective enterprise, because of the incorporation of the subjective element, pure objectivity is not possible. Facts are not neutral and they have different significance for different people, that is why, interpretations is always a central problem of history. According to R.F. Atkinson,

“....., it is as certain as anything can be that there must be more than one sort of explanation in history.”(3)

According to Charles Taylor,

“The interpretation aims to bring to light an underlying coherence or sense.”(4)

Most of the philosophers believe that the whole life is actually a hermeneutical activity and one can never transcend from the realm of hermeneutics is basically a philosophical discipline which deals with the problem of interpretation.

“A successful interpretation is one which makes clear the meaning originally present in a confused, fragmentary, cloudy form.” (5)

As we know that there is no clear line of demarcation between meaning and expression with respect to subject therefore,

“The object of s science of interpretation must thus have sense, distinguishable from its expressions. which is for or by a subject.” (6)

Historically it was the task of the theologian to intercept the divine language because the sacred stuff is basically closed in nature and there is a need of a hermeneutical treatment of text. In this regard traditional hermeneutics is important as it provides the ground for “the art of textual interpretation”. Later on the scope of hermeneutics extended upto religion, art, literature, law, culture, society and of course history.

Today hermeneutics has become an overall, comprehensive discipline, with the principles regulating all forms of interpretation. In early days, hermeneutics was an attempt to attain objectivity. Later on that aim lost its significance because of the variations in the conceptualization of truth. Hermeneutics is basically a two dimensional approach, which involves :

- a) Understanding
- b) Application

Firstly, the interpreter plays an active role in order to make a text, event or situation intelligible. Secondly, the interpreter also draws out the practical or

factual repercussions of the interpreted meaning. For the economy of understanding we can roughly categorize hermeneutics as :

- a) Romantic Hermeneutics
- b) Philosophical Hermeneutics
- c) Critical Hermeneutics

ROMANTIC HERMENEUTICIANS

The dilemma of the romantics is that despite presuming subject/object dichotomy they try to be one with the object of knowledge. As they presume unified conception of self there is a possibility of the realisation of objective truth, objective beauty etc., and most importantly, objective meaning, since they believe in the objectivity of meaning, there is a possibility of hierarchy of interpretation, that is, the more objective the interpretation the more good the interpretation. Thus for the attainment of the objective meaning they adhere to the notion of entering into the frame of reference of the other (object of understanding) through empathetic attitudes. The relation between the subject and object is central for Romantic Hermeneuticians particularly in the realm of humanities. According to Dilthey,

“.... It is ultimately not so much this specific object which distinguishes the human from the natural sciences, nor is it a unique method of investigation, but rather the relationship between the subject and his object..... The researcher.... approach is fundamentally hermeneutic ; he does not leave the sphere of understanding”.(7)

And for him,

“ Understanding as a relationship and mode of co-existence with the object... in understanding. ‘life meets life’. (8)

PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICIANS

The philosophical Hermeneuticians consider the whole life as a Hermeneutical activity. They believe that it is impossible to perceive the actual fact and that during understanding we mould that fact and what we perceive is just an interpretation. They reject the unified conception of self in favour of changing and unfolding self. The self is trapped into a process of becoming. This conception of self transforms the whole conception of truth and there is no possibility of absolute, certain and universal truth. This relativistic conception presumes that there is no ultimate meaning, and if there is no fixed and final meaning, then there is no ultimate meaning and every interpretation is just an interpretation. It means that there is no possibility of hierarchy of interpretation and there is always a possibility of interpretation of interpretation of interpretation and so on and so forth and there is no transcendence from the Hermeneutical circle. Gadamer is one of the main philosophical Hermeneuticians who believe that “....meaning only

emerges when it is interpreted, and continues to re-emerge with each new interpretation".(9)

CRITICAL HERMENEUTICIANS

We can contrast critical Hermeneuticians from philosophical ones in a manner that for latter Hermeneutics is an end while for the former ; Hermeneutics rather critical hermeneutics is just a means and there is a possibility of transcendence from the hermeneutical circle. They believe that we need critical hermeneutics because "truth is not transparent". Habermas teaches us that the problem of distortion in inter subjective understanding arises because the formal conditions of ideal speech are not fulfilled or realised because of capitalist rationality, technological advancement, scientific determinism, state influence, mass media, advertisement, etc. Thus, due to these extra linguistic factors truth is distorted and the order of "LIVE WORLD" is disturbed and we have to face a phenomenon of systematically distorted communication so there is a need of critical Hermeneutics which incorporates these extra linguistic factors for the attainment of truth. I would consider Collingwood as the classic example of Romantic Hermeneutics . He actually used History as a tool for the development of a Theory of Mind. It means that one can understand the human through history, because for him, history is the "outward of expression of thought"(10). His stand is based on the distinction between the inside/outside events and he believes that history is not just the analysis of events rather a conscious investigation of Action. And for him action is the unity of inside and outside of an event.

" The historian, investigating any event in the past, makes a distinction between what may be called the outside and the inside of an event. By outside of the event I mean everything belonging to it which can be described in terms of bodies and their movements: ... by inside of the event I mean that in it which can only be described in term of thought". (11)

For instance if Alexander attacked the subcontinent, then the attack is the outside of an event while the aim of attack is inside. By inside he means which can only be explained in terms of thought (rational thought). As for Collingwood, "... in History causes always take the shape of reason". (12) He thinks that no doubt... "the subject matter of history is exclusively action : but it would be equally wrong to think that reason cannot be causes".(13) If the rationale of an action is the legitimate content of causation then the inside part (of action) has precedence over outside event in the historical interpretation. On the basis of this assumption he derives a methodology of "re-enactment of past thought" or "re-thinking". For him thought is not timely bound rather it is eternal and continuous. It is one of the reasons that there is a possibility to re-think what has been previously thought about. Because of the influence of romanticism, he used empathetic attitude as a tool to realise the possibility of re-enactment or re-thinking. That is why in his system the historian must put himself into the frame of reference of the historical agent and evaluate him critically. He is very optimistic about the feasibility as well as the authenticity of his approach because of his faith in romanticism.

"The historian not only re-enacts past thought, he re-enacts in the context of his own knowledge and therefore, in re-enacting it, criticises it, forms his own judgement of its value, corrects whatever errors he can discern in it".(14)

According to him, historian is not actually concerned with events rather he is only "... concerned with the outward expression of thought".(15) Thus what he is trying to understand through history is that how human mind manifests itself in history. That is why he rejects the traditional function of history and for him,

"historical knowledge is the knowledge of what mind has done in the past, at the same time it is redoing of this, the perpetuation of the past acts in the present."(16)

THE PREVAILING INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF HERMENEUTICS IN COLLINGWOOD'S STAND

Collingwood's criterion of objectivity lies in the exploration of the actual inclination, approach, thought, or intention of historical agent based on empathetic altitude. That approach leads us towards an intense form of Intentionalism. The base word of the term "meaning" is derived from a German word "meinen". This means "to have in mind". The general philosophical theory which presumes this conception of meaning is called "Intentionalism". The intentionalists believe that "the meaning of an act or its product derives from the intention of its author.. that is actor".(17) Italics my own. But the anti intentionalists believe that the origin of historical act should not be confused with its meaning while the intentionalist approach is to study the psychology of the historical agent.

Although Collingwood delightfully accepted that the purpose of history is the study of mind and as far as the implementation of the method of re-enactment in history is concerned, "... in theory the agent (historical actor) is the best interpreter of the meaning of his or her own act"(18) because in rethinking the historian tries to "... re-enact the thought processes of the agent".(19) But Collingwood thinks that this is not the case and the historian has vantage position and it is because of the eagle vision of the historian that he can understand and critically evaluate the historical process far better than the historical agent. The historian is a better interpreter than the historical agent"... interpreters (including the agent at a later, more reflective time) can understand the meaning of an act better than the agent him or herself. (20)

Brian Fay believes that Collingwood's account of meaning is not adequate because he confuses re-enactment with interpretation. Fay believes that the realm of re-enactment is different than that of interpretation. According to him,

"re-enactment is a psychological process of identification in which historians and social scientists re-experience the

thought process which went through the minds of the agents as they performed various actions". (21)

On the other hand,

"... interpretation... is an explicatory process in which acts are situated within relevant social and intentional contents of the agent's cultural world". (22)

The clash between psychology and history is obvious as far as the understanding of human mind is concerned. In order to reconcile this dispute, we can segregate there spheres as follows:

"What is mind"? (actual aspect). This is the question of psychology.

"What/how mind does"? (potential aspect). This is the problem of history.

Collingwood could not accept this "structural/functional distinction because he thinks that this distinction might apply to resolve the problem of mind/body dualism, but not in the realm of mind. This is so because he believed that the mind is not a static structure so that one can understand it comprehensively, rather it is a process in which we cannot separate its "isness" from its "function". So psychology is intrinsically an inadequate approach to understand mind and we obviously need history. Brian Fay's criticism on Collingwood's approach is also not sound because of three reasons: first of all, the criticism is not sound because it is against the basic assumption of the romantic epistemological approach which presumes that empathy is necessary for clear understanding, because Brian believes that,

"the thesis that "you must be one to know one" mistakenly equates understanding with empathy or psychological closeness or transcultural identification". (23)

Secondly, Collingwood is working on Hegelian context, which means that, for him history is not a psychological phenomenon rather it is a rational one. The historian through empathetic attitude tries to grasp the rationale of a historical act rather than the psyche of the historical agent which is actually not possible. Thirdly, the historian within Collingwood's paradigm does not lose his contact with the present because in the empathetic attitude he is not just thinking, rather he is re-thinking. It means that because of the historicism he has more rationally deduced; refined and sophisticated mind and a continuity in the rational unfolding or deduction there is a possibility to re-think and think more objectively and clearly what had been thought previously. This is the reason why he presumes that the historian is in a better position to interpret a historical act than the historical agent who is in fact a part of the system.

However the epistemological leap in the romantic approach is that (which I have already pointed out even presuming a gulf between the knower and the known)

They try to be one with the object of knowledge for the attainment of objective meaning. They presume otherness and try to bridge that otherness through empathetic attitude and this is their dilemma.

In the end we can say that we can never eradicate the linguistic aspect from history and this incorporation of the former opens up the realm of hermeneutics. Through hermeneutics our understanding is directed from subjectivity to contextuality. In this contextual interpretation we can minimise the possibility of ethnic, cultural, political, religious and various other disputes. On the other hand we could rather or we should critically evaluate and reinterpret our concepts.

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The Living Death of Modernity and the Poverty of Post-modernity in the Time of Terror

Abdul Wahab Suri

Introduction

The rise of post-modernity has been interpreted by Rorty¹ as the victory of poetry over philosophy, that is, the domination of aesthetics over universally valid reason. Post-modernity idealizes contingency, relativity and differences which is the refutation of modern urge of absoluteness, objectivity and universality. It has generally been argued that the post-modern discourse has questioned the intellectual legitimacy of the universalization of grand narratives particularly the meta-ethical narrative derived from the historical experience of Enlightenment thought.

Since the universality of the modern theory and its corresponding institutions has ruthlessly been criticized by dominant philosophical discourse of our times i.e. post-modernism, therefore, it has been interpreted by the non-Western post-colonial intelligentsia as an internal critique of not just the universality of modernity but also the critique of cosmopolitan internationalization i.e. liberal cosmopolitanism. They believe that the post-modern argument justifies the legitimacy of cultural particularity and historical specificity of all meta-ethical narratives and by virtue of the incommensurability of different meta-ethical

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¹ Richard Rorty (1931-2007) is an eminent American philosopher. He has been acknowledged as anti-foundationalist who denies the philosophical legitimacy of transcendental basis of all kind of grand narratives. That is why he has been categorized as the post-modern philosopher of our times.

narratives de-legitimizes the universal imposition of any specific meta-ethical narrative. Thus, it provides an anti-foundationalist justification of the peaceful co-existence of mutually incommensurable particularities, state structures, social orders and religious particularities.

Contemporary cosmopolitan liberalism which is presumed to be the leading ideological framework in the War against Terror is (by implication) questioned by the post-modern discourse. In this paper we will try to argue that post-modernity cannot provide any substantive theoretical basis to counter American urge to impose liberal values and its corresponding institutions to the non-liberal, underdeveloped, pre-modern post-colonial societies. The paper will be divided into two sections: in the first section, we will try to provide initial exposition of the argument that how post-modern anti-foundationalism can be instrumentalized to counter the hegemony of unipolar world order in the time of terror. In the second section we will try to establish that the post-modern critique against the universality of ground narrative can be instrumentalized to justify American invasions all around the world.

The central idea of this paper is that the post-modernist argument to counter liberal cosmopolitanism is not only inappropriate to legitimize pre-modern, non-liberal collectivities rather it also has the potential to be instrumentalized to justify American liberal imperialism in the War against Terror. The major assumptions of this paper are:

- a) The Western world in general and the US in particular are committed to liberal values and their corresponding socio-political and economic institutions. It means they are not only interested in safeguarding their

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national interests in the War against Terror but they also have a substantive commitment with liberal grand narratives too.

b) Liberal cosmopolitanism is not a conspiracy against non-liberal communities; rather it is a thought which rests upon the assumption that the Enlightenment intellectual tradition provides reasonable foundation to standardize as to how man, society, and the state should be?

c) Post-modern thinkers have posed substantive intellectual challenge to the universalistic foundations of modern political theory in general and liberal political theory in particular. It is difficult to defend the universality of liberal grand narrative on epistemological and ontological grounds in post-modern discourse.

d) The traditionally religious non-liberal communities and statecraft are not ready to accept liberal cosmopolitanism comprehensively. Moreover, they need an indigenous theoretical framework of their own in order to legitimize their non-liberal particularities.

e) Some of the non-liberals presume that post modernist anti-foundationalism can be theoretically instrumentalized for justifying their historically derived socio-cultural particularities against the dictatorial arrogance of American foreign policy framework.

Section-A

We, in the underdeveloped world belong to nations whose imports exceed their exports with trade deficit the intrinsic aspect of our collective existence. We import everything, i.e., from consumer items to weapons of mass destructions, medicines to diseases, from ideas to conflicts. We import wars, from Cold war to War against Terror and enjoy export subsidies to bleed and burn our people. The contemporary intellectual arena is constantly announcing the victory of post-modernity over modernity or in Rorty's

words the victory of poetry over philosophy, i.e., the dominant philosophical discourse is acknowledging the limitations and fundamental incoherences in Modern-Enlightenment project and its corresponding grand-narratives.

The contemporary international order is no doubt, intrinsically modern as far as its institutional dynamics are concerned but in contemporary philosophical discourse the modern philosophical foundations, i.e., its ontological, epistemological, axiological and moral foundationalist essentialism have not only been questioned but their absoluteness, certainties and universality have been damaged theoretically by the emerging post-modern thought.

The question is why does pre-modern underdeveloped post-colonial intelligentsia are so excited by the post-modern relativity, contingency and nihilism? What solution does it offer to cure the miseries of Muslims both inside and outside the Western World? The rise of post-modernity is not a recent phenomena but the need of post-modern relativism (instrumentally) to respond to the question (that *how man should be?*) during the time of terror appears to be a more pragmatic response to justify oxymoronic positions of Muslim populations worldwide, i.e., protect the Islamic fundamentals without being intellectually marginalized by the rise of anti-modernist forces in the Muslim world.

The most ironic aspect of modern Muslim intelligentsia and Islamic modern intellectual discourse is that, Islamic modernism is losing ground in the Muslim world due to the rise of post-modern literature, because what they were offering to their people as a universally acknowledged solution to all their problems (which has a potential to erode their traditional religious framework too)

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has been challenged and up to some extent has intellectually been defeated in the Western world. Hence, they are trapped in an intellectual dilemma and the gravity of their irony is that their modern agenda has not been properly institutionalized and the vast majority of these Muslim areas are living in underdeveloped pre-modern cultural structures.

Globalization has either been presented as an evolutionary phenomenon or as an unintended consequence of modern techno-scientific development. But from the non-liberal perspective it is an ongoing process of delegitimization of the live-world which is derived from pre-liberal or non-liberal intellectual sources. Its values, socio-political institutions in fact the whole live-world will be redefined from the emerging trends of cosmopolitan liberalism. According to Peter Gowan, globalization is the "radicalization of the earlier forms of liberalism."² The War against Terror has generally been presented as a clash between Islam and the West. This claim will be true if we reduce the whole Western intellectual discourse into the realm of liberalism. There is no doubt that contemporary War against Terror is not only led by the liberal statecraft but they are also interested in imposing liberal political agenda through the institutionalization of cosmopolitan liberalism via cosmopolitan governance, rather than the formalization of global state. The contemporary world order is interested in "cosmopolitan governance that is, cosmopolitan rules and norms, not about everything."³

There are two fundamental tendencies which are noticeable in the contemporary unipolar globalized world.

² Peter Gowan, 'The State, Globalization and the New Imperialism: A Roundtable Discussion', *Historical Materialism: Research in Critical Marxist Theory* 9, (Autumn 2001): 4.

³ Ibid.

The liberal states are expanding liberal values and their corresponding institutions through national, regional and global actors and institutions. Secondly, the capital accumulation process has exceeded the limits of the traditional nation-state, i.e., markets are globalized and an inherent antagonistic relation between *national capital* and *capital in general* has emerged. In Gowan's words, "Globalization deals with what you might call the market side of liberalism and liberal cosmopolitanism deals with the political side of liberalism."⁴

It implies that contemporary global trends, i.e., both political and market dimensions of liberalism are not only globalizing themselves but also complementing each other. According to Gowan, the old Westphalian state order has been delegitimized which acknowledges "the absolute right of states"⁵ and now state legitimacy criterion is conditioned with the institutionalization of "minimal human rights and democratic rights."⁶ There is a growing concern in the Western world that democratic political procedure has been instrumentalized in the non-Western world to protect illiberal socio-cultural and religious practices. Democracy and liberalism which were "interwoven in the Western political fabric, are coming apart in the rest of the world. Democracy is flourishing constitutional liberalism is not."⁷ Zakaria believes that a liberal dictatorship is relatively more preferable than illiberal democracy. "Economic, civil, and religious liberties are at the core of human autonomy and dignity. If a government with limited democracy steadily expands those freedoms, it should not be branded as a

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Fareed Zakaria, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', *Foreign Affairs* 76 (November-December, 1997): 23.

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dictatorship.”⁸ He thinks that both the political and market “pressure of global capitalism can push the process of liberalization forward as they have in China.”⁹

Zakaria is interested in the justification of liberal cosmopolitanism. He thinks that liberalization of constitution will provide substantive foundation to transform traditional illiberal democracies. He claims that the democratic process should be conditioned with liberal constitutionalism. “We need to revive constitutionalism. One effect of the over emphasis on pure democracy is that little effort is given to creating imaginative constitutions for transitional countries.”¹⁰

There is a growing concern regarding the axiological strength of religion to influence the socio-political order of a given live-world. Generally, religious fundamentalism has been associated with extremism, intolerance, lack of civility, source of discrimination and polarization by the dominant discourse of cosmopolitan liberalism. It considers secularism and process of secularization as a fundamental criterion to judge the level of civility of a given public order. It is because of this reason that “fundamentalist ... claim to be victims of stereotyping and cultural marginalization.”¹¹ It has also been acknowledged that although the fundamentalists “lack status and respectability in important centers of cultural power”¹² but even then religion has far better capacity of its pigmentation with tribal, ethnic, national and communal

⁸ Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom Liberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), 156.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Stephen Macedo, ‘Liberalism, Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God Vs J. Rawls?’, *Ethics* 105 (April 1995): 469.

¹² Ibid.

particularities to “function as a mobilizing oppositional ideology.”¹³ The cosmopolitan liberalism considers itself as anti-perfectionist and claims to offer a public order which is neutral regarding the prioritization of any specific conception of a good form of life. This apparently presumed de-ontological foundation of liberal public order claims to guarantee difference and diversity. The religious fundamentalists are not satisfied with this domain of difference and diversity which is circumscribed by the predominantly liberal modern theoretical framework.

Nomi Stolzenberg has defended the plausibility of the fundamentalist charge that teaching “diverse view points in a tolerant and objective mode threatens the survival of their culture.”¹⁴ Liberal cosmopolitanism considers itself as a conflict resolving mechanism and claims to provide a public order in which assimilation of apparently incommensurable conceptions of Good is possible. This imposed liberal public order and assimilation has been interpreted by many religious fundamentalists as a new kind of totalitarianism in which assimilation cannot be possible without the disintegration of one’s specific communitarian particularities. According to Stolzenberg “a liberal means of assimilation, “cousin of totalitarianism.”¹⁵

The fundamentalists’ charge on the totalitarian aspect of liberal cosmopolitanism reveals that fundamentalists accept the legitimate constraints of a given public order. It appears that contemporary fundamentalists just want to be acknowledged of their existence as legitimate form of life. For instance, Khurshid Ahmed claims that, “an

¹³ Jeff Haynes, ‘Religion, Secularization and Politics: A Post Modern Conspectus’, *Third World Quarterly* 18 (September 1997): 709.

¹⁴ Stephen Macedo, ‘Liberalism, Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism’, 469.

¹⁵ Ibid.

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open and just world would have to be genuinely pluralistic with link ups and inter-relations that enable all people, societies and states to reap benefits through cooperation as much as healthy competition.”¹⁶ There is no doubt that religious fundamentalists, are committed with their conception of Good and believe in the priority of *Good over Right*. The religious fundamentalist cannot conceive of a live-world which is devoid of sacred and spiritual predications. They are not satisfied with the secularization model imposed by liberal cosmopolitanism to transform Islamic live-world. They believe that the incorporation of spiritual issues in contemporary live world is such a need which has also been acknowledged in the Western world. For instance, Fogel¹⁷ claims, “new set of egalitarian reforms that adhere to the urgent spiritual needs of our age, secular as well as sacred. Spiritual (or immaterial) inequality is now as great a problem as material inequality perhaps even greater.”¹⁸ Fogel’s analysis regarding the significance of the spiritual aspect of human existence in the formation of the socio-political order of the given live-world is apparently contrary to that of Fareed Zakaria’s thesis of illiberal democracies. According to him, religious intervention in the political domain transforms democracies into illiberal democracies and considers it as the menace of the age. He believes that the organic relation between liberalism and democracy has been disentangled. “The two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric

¹⁶ Khurshid Ahmad, ‘The Challenge of Global Capitalism: An Islamic Perspective’, *Policy Perspectives* 1 (April 2004): 7.

¹⁷ R. Fogel is The Nobel Laureate for Economics 1993. He acknowledges the significance of spirituality in the development of a sustained live world.

¹⁸ R. Fogel, *The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 1. Quoted in Khurshid Ahmad, ‘The Challenge of Global Capitalism: An Islamic Perspective’, 8.

are coming apart.”¹⁹ This dis-entanglement is not accidental rather it is also being properly theorized by many 20th century Muslim intellectuals. However, he claims that “Islamic theocracy appeals only to a fanatical few.”²⁰ On the other hand, Fogel believes that we cannot and we should not insulate moral and political life from our spiritual concerns. He thinks that, “The democratization of intellectual life will broaden debates and insinuate spiritual issues more deeply into political life.”²¹ According to Ahmed, “Islam cannot detach itself from the political sphere”; Islam, according to him, “Stands for faith in the Prophet (peace be upon him) as a model and source of guidance. It demands firm commitment among its followers to live in obedience to the Divine will and Guidance. Sharia’h (literally the Path) is a set of norms, values and laws that go to makeup the Islam way of life.”²²

The rising trend of unipolar cosmopolitan liberal order considers every form of life as a threat to global peace which is driven by non-liberal, anti-capitalist theoretical foundations. One of the most important aspects of contemporary War against Terror particularly in post- 9/11 scenario, is that each party considers itself as a response to the offensive expression of the other. The Islamists consider liberal cosmopolitanism as a form of “neo-liberal imperialism.”²³ They claim that Islamic societies are not totalitarian societies; however, they are also not liberal in the sense as liberal cosmopolitanism demands them to be.

¹⁹ Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, 23.

²⁰ Zakaria ‘*The Future of Freedom: Democracy Home and Abroad*’, 13.

²¹ Fogel, *The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalitarianism*, 242.

²² Khurshid Ahmad, ‘The Challenge of Global Capitalism: An Islamic Perspective’, 12.

²³ Asef Bayat, ‘Islamism and Empire: The Incongruous Nature of Islamist Anti-imperialism,’ *Socialist Register* (2008), 38.

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Islam, according to Ahmed, “spells out a genuinely pluralistic religion and cultural landscape for man kind. It is free will and dialogue that ideological borders can be crossed.”²⁴ The idea of reasonable pluralism expounded by Rawls, according to Ahmed, acknowledges the incorporation of Muslim societies within the framework of the law of people.²⁵ Hierarchical societies which are not intrinsically liberal, according to Rawls, should not be excluded from the realm of the law of the people. He claims “other decent people whose basic structure does not fit my description of a consultative hierarchy, but who are worthy of membership of a society of people.”²⁶

The dominant cosmopolitan liberalism is more concerned with the universalistic potential of contemporary discourse of Islamism. The Islamists, according to liberals, consider their ideology as universal. “Islam is a universal religion and the Muslim Ummah is a global community. Faith is the foundation that defines the global nature of Islam for the Muslim Ummah. *Tawhid* (Oneness of God) establishes the unity of the universe, the oneness of humanity, the unity of life and the universality of law.”²⁷ These universalistic theoretical foundations of political Islam have been interpreted by liberal policy framework as a threat to their global design. “Rightist circles are clear that Islamism is a regressive anti-modern and violent movement that poses the greatest threat to the free world.”²⁸ The

²⁴ Khurshid Ahmad, ‘The Challenge of Global Capitalism: An Islamic Perspective’, 13.

²⁵ John Rawls, *The Law of the People with the Idea of Public Reason Revisited* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999). Quoted in Khurshid Ahmad, ‘The Challenge of Global Capitalism’, 11.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁷ Khurshid Ahmad, ‘The Challenge of Global Capitalism’, 12.

²⁸ Asef Bayat, ‘Islamism and Empire: The Incongruous Nature of Islamist Anti-imperialism’, 38.

liberal foreign policy framework acknowledges Islam based anti-globalization trend along with the rhetoric of universal Islamic values as a fundamental value threat to the globalization of liberal values and their corresponding socio-political and economic institutions.

The contemporary War against Terror may be a new phenomenon for liberal capitalist unipolar order but for the Islamists it is the unintended consequence of their continuous struggle against different forms of oppressions and imperialism. Their ideological foundations do not rest upon the vulgarized interpretation and war strategies of so called Al-Qaeda (which is actually an engineering firm) rather it is embedded in the historicity of Muslim community founded in the state of Madina-tul-Munawara by the Prophet (Peace-be-upon-him). This impetus to rise against invincible, hegemonic oppression is interwoven into the historical fabric of Muslim community. Islamic history is full of many disproportionate but successful combats (both militant, cultural and civilizational) by apparently weak and ill-equipped Muslims. They have a long history of successful struggles. Within 50 years of *hijra*, they did not only defeat the most powerful nations or civilizations (for example, the Egyptians, Persians and Romans) but they also converted them to Islam. Both Egyptians and Persians are now proud to be Muslim despite the fact that they had a glorious history of their own before the advent of Islam. It will be a superficial understanding of the anti-imperialist tendency of Islamists from the perspective of Al-Qaeda. "A cursory survey of the discourses and practices of Islamists reasonably foregrounds critical and anti-imperialist tendencies."²⁹ There are hundreds and thousands of historical foundations an Islamist can provide to theoretically legitimize the struggle against the hegemony of

²⁹ Ibid., 41.

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global cosmopolitan liberalism and capitalism. The collapse of Abbasids due to Mongolian intervention, the rise of Salahuddin against the Crusaders, the plundering of colonial imperialism, the post-colonial rejuvenation of Islamic forces, the Russian collapse, Afghan war and emancipation of Muslim majority states due to Soviet disintegration, the Iranian revolution in which Islam was used as the ultimate mobilizing force against the puppet regime of the USA, i.e., the Shah of Iran.

This multi-dimensional discourse of Islamism has different manifestations. For instance, it has bred revolutionary movements like Intifada, Taliban, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir etc. It has liberation or separatist movements like East-Turkistan movement in China, Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, Hurriyat Conference in Kashmir, Islamic Chechen Separatist Movement, etc. It has resistance movements like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Jamat-e-Islami etc. It has reactionary movements like Al-Qaeda. It has reformist movements like Tablighi Jamat, Dawat-e-Islami, Minhaj ul Quran etc. Moreover, there are hundreds and thousands of non-state actors and militant wings, hundreds of political parties, NGOs, charity organizations, Sufi institutions which are part of the multi-faceted Islamic world. Apart from their differences Islam is the common denominator in all those different socio-political, cultural and moral manifestations of Islamism.³⁰ All some way or the other represents different manifestations of Islamism.

³⁰ Hizb-ut-Tahrir is basically a Sunni revolutionary cum pan-Islamic political organization working for the establishment of Caliphate.

Taliban: It means "Student". It is a political cum militant group which ruled a large part of Afghanistan. They are influenced by the Deobandi interpretation of Islam. They emerged as the dominant political and militant group

The liberal foreign policy framework should acknowledge that the imposition of modern liberal cosmopolitan order through direct or indirect political and economic sanctions (both through national and international institutions) to counter Islamism will be counter productive, particularly in such an intellectual environment where post-modern thinkers are delegitimizing the universal foundation of modern grand narratives.

Section-B

No doubt that there is a fundamental contradiction between traditionally religious and modern theory regarding the issue of *how man should be*? The theoretical antagonism

during Afghan civil war in the post 1989 Russian evacuation from Afghanistan.

East Turkistan Movement: Although these are multiple separatist groups both secular and religious who are struggling to emancipate themselves from Chinese state authoritarianism but there is no doubt about the fact that apart from its ethno-centric foundations, Islam does play an important role in its political resistance particularly in Southern Xinjiang.

Islamic Salvation Front: Al-Jabhahal-Islamiyah lil-Inqadh (Front Islamique du Salut): The fundamental object of this Algerian based movement is to develop an Islamic state.

Islamic Chechen Separatist Movement has many sub-divisions but their commitment with Islam despite their ethno-centric foundations is unquestionable.

Hamas: Harkat-al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya: Islamic-Resistance-Movement. It was founded in 1987. It is basically a sub-division of Ikhwan-al-Muslimin and was founded by Shaikh Ahmed Yaseen.

Hezbollah: It means "Party of Allah". It is a Shiite Islamic militant party which was initially based in Lebanon. It was founded in 1985 by Hasan Nasrallah.

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between the traditionally religious authoritarianism and modernism is not just of epistemological nature which is generally being discussed in term of the dichotomy between faith and reason; rather it has metaphysical and axiological foundations too. If we try to conceptualize modernism under the framework of Enlightenment, i.e., Aufklärung, from which it has been derived, then we will be able to understand the gravity of antagonism between pre-Enlightenment theoretical framework and Aufklärung because the latter is an attempt to determine, “....., what we are, what we think, and what we do today?”³¹ The modern philosophy is the explication and modernism is the institutionalization of Aufklärung. In Foucault’s words, “Modern Philosophy is the philosophy that is attempting to answer the question raised so imprudently two centuries ago: Was ist Aufklärung?”³²

The question arises why do we consider Aufklärung (i.e. Enlightenment) as unconventional (i.e. in traditionally religious context) way to understand who we are? The answer is evident from the usage of the term “Aufklärung”. It is according to Kant, “neither a world era to which one belongs, nor an event whose signs are perceived, nor the dawning of an accomplishment... [Rather] as an Ausgang, “an exist”, a “way out,”³³ unlike the conventional way of understanding which focuses on similarity with respect to the continuity or the practices of our ancestors or the words of the God revealed.

The colonization of modern discursive reason, according to Marcuse, has transformed a free man into “one

³¹ Michel Foucault, ‘What is Enlightenment’, in *Ethics Subjectivity and Truth: Essential Works 1954- 1984*, Vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: New Press, 2006), 303.

³² Ibid., 304.

³³ Ibid., 305.

dimensional man.”³⁴ The institutionalization of modern discursive practices has developed an “all encompassing method of control.”³⁵ The “Great Refutation”³⁶ will be the reasonable solution against the prevailing domination of capitalist rationality and its corresponding institutions and methodologies of social repression. Pseudo needs have been generated among the masses via digitally constructed world of mass media. It performs two functions simultaneously; on the one hand, it softly compels the individual to accept the order of global capital; on the other hand, it delegitimizes the revolutionary potential of disenchanted masses. In other words, it keeps their trust on the modern mechanism of social control as an ultimate source of human freedom. This is what Marcuse called repressive desublimation.³⁷

Unlike critical theorists, the post-modernists are far more committed with the idea of the Great Refutation. They have questioned the intellectual legitimacy of all kinds of grand narratives, including that of Lyotard who considers “incredulity towards meta-narratives”³⁸ as a condition of post-modernism. Haynes believes that although there are certain wishful thinking and expectations of religious people regarding the global resurgence of religion but we accept that due to the rise of post modernism more theoretical space is available for non-modern intellectualism. On the one hand, it has delegitimized the modern monologue regarding the mastery over nature as the non-contestable

³⁴ Herbert Marcuse, *One dimensional Man. Studies in Ideology of Advanced Industrial Societies*, Second Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), xi.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Lyotard, *The Post-modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979). Quoted in Haynes J., *Religion Secularization and Politics*, 716.

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"telos" (purpose) emerging from the Enlightenment historical experience. And, on the other hand, it refers "to change in the means of orientation and identity structure. Postmodernism... directs our attention to changes taking place in contemporary cultures."³⁹ Post-modernism has cracked the modern guide and has provided the intellectual possibility of non-modern solutions to our contemporary world. Post-modern anti-foundationalism prefers the local and particularistic resolution of our modern-day challenges rather than a centralized, universal and predominantly bureaucratized mechanism to resolve our problems. According to Akbar S. Ahmed, post-modernism "encourages the rejection of centers and systems, engenders the growth of local identity, makes available information and thus teaches people to demand their rights...fosters ideas of freedom and eclecticism [and] challenges, the State."⁴⁰ These expectations have been celebrated by Ahmed because of the decentralizing capacity of post-modern discourse which in fact neutralizes the dictatorial dynamic of modern discursive practices. The post-modern argument regarding the exposition of philosophical incoherences in modern universalistic project has the potential to be instrumentalized to theoretically justify non-modern ways of life. Rosenau considers this de-centralization of modern authoritative mechanism as counter productive because it can be pragmatically instrumentalized by the regressive anti-western forces. "This decay can be discerned in the pocket of disaffection with the scientific rationalism of

³⁹ Mike Featherstone, 'In Pursuit of Postmodernism: An Introduction', *Theory Culture and Society* 5 (1988): 195-216. Quoted in Haynes *Religion, Secularization and Politics*, 716.

⁴⁰ Akber S. Ahmed, *Post-modernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 129.

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⁴⁰ Akber S. Ahmed, *Post-modernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 129.

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subjugating autonomous form of collective life of state control."⁴⁵ Haynes has tried to differentiate religious pluralism from that of religious fundamentalism. The former presumes the legitimacy of multiple religious interpretations while the latter presumes only one religious interpretation which leads to perfectionism and will eventually generate anti-liberal socio-political consequences.⁴⁶ Haynes believes that post-modernism accommodates religious pluralism rather than fundamentalism. He believes that religious pluralism is compatible with the history of Islam, Christianity and Buddhism.

Despite the fact that modernism has generally been presented as a binary opposition to religious authoritarianism, there are certain fundamental coherences between the two. These fundamental paradigmatic similarities between the two enable modern thought to become an ultimate alternative of religious authoritative societies. Historically, religious intelligentsia in such societies theorized their religious and theological foundations through such frameworks which are paradigmatically quite similar to that of modernism.

Since religious authoritarianism (both Christian and Islamic) were pre-modern, therefore, it is quite reasonable to imply that the modern vocabulary must be influenced by the religious linguistic jargon and conceptual formation. The initial expositions of the history of ideas reveal the obvious replication of the core theoretical concerns of religious authoritarianism by modernism. This replication has generally been identified for contrasting the conceptual

⁴⁵ Haynes, *Religion, Secularization Politics*, 718.

⁴⁶ G. Hyden, 'Governance and the study of Politics', in *Governance and Politics in Africa*, ed. G. Hyden and M. Bratton (Boulder. Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), 1-26. Quoted in Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Penguin 1992), 4.

antagonism between the two discourses. But people generally ignore the compatibility between the two regarding the reasonable conditions of the meanings presumed by the two apparently antagonistic paradigms of thought. For instance, modernism and religious authoritarianism both are essentialist, foundationalist, universalistic and absolutist. Both are predominantly dualistic and acknowledge a legitimate domain of non-material component of human existence. Both consider a legitimate theoretical basis for non-material aspect of human existence, i.e., soul (for religious authoritarians) and mind or self (for classical modernists). Both consider self or soul as a fundamental agency of goodness. Rorty acknowledges that even the Enlightenment thinker like Kant cannot ignore the divinizing capacity of human self as traditionally presumed and also claimed by the religious intelligentsia.

He claims "the Kantian notion of conscience divinizes the self."⁴⁷ This reflects the mystical influence of religious vocabulary on Enlightenment intellectual and ontological discourse. Both religious authoritarianism and modernism predominantly presumed and defended a unified conception of self which pave the way for peculiar kind of transcendence. Both emphasize the significance of silent internal dialectics as a source of moral goodness. Kant identifies the significance of inwardness "to find that point of contact in our moral consciousness in our search for righteousness."⁴⁸ The internal inwardness is quite similar to that of religious mystification to grasp universalistic values through the direct acquaintance of reality. Kantian transcendental idealism has eradicated metaphysics from

⁴⁷ Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 30.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

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the legitimate domain of knowledge, but it does not mean that it has ignored the centrality of metaphysical subject, i.e., "rational will" for the appropriate execution of moral duty which is actually the domain of the self. It is because of this reason that he called the "common moral consciousness", the center of the self."⁴⁹

This mystification of self is the legacy of Christian mysticism and sacred vocabulary has influenced the secular discourse derived from Enlightenment intellectual tradition. According to Rorty, "Ever since Kant's day, however, romanticism and moralism, the insistence on individual spontaneity and private perfection and the insistence on universally shared social responsibility have warred with each other."⁵⁰

One of the most important and fundamental tendencies which is common in both discourses (i.e. religious authoritarianism and modernism) is the commitment with one's teleological foundations. The ontologically grounded and epistemologically defended teleological parameters are presumed to be fundamental for the determination of the conditions of meaning, i.e., discourse. These teleological assumptions are clearly explicated and elucidated in religious theory as well as in practice, but in modern thought it is not as clear as in religious discourse but in practice it is more substantively expressed and institutionalized as compared to religion.

Religious authoritarianism is generally criticized by the modern intelligentsia because of its theologically determined homogeneity of socio-cultural existence. The organic whole of salvation, spiritual purification, moral

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

uplift and self sacrifice is natural telos derived from the consciousness of being with God. The telos not only determines the value structure of a religious authoritarianism but also suppresses any other alternative meaning or purpose of human existence which is in conflict with this ontologically determined telos. The non-contestability of telos is rested upon the assumption that it reflects the ultimate essence of human being. Thus, it abandons the possibility of diversity, spontaneity, novelty and autonomy regarding the determination of the meaning of one's own existence, according to modernists.

There is no doubt that this teleologically determined foundationalism of religious authoritarianism has provided a theoretical content for modern Enlightenment to stretch the possibility of possibilities and to present "will to freedom" as an alternative telos against the religious ideal of 'self-negation', so that the transition from God centrality to anthropocentricity can be possible. But the history of ideas reveals that modernist commitment regarding the excavation of true essence of human beings is the reciprocation of religious authoritarianism. They have claimed to discover the true nature of human being by the application of scientific methodological framework. The "death of the God"⁵¹ is celebrated by Aufklärung and anthropocentricity is the logical corollary of the birth of modern man. "The God then started to disappear in the popular conception of the universe and all possibilities were opened to human subject, author of his own development,

⁵¹ See Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Gay Science' in *Cambridge Text In the History of Philosophy*, ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), in which he has announced the madman announcement that now the God is Dead, we have killed the God. This allegorical expression of Nietzsche explicates the refutation of God centrality in favor of anthropocentricity.

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emancipated from the divine design.”⁵² The “*entwicklung*” has been institutionalized as fundamental policy framework. The works of Darwin, Hegel and Marx have provided the philosophical and pseudo-scientific foundations of progress or development as the ultimate telos, which is the result of human intellectual evolution. The evolutionary theorists have tried to establish that the “historical process...unfolds with the same necessary character of natural laws.”⁵³ This scientifically determined teleological perspective although has critically been evaluated by many thinkers like Schopenhauer, Bergson, Nietzsche, Dilthey and most importantly Gadamer. This telos has been accommodated by almost all grand narratives emerging from modern intellectual process. The politicization of the modern vocabulary, along with the aggressive process of colonization made industrial way of life an ultimate fruit of modernism. “The industrial mode of production which was no more than one among many forms of social life became the definition of the terminal stage of unilinear way of social evolution.”⁵⁴

This theorization of modern telos and its corresponding institutional order has not just provided a new discourse through which one can determine the meaning of life but most importantly it claims to have an Archimedean reference for the determination of absolute, certain and universal values. The prioritization of this Archimedean reference point as a neutral spectacle to understand and experience the confronting reality compels non-Western world to acknowledge that modern live-world is the most superior expression (both in content and form) of human existence. The modern “stage came to be seen as the

⁵² Gustavo Estava, ‘Development, in *Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge and Power* ed. Wolfgang Sachs (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1993), 9.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

natural culmination of the potentials already existing in Neolithic man, as his logical evolution.”⁵⁵ The process of modernization has been introduced in our part of the world under colonial rule. It has been presented as a neutral perspective to justify one’s true faith.

Post-modernism not only delegitimized modern authoritarianism and its universal, teleological inwardness and transcendence, in short, the universality of modern discursive practices, rather it has the potential to contest any absolutist or universalistic formulation of religion too. “The post modern era rather than being dominated by fundamentalism alone is a period of wider religious reinterpretation, where popular religion challenges mainstream religious organization.”⁵⁶ Religious pluralism will eventually undermine the absolutist potential of religious fundamentalism and extremism. In this way, it in fact serves the interests of liberal democracy to develop a pluralistic society. Haynes acknowledges that Muslims both in Western and non-Western Third World have learned how to replace traditional social matrix (which was derived from kinship and tribal ethnic particularities) from new social solidarity networks. “Muslim community organizations... often appear to “rescue” those who are drifting in the urban milieu.”⁵⁷

He considers post-modernism as one of the most effective theoretical frameworks to counter the religious fundamentalism which is actually the result of the failure of modernism in the non-Western world. He claims that the potential receivers of post-modern pluralism in non-Western world are different from that of Western world, because the

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ J. Haynes, *Religion, Secularization and Politics*, 717.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 719.

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nature and manifestation of fundamentalism is different in Third World from that of the industrialized West. For instance, in the Western world Christian fundamentalists are predominantly found among the most affluent, successful members of society. Clearly it would be absurd to argue that alienation explains the existence of such people in the USA⁵⁸ whereas in the Third World, "Post modernism is synonymous with poverty, leading poor especially receptive to fundamentalist arguments which supply the mobilizing ideology."⁵⁹ In this way post-modernism has the potential to heal the wounds of both the disenchanted poor in the Third World and alienated affluent in the West. Thus, it replaces religious fundamentalism from more emancipatory, diversified, novel religious pluralism.

The Muslim community and its corresponding socio-cultural settings are generally being acknowledged as anti-liberal therefore cosmopolitan liberalism is presumed to be a normative framework to determine *how man, society and state should be?* Post-modern intellectualism is one of the most important philosophical paradigms to counter or delegitimize cosmopolitan liberal grand narrative and provides an intellectual space to any community or individual to define oneself independent of any presumed grand narrative that has been derived from the Enlightenment historical experience. *How man should be?* cannot be answered without having any specific foundationalist, essentialist conception of reality. It is quite reasonable to imply that the philosophical delegitimation of liberal grand narrative by virtue of post-modern critique will provide a theoretical bedrock to justify Islamic socio-political and cultural order if not as an ideal then at least a reasonable, decent alternative from of life.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 720.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 719.

However, it is very important to understand, whether post-modern rejection of grand narrative is just the rejection of modern ground narrative or the rejection of grand narrative per se. Secondly, the post-modern delegitimation of modern conception of self, morality and prudence is just the rejection of modern ontological, axiological and epistemological foundations or is it the rejection of foundationalist, ontological, axiological and epistemological perspectives per se. There is no doubt that post-modern rejection of grand narrative and foundationalist essentialism is the rejection of all forms of comprehensive philosophical and of course theological doctrines.

Kantian transcendentalism cannot be questioned without rejecting the idea of transcendental subject which reconciles the distinction between prudence and morality by virtue of universalizability principle. This historical dimension of Kantian tradition legitimizes liberal values with respect to liberal meta-narratives. The Hegelian historicism has questioned this transcendentalism to satisfy the urge of absoluteness, objectivity and universality and most importantly an attempt to answer the question, "How man should be"? Hegelian immanence acknowledged the role of communities and historical particularities regarding the determination of *what ought to be*?

Rorty has tried to provide an initial exposition that how this traditional distinction between morality and prudence has been reinterpreted by the anti-foundationalist post-modern bourgeois liberals. "[Such] liberals might convince our society that loyalty to itself is morality enough and that such loyalty no longer needs an a-historical backup."⁶⁰ According to Rorty, the liberal commitment with

⁶⁰ Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 199.

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liberal values is not undermined by post-modern relativism. He acknowledges that the contemporary "post-modernist bourgeois liberalism sounds oxymoronic."⁶¹ It is oxymoronic in the sense that despite acknowledging that they have transcended from the pre-conditions of liberal grand narrative they also "think of themselves as having opted out of the bourgeoisie."⁶² On the other hand, they are not able to detach themselves from capitalist liberal institutions and their corresponding vocabulary, i.e., the vocabulary derived from the Enlightenment intellectual tradition. "This vocabulary is built around a distinction between morality and prudence."⁶³ Rorty believes that "the traditional philosophical distinction between absoluteness, relativism, morality and prudence etc. are just the "remnants of a vocabulary we should try to replace."⁶⁴ This reinterpretation of the status of 'liberal community is rested upon a conception of self which is basically a "network of belief, desires and emotions with nothing behind it, no substrate behind the attribute."⁶⁵ This molecular representation of self provides a rationale to justify "moral and political deliberation and conversation"⁶⁶ without relying on any specific meta-ethical narrative or universalizing principle. It means that although one cannot provide ultimate ontologically grounded and epistemologically consistent argument to justify the priority of relativity over absoluteness but he tries "to make the vocabulary in which these objections phrased look bad, thereby changing the subject rather than granting the objector his choice of weapons and terrain by meeting his criticisms."⁶⁷ He claims

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 44.

⁶⁵ Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativisms and Truth*, 199.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 44.

that liberal socio-political institutions provide relatively better framework to accommodate the contingency of language and self. This will provide a reasonable framework which "revolves around the notions of metaphor and self creation rather than around the notions of truth, rationality and moral obligations."⁶⁸ Rorty believes that the intellectual contribution of Wittgenstein, Davidson regarding the contingency of language, Freud and Nietzsche regarding the contingency of self-hood "do not ground democracy but they do permit its practices and its goals to be re-described."⁶⁹ One can presume that Rorty is trying to reformulate "the hope of liberal society in a non-rationalist and non-universalist way."⁷⁰

It is a general presumption that contemporary, post-modern-liberal order provides far better framework for religious pluralism. However, Rorty claims in "its ideal form, the culture of liberalism would be one which was enlightened, secular through and through."⁷¹ It is important to note that liberal order is not only secular rather, according to Rorty, it would be de-divinized too. The liberal culture would be one "in which no trace of divinity remained, either in the form of divinized world or a divinized self."⁷² The liberal position regarding the traditional dichotomy between sacred and secular was not anti-spiritual or atheistic as compared to their ideological opponent, i.e., leftists whom they consider as "ideological infidels" during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. However, the post-modern position regarding the possible dynamics of liberal culture would, according to Rorty, "have no room for the

⁶⁸ Ibid., 34.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 44.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

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notion that there are non-human forces to which human beings should be responsible."⁷³

The modern urge to discover absolute, certain and universal truth has provided intellectual space for holiness, immortality and legitimacy of divine authority. This sacred and secular dynamics of liberal order is needed to be revisited, according to Rorty. In post-modern world liberal culture "would drop or drastically reinterpret not only the idea of holiness but of devotion to truth, the fulfillment of the deepest need of the spirit."⁷⁴

The fundamental limitation of post-modernity is that it has disentangled the historically established relation between philosophy and politics. It is because of this reason we claim that post-modernism cannot survive on its own. The philosophical position emerges from contemporary post-modernity cannot be spelled out in any substantive political procedure and institution. This disentanglement of philosophy and politics will be far more dangerous because in order to maintain status quo against post-modern radicalism, "pragmatism" will be the most reasonable alternative according to Rorty. Because, only the anti-foundationalist pragmatist can prioritize workability and practicality over the "objective standards of goodness and truth."⁷⁵ Despite the fact that pragmatists are radically doubtful regarding the absolute validity of the vocabulary that any one has adopted to articulate the true expression of reality, even then they are dependent on existing liberal socio-political institutions because they think that they are workable and practical. According to Rorty, "we can think of one sense of community as having no foundation except

⁷³ Ibid., 45.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativisms and Truth*, 33.

shared hope and trust created by such sharing.”⁷⁶ It is because of this reason that post-modern liberalism is ironic. Under the burden of this irony, liberalism should not be scienticized or rationalized rather it should be poeticized so that every one can realize his “idiosyncratic fantasies.”⁷⁷ This strand of post-modern liberalism rests upon a pragmatic illusion of workability, practicality and a so-called radical community of doubt. This solution is not consistent with any community of faith.

We are at the juncture where our ancestors almost three hundred years back were celebrating the intellectual defeat of Christian thought against the ruthless critique of modern enlightened thinkers who were identifying the theoretical contradictions and incoherence’s of scholastic epistemological tradition. Under the historical experience of Crusade we (the Muslims) were enjoying the fall of Christian intellectualism in Western world. We were not only celebrating the intellectual disintegration of Christian intellectual hegemony but we were also claiming that Muslim intellectual tradition via Spain has contributed a lot in the development of such thought (i.e. Enlightenment) which eventually made “the death of God” possible.⁷⁸ For instance, Allama Iqbal claims that, “[The] world of Islam is spiritually moving towards the west. There is nothing wrong in this movement for European culture on its intellectual side and is only a further development of some of the most important phases of the culture of Islam.”⁷⁹ The rise of modernity has been acknowledged by our intellectuals as the natural unfolding of Muslim intellectual tradition.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, 53.

⁷⁸ F. Nietzsche, ‘Gay Science’, 119.

⁷⁹ Allama Jawaid Mohammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Sung-e-Meel Publishers), 14

The Living Death of Modernity

It was presumed that modern epistemological tradition has not only enhanced human control over its natural physical environment but it has also provided an objectivistic intellectual framework to reconstruct Islamic thought. "[It] is necessary to examine, in an independent spirit, what Europe has thought and how far the conclusions reached by her can help in the revision and if necessary reconstruction of theological thought in Islam."⁸⁰ As the result of this philosophically incoherent presumption for the last ninety years or so, we are ruthlessly trying to reinterpret, reconstruct, re-excavate Islamic theoretical foundations through modern conceptual framework. In fact, for the last ninety years either we are trying to provide religious justification of modernity, or modern justification of religiosity. The result of these desperate efforts to impose modern conceptual framework over intrinsically non-modern revealed religion, is that we have produced a lot of literature to overcome our intellectual inferiority complex which is the theoretical corollary of the intentional efforts of post-colonial belated consciousness. Islamic modernism, Islamic democracy, Islamic socialism, Islamic nationalism, Islamic economics, Islamic banking, Islamic finance, Islamic feminism etc are all different intellectual adventures to harmonize Islamic intellectual tradition with modern knowledge revolution and its corresponding institutions. Our intelligentsia is so obsessed by the contemporary intellectual dynamics which are interestingly institutionally modern and intellectually post-modern, that it will not be surprising for us to anticipate the intellectual justification of Islamic wine, Islamic Gayism and Islamic lesbianism which are intrinsically oxymoronic. The reason of these far reaching oxymoronic conceptual adventures that, all the above mentioned intellectual attempts have been incorporated in our intellectual tradition and the exponents

⁸⁰ Ibid., 15.

of these oxymoronic conceptual order have substantive following in contemporary Muslim societies.

The intellectual justification of post-modernism will be the last nail in the Muslim intellectual coffin. It must be noted that Islam should not be defended by any theoretical context which is not consistent with the rationale, revelation, historicity and the mechanism of "*Taqleed*" derived from the established collective history of the Ummah.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that:

1. Post modernism is not the absolute rejection of modernism rather it is just the denial of the universality of modern discursive practices.
2. The post-modernist commitment with *Aufklarung* is unquestionable. They want to stretch the possibility of possibilities.
3. Unlike modernists the post-modernists justify Enlightenment values of autonomy and self-determination on aesthetical grounds.
4. There is no non-capitalist reference point of post-modernity; therefore, there is no possibility of transcendence from capitalist live-world.
5. At the theoretical plane the so-called Muslim intelligentsia seeks different arguments to reasonably counter Western dictatorial polity for their non-liberal values and their corresponding socio-political institutions. For instance, they use the post-modern anti-foundationalism, anti-universalism and anti-essentialism to delegitimize American sponsored cosmopolitan universalism, but they are not aware that this pragmatic theorization of post modernism will be counter productive.

The instrumentalization of post-modern discourse to protect pre-modern values and social particularities creates three dimensional problems for post-colonial underdeveloped societies:

1. The post colonial intelligentsia has to compromise the universality of its grand narrative because post-modernism rejects the theoretical possibility of all kinds of grand narratives.
2. The post-colonial intelligentsia has to deny their sixty or seventy years intellectual efforts that have been derived either from religious justification of modernity or modern justification of religiosity.
3. They have to compromise the theoretical legitimacy of the modern institutions which are imposed by their colonial masters.

READING ZAKARIA'S DEFENCE OF LIBERAL TERRORISM*

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The Future of Freedom is a revealing book for understanding the internal contradiction between liberalism and democracy. The book is a logical continuation of Zakaria's article, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy" (Foreign Affairs Nov. Dec. 1997 p. 22-43). It is generally believed that this book is very important to understand American foreign policy towards the Islamic world particularly after the incidence of 9/11. The book is a clear acknowledgment of the internal contradiction in capitalist democracy in a country which has no non-liberal legacy, i.e. America. The non-liberal community i.e. the Red Indians, was completely destroyed by the state governed by Enlightened, liberal, free and autumous individuals. Fifteen million Red Indians were ruthlessly slaughtered by Americans over a span of two centuries.

The book comprises seven chapters including a conclusion. The introductory chapters provide a brief summary of contemporary politics through a liberal perspective Zakaria considers the present age to be a democratic age. He believes that the defining feature of politics in this era is democracy.

Zakaria thinks democratic process is not just a political procedure rather it is the best known mechanism for piecemeal social engineering. The process of democratization according to Zakaria transforms democracy "from being a form of government to a way of life". (Zakaria 2003 p. 14). He believes that democracy and liberalism are linked with each

* F. Zakaria: The Future of Freedom New York Norton 2003.

other due to the specific historical experiences of the West. According to him, "liberal democracy has been interwoven in to the Western political fabric (Zakaria 1997, p. 23). He claims that in the non-liberal part of the world the relation between democracy and liberalism has been broken. The scope of illiberal democracy is expanding. Democratic political procedure has been instrumentalized to abandon the liberal agenda and legitimize an illiberal socio-political order. Many of the countries around the world "do better on political liberties than on civil ones" (Zakaria 1997, p. 24). This means that people are ready to accept democratic political procedure but are not ready to accept liberal social order. He claims that, "half of the democratizing countries in the world today are illiberal democracies" (Zakaria 1997, p. 24). The rise of illiberal democracy is a threat to individual freedom. Therefore there is a need to ensure liberal rights to protect freedom both at home and abroad. The future of individual freedom is assured not by a democratic but by a liberal regime.

This paper has been divided into three sections. In the first section we will provide a brief summary of liberal political theory and its relation with democratic political procedure. In the second section we will discuss Zakaria's position regarding the relation between democracy and liberalism. In the last section we will try to identify the root cause of this contradiction between liberal theory and democratic procedure.

I. The Liberal Religion

The term liberalism is being used in many different ways. The word liberal was first used in 1812 to describe a Spanish political party. (Hall 1988, p. 35). Those who believe in the universality of liberal values for instance Gore Vidual (see Hall 1988, p. 35) claim that pre-religious societies (Greek / Roman) were embrionically liberal. The fundamental softness of life which is claimed to be provided by liberal public order was also available in pre-modern societies. By softness of public life one means that the private life of individuals is not directly subjected to public order (see Hall Ibid p. 35).

The general characteristics of the political form of liberalism justify its interpretation as a modern phenomenon. The values of liberalism are derived from Enlightenment thought. We can define liberalism under three core headings: firstly, liberalism is a socio-political movement, which prioritizes the individual over collectivities. Secondly, liberalism considers freedom as ideal and institutionally protects individual freedom by considering this to be fundamental right of an individual. Thirdly, it considers tolerance as a fundamental value. The axiological significance of tolerance is organically linked with the priority of individual freedom. This prioritization legitimizes the equality of all incommensurable conceptions of the good and demolishes any system or hierarchy of values (specifically the value system of religion) which does not recognize the "will to freedom" as the only legitimate public good. Thus it provides the basis of an ostensibly pluralistic society.

Another important characteristic of modern day liberalism is that it is a socio-political movement which presumes an organic relation between liberty and commerce. The Scottish Enlightenment established a relation between wealth and virtue (see Hall 1988, p. 34-44). This intellectual tradition redefines the traditional concept of civic virtue. The traditional

concept of the virtuous life “has its roots in Greek city states” (Hall p. 37). In such societies, the virtuous man is seen as, a citizen who actively participates in political life, which is frugal and orderly and always prepares for wars. “Such a virtuous man was to serve in the militia and it was very largely through popular participation in infantry warfare that the right of citizenship were first gained” (Hall p. 37). Smith rejects this conception of the virtuous life (Ibid p. 37), for two reasons. Firstly in this conception, virtuous man does not respect individual freedom as a legitimate public good and tolerates slavery. Secondly, he does not consider poverty as a social evil and prefers to live a frugal life. Scottish Enlightenment redefines the conception of virtuous man as one who ensures individual freedom and recognizes it as a fundamental right of every individual. Secondly, poverty is accepted as a social evil. In substantive sense, poverty elimination and accumulation of wealth become the ultimate ends of a citizen in a civil society. This axiological transformation posits an organic relationship between liberty and capital and political economy is the science of capital accumulation. The society that emerges from this organic whole of liberty and capital is considered to be a commercial society. Such a society ensures individual freedom through institutional protection of fundamental rights, and it tries to eliminate poverty through both market and extra-market strategies i.e., by improving labour productivity, modernizing education systems and developing infrastructure etc. Liberal political philosophy has markedly been influenced by Scottish Enlightenment thought. Thereby, it is generally believed that a capitalist economy is an inevitable pre requisite for the practice of liberal values.

I.1 Democracy a Political Procedure to Protect Individual Freedom

In the liberal framework freedom is possible only within an order. Liberals do not presume an anarchic conception of freedom. In the Lockean framework “Law” is embrionically an instrument to sustain “liberty”. Locke claims that “in all the states of created being capable of laws, where there is no law there is no freedom” (Locke 1689 p. 306). Locke believes that although the state of nature is the state of absolute freedom it is unprotected. So in the state of nature arbitrary expression of ruthless power is an unintended consequence of this perfect state of freedom and equality. In contrast to the state of nature, Locke gave the idea of civil society. Civil society presumes an authority, which provides a criterion to judge between two or more groups. The criterion basically consists of a system of rights and duties. The Lockean conception of autonomy is derived from his conception of estate i.e. property. The purpose of Law is to protect individual property. The protection of property is considered to be synonymous with the protection of autonomy. Since Locke considers the human body as property, therefore the use of the body i.e. actions, thought, conscience etc should be protected through the system of Laws. In this context he claims that the essential purpose of Law is to protect individual autonomy and freedom and “the end of Law is not to abolish or restrain but to preserve and enlarge freedom” (Ibid, p. 306). The enlargement of freedom means the maximization of the individual’s capacity to actualize the absolute right of property without any obsticale. Thus in civil society, the framework of Law protects the individual’s “actions, possessions and his whole property” (Ibid, p. 306) from arbitrary interventions of others and makes individual autonomy possible. The other rights are the corollaries of the property rights in the Lockean framework. For instance the right of conscience, expression, religion etc. are the rights which can not be overridden by any agency even government. The

role of property ownership in the derivation of fundamental rights, in the Lockean framework reveals the geneology of human rights. It appears that human rights are the instruments for protecting the propertied capitalist minority from the property less majority. Locke considers interest as the basis of the constitution of political society, as people are seen to unite in the form of political groups for the pussuit of their particular interests. The individual “seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others who are already united or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estate” (Ibid, p. 205). Thus the fundamental right which needs to be protected is the right of property.

The nature of government which makes this prioritization of right possible, is a government by consent. The fundamental objective of such government and its legislative body is to secure everyone’s property. (Ibid, p. 131). The property rights are regulated by governmental agencies but government cannot abolish property right. However there is an open possibility of adjustment in property rights. The legitimacy of adjustment is derived from the consent of the majority. Any arbitrary attempt to violate the right of property is not tolerable. Locke believes that the existence of honest, unbiased, systematically institutionalized legislative authority is inevitable for the preservation of property. The legislative body must guarantee the individual right of property. If the legislators violate this inviolable right of property “then they put themselves into the state of war with the people who are thereupon absolved from any further obedience” (Locke, 1689, p. 222). The abolition of property justifies civil disobedience and legitimate use of force against violation of individual rights until the “establishment of a new legislation (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and security which is the end for which they are in society”. (Ibid, p. 222).

According to MacPherson, the Lockean emphasis on liberal ideology is determined by Locke’s trust regarding the “moral sufficiency of capitalist market production”. (MacPherson 1962, p. 39). It is because of this reason that Locke defends capitalist property on the basis of his political theory. The constitutional order of capitalist property is presumed to be a workable mechanism for practicing liberal values. It has been acknowledged that the word “property” and “right” are virtually synonymous in Locke’s usage (Dunn, 1973 p. 39). Tully believes that Lockean liberal argument is not an absolutist defence of liberalism. In this regard Dunn also opines that the Lockean defence of “right” through constitutional political procedure has been misinterpreted because many of the rights which men held within this society were rights which had come to them through what one might term as the capitalist channel (Dunn, p. 39). He claims that the Lockean defence of liberal values and individual right i.e. right of property was historically determined and Locke is committed to a legitimation of capitalist order.

J.S. Mill is also one of the important exponent of liberal thought and presumes an organic relation between liberalism and democracy.

The definition of the “general concept of freedom” is not the core concern of Mill’s work, rather his main focus is on the problem of civil liberty. In this regard he analyses the nature and parameters of civil power “which can legitimately be exercised by society over the individual” (Mill 1912, p. 5). The expression of civil power necessarily constrains individual liberty. This legitimate expression of power for the protection of individual autonomy is the

central issue of political philosophy. Sovereignty and liberty are the two issues, which are paradoxically co-existent. The inverse relationship between the two has manifested itself in the political history of democratic regimes. The sustenance of both dimensions of political life is inevitable yet contradictory. The natural outcome of this paradoxical relation between the sovereignty of the state and individual autonomy is that society is dichotomized into two different spheres. The one is the sphere of the ruling body and the other is the sphere of the people who are ruled. Generally it is believed that there is an antagonistic relation between these two spheres. The ruling body (or government) prioritizes authority, however the civilians identify themselves with liberty. Mill believes that the root cause of this antagonism lies in monarchical state structure. In such a political structure the ruling elite derives its authority from inheritance or conquest, and does not hold it at the pleasure of the governed (see Ibid, p. 5). This authoritative expression of power is generally conceived as “a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects, no less than against external enemies” (Ibid, p. 6). Mill believes that the idea of liberty is derived from the limitation of this authoritative power of the government. According to him, the limit which was set “to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community... was what they meant by liberty” (Ibid, p. 6). Mill provides two different ways to constrain the authoritative power of the ruling body as follows:

- i) The derivation of the body of political rights/liberties. This system of rights protects individual sovereignty, which was infringed by the rulers. The violation of these rights justifies civil disobedience.
- ii) The derivation of a constitution by the elected representatives of the people (on the basis of a system of rights/duties). This constitutional system of checks and balances provides both, legitimate expression of political authority and protection of the sphere of individual sovereignty, independent of state coercion.

The phenomena of democratic rule is an attempt to resolve the contradiction between authority and liberty. Mill believes that the elected government is more or less representative of the general interests of the people, therefore these “temporary rulers become the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, whatever any such party existed and superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous effort to limit the power of rulers” (Ibid, p. 7). According to him even in democratic rule the contradiction between sovereignty and liberty has not been eliminated. The purpose of political parties was to defend the interests of the general public by extending their sphere of liberty. What he tries to emphasize is that even in democratic rule the interests of the ruling body may be dichotomized. It is because of this reason that the strategy to limit the political power of the ruling body was changed. The contradiction between the ruling body and general public can only be resolved by the identification of the mutual interests of both parties. “The rulers should be identified with the people; (so) that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation” (Ibid, p. 7). The major concern of this approach is to dilute the antagonism between the ruling body and the general public. In this regard the ruling body itself becomes the instrument of the will of the people (or at-least that of the majority), to determine, a legitimate private sphere of life, to protect individual autonomy and to maintain balance between the public and private spheres of life.

The determination of the legitimate sphere of individual autonomy (right of self-determination) with the help of a body of right/duties along with the derivation of certain rules of conduct are necessary to sustain a just socio-political order. These rules of conduct according to Mill simultaneously impose certain constraints on individuals to sustain a just public order (in the form of laws) as well as protect individual privacy and autonomy.

Mill differentiates government by Nature from government by convention. He believes that the existence of government, if explained in terms of Nature, will take the form of a deterministic political paradigm, in which no choice will be possible. On the other hand, conventionally grounded government is free government, which presumes unlimited choices. He rejects both the extremes as there is always a possibility of choices within certain limits. Government by Nature is an essentialistic conception, which presumes a definite way to run governmental structure. He defines such government in terms of a fixed nature which leads us to a political procedure which is essentially deterministic. It presumes a definite procedure to realize those ends which are compatible with the essentialistic nature of that government. On the other hand, there is a government by convention, which presumes unlimited possibilities to actualize conventions through governmental structure. Since the essence of conventions lies in the form of life therefore there are innumerable choices to actualize those conventions. In a democratic framework, Mill believes, the “will of the people”, means the will of the majority. It is because of this reason he acknowledges that the “tyranny of the majority” is an open possibility of this political framework (see Mill On Liberty p. 9). The domination of majoritarian dictatorship poses a threat to individual autonomy. According to Mill there is a need for institutional protection of individual liberty “against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling” (Ibid, p. 9). He categorically claims that “there is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit; and maintain it against the encroachment; is indispensable to the good conditions of human affairs, as protection against political despotism” (Ibid, p. 10). This shows Mill’s commitment to liberal values. It implies that the core concern of political theory on the one hand, is to determine those limits and encroachments which are indispensable for the sustenance of capitalist individuality. On the other hand it must ensure the area of non-interference or individual autonomy through the prioritization of certain inviolable rights. Mill identifies certain conditions, which are necessary for the establishment of popular government. These conditions, are as follows:

- a) The existence of a particular system or institutional structure, which determines the body of rights and duties.
- b) General acceptance of that system of government along with public willingness to keep that system standing.
- c) The capacity to maintain and consolidate that particular system of government (particularly through educating people within the limits which are provided by the system of rights and duties).

Historically speaking, capitalist government has been justified as a mean for providing a guarantee to ensure “order” and achieve “progress”. The problem arises when we try to prioritize “order” (i.e. rule of Law) over “progress” (i.e. maximization of discounted

consumption flows) or vice versa. Mill believes that although “progress” is the ultimate aim of government the mechanism for the achievement of progress is not sustainable in the absence of ‘security’ and “order”. There is no need to prioritize one over the other. “Order” and “progress” are organically linked with each other therefore a “good government (is) that which achieves progress on the basis of order” (Mill, 1963, p. 791). Mill’s approach is basically teleological because as a utilitarian he presumes a specific purpose of human existence (i.e. maximization of pleasure). Thereby the liberal utilitarian conception of the self is decisive to understand this justification of capitalist socio-political order. This organic relation between ontology and politics is of fundamental important for identifying the qualities of citizens, nature of moral order and statecraft. Mill believes that the legitimacy and the efficiency of the government are related to its capacity for promoting virtues that are compatible with the consolidation of capitalist rules.

In Mill’s framework although individual liberty has its importance and he considers individual liberty as a necessary condition of “progress” he does not negate the importance of community (at the political level). Government is fully responsible for developing and improving the life of its people. In this context the role of education is decisive. However Mill acknowledges that education is basically an evolutionary phenomena and it is dependent on the stage of development in which individuals are situated (i.e. their social environment). There is a linear chain of states, the realization of one stage is lexically connected with the fulfillment of the other. Despotism is “a legitimate mode” to rule barbarians and savages. But since there is an open possibility of improvement in political structures, therefore despotism should not be considered as an end. Self government is the most refined form of political evolution. Mill believes that learning from the past and education for the future makes human development possible.

According to Mill the nature of representative government is different from benevolent despotism. Benign dictatorship in the form of absolute rule of morally, spiritually or intellectually developed individuals, might be beneficial but there are two major associated problems:

- a) No proper institutional structure (equipped by a system of checks and balances) which ensures peaceful transference of power.
- b) No institutional security of individual rights and liberty is guaranteed.

Mill favors representative government because he claims that, it is a historically acknowledged fact that the freedom of the individual has been ruthlessly circumscribed in despotism which directly affects “progress”. Furthermore “obedience” in despotic regimes (which is a necessary condition of authoritarian rule) undermines the priority of individual liberty, which negatively affects the intellectual, moral and political evolution of society. Intellectual stagnation manifests itself in the form of moral corruption and structural deterioration of despotic regimes. This argument presumes that high culture flourishes in a free and liberal society. Thus the essential function of a state is to provide as much freedom as possible to its citizen so that they can express themselves freely. For Mill self government is the best possible political framework. In this regard representative democracy is comparatively

more practical than direct democracy. It implies that the democratic form of government is an ideal form of polity because:

- a) It provides an institutional framework for the peaceful transference of power.
- b) It ensures individual rights.
- c) It provides a (legally protected) free space to develop the individual's moral intellectual, creative and critical capacities (which provide the firm foundation of capitalist order).

In order to excavate the organic relation between liberalism and democracy Rawls is also one of the major contemporary thinkers.

In his analysis of liberty, Rawls is not concerned with the definition of liberty. It is more than obvious that he is much more interested in "the relative values of the several liberties and why they come into conflict" (Rawls 1971, p. 201) with each other. So he sets aside the traditional distinction between positive and negative conceptions of freedom expounded by Berlin.

According to Rawls, any meaningful explanation of freedom must address three questions which are as follows:

- i) Who are the agents of freedom?
- ii) Freedom from what? i.e. what kind of restrictions or limitations are to be eliminated?
- iii) What legitimate constraints are needed to enhance general freedom i.e. "what it is that they are free to do or not to do"? (Ibid, p. 202).

It is customary to define freedom in terms of obstacles and maximization of freedom is considered as synonymous with the elimination of the identified obstacles. The identification of obstacles (political, social, cultural, religious, emotional, aesthetical etc.) is a never-ending phenomenon; therefore, the absolute realization of freedom is not possible. For Rawls, these questions are organically linked with each other as well as they pose a challenge for contemporary political philosophy. "This or that person (or persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint (or set of constraints) to do (or not to do) so and so" (Ibid, p. 202).

Rawls focuses on the constitutional and legal restrictions, which refrain individual freedom. He acknowledges that there is no one sense of liberty because there are different agents of freedom, for instance (i) person (ii) associations or organization or corporations and (iii) the state. Therefore liberty is the name of a "certain system of public rules defining rights and duties" (Ibid, p. 17). This means that freedom is just a space whose frontiers are determined by the system of rights. According to Rawls, in the political sense the meaning of freedom is determined by the publicly acknowledged institutions, because the prioritized system of rights cannot be protected without having a proper institutional structure.

There are different spheres of liberties due to which there is always an open possibility of clash among different spheres of liberties. The role of institutions (political, legal, and economic) is to protect one agent (person, association, state) from the interference of the other. It is the institutional framework, which imposes legal obligations over the agent, not to interfere in the other's political, religious, moral etc. affairs. Since there are different spheres of liberties, therefore basic liberties should be assessed in a single system rather than particular liberties on their own. The task of the delegate (in a constitutional convention) and legislator is to balance one sphere of liberty against that of the other for the attainment of the "best total system of equal liberties" (Ibid, p. 19).

In the Rawlsian framework, the conception of freedom is not anarchic. He acknowledges certain restrictions and limitations as legitimate and necessary for the sustenance of the system of liberty. The limitation of freedom is not unjust because "these limits are subject to certain criteria expressed by the meaning of equal liberty and (the) serial order of the two principles of justice" (Ibid, p. 20).

He acknowledges that the framework of constitutional democracy is not a perfect political system but in such a system two conditions are necessarily be satisfied namely (i) the principle of equal liberty and (ii) the existence of a "just and effective system of legislation" (Ibid, p. 21).

In the Rawlsian framework, the principle of equal liberty is concretized (in constitutional procedure) in the form of the "principle of equal participation". The initial reference of constitutional democracy is equal political participation. The worth of a democratic decision is determined by the extent to which the principle of equal participation is realized. Before discussing the relation between liberty and political participation, Rawls mentions the general features of constitutional statecraft as follows:

- i) Socio-political and economic policies are decided by elected representatives for a limited period.
- ii) These representatives are accountable to the electorate.
- iii) The representatives have advisory capacity for effective legislation according to legitimate public sentiments.
- iv) The executive body (i.e. judiciary) is responsible for monitoring legislative procedure according to the constitution or the spirit of the constitution.
- v) Political parties are not just interest groups rather they must have some political agenda and public conception of the good.
- vi) The constitution determines the parameters of the legislative body; however, "a firm majority of the electorate is able to achieve its aims by constitutional amendment" (Ibid, p. 222).
- vii) All sane adults have the right to vote.

- viii) Fair, free and regular elections are also important for the sustenance of a constitutional regime.
- ix) The need of a loyal opposition to counter one party dictatorship, to open up healthy bargaining and clash of opinion for the realization of the principles of justice, for the promotion of the public good, and to critically evaluate and analyze the prevailing socio-economic and political policies of the government.

In the Rawlsian framework, the principle of equal liberty is institutionally concretized. Therefore the initial reference of constitutional democracy is the realization of the principle of equal political participation.

Rawls believes that there is always an open possibility of the clash of certain spheres of liberties therefore, there is a need of a "firm constitutional protection for certain liberties particularly freedom of speech and assembly and to form political associations" (Ibid, p. 223). The institutionalization of the principle of equal liberty in the form of equal participation requires a three-dimensional analysis namely the meaning of equal participation, the extent of this participation and its limitation and the measures which are necessary to be taken for the enhancement of its (i.e. equal participation) worth. In this regard, equal participation is characterized by a) one man one vote, b) every citizen has equal access to public offices. This means that everyone is free to i) join political parties, ii) run for elective positions and iii) hold places of authority. However reasonable constraints of "age limit" and condition of permanent residence must be imposed.

As for the question of the extent of participation is concerned, Rawls is not very clear though he believes that the problem of the extent of political liberty (equal participation) is raised if:

- a) The constitution establishes majoritarian dictatorship.
- b) The ability of the majority to achieve its objectives through constitutional amendments is unrestrained.

In order to cope with these problems there is a need to limit the scope and authority of the majority through constitutional checks and balances, separation of state power, judicial review etc. But the problem is that these constraints eventually "limit the scope of the principle of participation" (Ibid, p. 224). Interestingly Rawls believes that these constraints are consistent with the principle of equal participation, because "similar restrictions apply to everyone and the constraints introduced are likely over time to fall evenly upon all sectors of society" (Ibid, p. 224). Lastly there is always a need of institutional backing to promote the sanctity of the principle of equal liberty through the systematic, coherent, and consistent realization of the principle of participation.

Rawls identifies the major cause of the failure of constitutional government as the lack of systematic institutionalization of the principle of participation. He believes that the root cause of all defects is the "failure to insure the fair value of political liberty" (Ibid, p. 226). It is

a historical fact that the disparities in the distribution of material welfare were tolerated by the legal system of constitutional governments. The reason for this according to Rawls was that economic inequalities were mistakenly considered as compatible with political equality. The natural corollary of this is that no measures have been taken to develop such institutions, which are necessary for the sustenance of the formally given political equality. However Rawls believes that political injustice is much more disastrous than market imperfections. Concentration of political power is much more dangerous than that of capital concentration. It is another matter that in today's world capital and political power have become synonymous. Rawls acknowledges that "parties and elections are financed not by the public funds but by private contributions, the political forum is so constrained by the wishes of the dominant interest" (Ibid, p. 226). This simply means that the dominant capitalist directly or indirectly effect the political process in general and individual liberty in particular which is constitutionally guaranteed and institutionally protected. This implies that between the lines Rawls acknowledges capitalist domination as an unintended consequence of constitutional democracy. Rawls believes that since these problems are in fact the problems of political sociology, therefore they do not need to be directly addressed in his theory of justice. In other words the theory of justice must not be taken as "a theory of political system" (Ibid, p. 227).

Rawls believes that the existence of a loyal opposition is necessary for just political process, because it helps to derive a conception of the good (according to the will of the people), and at the same time without negating the only legitimate public good i.e. "individual freedom" (freedom of thought, assembly, expression and property) keeps on interpreting or reframing the meaning of this public good. There is no single and ultimate policy or methodology to maximize individual liberty, therefore the purpose of the opposition is to critically analyze policies and constantly identify the obstacles which obstruct individual freedom.

II. Democracy's Instrumentality

The above analysis reveals that mainstream political theory sees democracy as the only legitimate political procedure to practice liberal ideology. It is also implied that liberal rights are the necessary pre-amble of a constitutional democracy and they can not be abolished even through the democratic process. The texts also reveal that in liberal order freedom can only be ensured formally, through the institutional realization of the principle of equal political participation. In this context Zakaria's defence of liberal undemocratic political mechanisms and rejection of illiberal democratic procedure by suspending or restricting the right of equal political participation of the citizen of a democratic but illiberal state is directly in conflict with liberal orthodox theory and raises the question of the priority of liberalism over democracy.

Zakaria's conception of democracy is quite general. He believes that "If a country holds competitive, multiparty elections, we call it democratic". (Ibid, 25). When he defines democracy he totally abstracts from theory and historicity. The justification of one man one vote is not institutionally recognizable without accepting a specific ontological assumption that man is ontologically capable of determining his ends therefore it will be considered as an inviolable right of the individual to frame, revise and rationally pursue his own conception of the good. This phrasographic ontological, account is the theoretical justification of the claim

that the good is determined by the will of the people. Zakaria does not present any justification of this absurd ontological pre-supposition underlying constitutional democracy.

Zakaria's conception of democracy is as follows:

"A country is regarded as democratic only if it guarantees a comprehensive catalog of social, political, economic and religious rights. This turns the word democracy into a badge of honor rather than a descriptive category". (Ibid, 25). According to Zakaria constitutional liberalism is not a political procedure for selecting government rather it is a procedure for the selection of "government goals" (Ibid, 25). And what should be the goals of government? "To protect an individual's, autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source, state, church or society". (Ibid, 26). Interestingly he recognizes that all these goals are specific to the western world and derived from the historical experiences of "constitutional liberalism developed in western Europe and the United States as a defense of the inviolable right to life, and property and freedom of religion and speech" (Ibid, 26).

Economic liberalization in undemocratic East Asian countries (Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia S. Korea, Taiwan and Thailand) is interpreted as "progress" Zakaria thinks that economic liberalization will pave the way for cultural and political liberalization. But interestingly he does not believe that illiberal democracy can make people liberal. Rather he wants to abolish the democratic system and establish a liberal dictatorship for the enforcement of liberal rights.

Zakaria believes that political rights are meaningless and sometimes become disastrous for civil society if they are not accompanied by human rights. He is ready to accept undemocratic liberal governments which provide liberal rights. Thus he has rejected the organic relation between equal political participation and the equality of individual liberty i.e. the right of self-determination.

Zakaria prioritizes constitutional liberalism over democracy because while constitutional liberalism guarantees democracy, democracy does not guarantee liberalism. The future of freedom is in danger within politically democratic and culturally illiberal societies, but the future of freedom is secure in undemocratic but culturally and institutionally liberal societies.

It is generally believed that democratic freedom is compatible with any ideological framework because people consider it as a value neutral mechanism. Fareed Zakaria also appears to believe that democracy is a value neutral political procedure. History reveals that democratic process is not compatible with all ideological frameworks because it necessarily transforms society into a liberal order (Iran for example). It is because of this reason that we claim that democratic process is not a value neutral system. Any ideology which does not consider the human being as autonomous law giver and which believes that good is not determined by the will of the people i.e. which is not anthropocentric, is not compatible with democratic political procedure. It must eventually try to control and abolish the democratic process.

Democratic process is theoretically, grounded in liberal ideology and if it has failed to institutionalized individual autonomy (As Zakaria is worried about) then this means that democratic political procedure is not the ultimate political procedure to establish liberal public order. Then the question arises how do we know that Islamic political procedure is incompatible with the development of civil society. The answer is simple. The ontological and epistemological incompatibility between Islam and liberalism delegitimizes capitalist order. In Islam the good is not dependent on the individual's will rather it has been revealed. The conception of self, cosmology and epistemology of Islam denies the right of the individual to change, revise, and pursue his own conception of the good.

Democracy has become irrelevant for the Western world. Their people are already situated in a liberal culture and are enjoying the associated fundamental softness of life. The circuit of citizenship is restricting and the sphere of the market is expanding. It is the circuit of capital which actually guarantees individual freedom in its concrete form. Now the abstract expression of freedom (i.e. vote) is actually irrelevant for a westerner because for him freedom simply means to choose between Reebok and Nike. The issues of high politics are irrelevant for the westerner. Only a small proportion of people participate in the political process. Democratic process does not effect their lives because in capitalist democracy power is not transferred to any one. All citizens are equally subservient to the hegemony of global capital.

In the Muslim world on the other hand the democratic process does play a significant role. People are concerned about the issues of high politics because people are not liberal. So, democracy may create an obstacle for establishing the hegemony of global capital. And it is an open possibility that democracy may be instrumentalized to demolish liberal political and economic imperialism.

The priority of liberalism over democracy reveals that one is expected not only to accept the priority of right, but also its liberal interpretation even if this contradicts the will of the people or violates the right of self-determination of the people. So whatever is happening in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay etc. actually reflects the real spirit of liberalism. Bush and Blair are true liberals. They are following the footsteps of the America Founding Fathers, and they are revitalizing the history of liberalism. Guantanamo Bay and Abu Gharib prisons represent best human rights practices.

III. Justifying Liberal Terror

There are at least two major weakness of Zakaria's analysis and both weaknesses are organically linked with each other.

Zakaria believes that liberal rights are universal and they are the necessary resource to make people civilized. But he rejects the methodology (i.e. democracy) which is theoretically prescribed by liberal thinkers. He emphasizes the genealogical priority of liberalism over democracy. This implies that liberal rights are not naturally nurtured, institutionalized and respected. They need to be protected and imposed upon individuals through state power.

Zakaria tries to give an impression that democracy is not a problem in the West because people are essentially liberal, respect human rights and are civilized. Therefore even when Americans act undemocratically it is tolerable because they respect liberal rights. One of the most important components of the American government i.e. the Supreme Court is extremely undemocratic in nature, because "it is headed by nine unselected men and women with life tenure" (see Zakaria p. 22). Similarly, each American state has two seats in American Senate irrespective of its population ratio. This is the most devastating interpretation of the "right of equal political participation", and thanks to this interpretation "the U.S senate is the most unrepresentative upper house in the world" (Ibid p. 22).

Zakaria tries to give an impression that once people become liberal they democratically establish a framework of rights and start respecting the rights of the "people". But the history of liberal democracies reveals that, liberal democracies have committed massive ethnic cleansing sometimes amounting to genocide specially in colonial context where large social groups were defined as lying out side of "the people". (see Mann 1999 p. 23). Zakaria believes that the liberal constitution guarantees the right of the "people" through civil society institutions but who are those "people", the American constitution was written by "fifty-five middle aged white gentlemen of the highest rank and property closeted for two weeks in Philadelphia" (Ibid p. 23). It is also believed that these archangels occupying a vantage position reflected the will of the people but it is a historical fact that they in there definition of "we the people" did not mean "to include women, slaves and native Americans" (Ibid p. 23) The American constitution is an instrument for protecting the capitalist minority from the non-capitalist majority.

It is also very important to note that the violence against non liberal communities i.e. the Red Indians committed by the Spanish, British, Portuguese, and the Catholic Church was far milder than the atrocities committed by liberal American Revolutionaries, and settlers and that is "why most Indians supported the British in the American Revolutionary war" (Ibid, p. 26). It can statistically be proven that liberal atrocities are far greater than that of non-liberal regimes, Mann believes that deliberate genocidal bursts were more common among British than Spanish or Portuguese settlers. (Ibid, p. 26), who were relatively less liberal than the Britishers.

The history of liberal democracy which has unfortunately been ignored by Zakaria reveals that, "ethnic cleansing, murders, deporting, amounting at its worst to genocide, was **central to the liberal modernity of the New World** committed first by the settler colonies than by the first new nations. The process continued in North American and Australia until there were virtually no more native people to exterminate" (Ibid, p. 27).

Thus history reveals that entnhic cleansing is a missing link between liberalism and true democracy. Because genocide provides a homogenous society.

This is one of the aspects of liberal democracy which should be presented before defending the liberal dictatorship. The above analysis reveals that Zakaria's distinction between liberal and illiberal democracy is fictitious, deceptive and distorted. It is a historical

fact that “liberal democracies were actually committing genocide against other democracies repeatedly” (Ibid, p. 26). In this perspective what people like Zakaria want to do in the Muslim world is similar to what liberal democrats had previously done in the Western hemisphere during the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries.

Secondly, it seems that the prioritization of liberal rights is presumed to be a non-contestable truth and it is not epistemologically possible to question the priority of right over the good or the universality and cultural neutrality of liberal rights. Zakaria tries to give an impression that liberal rights are not in conflict with any civilized society and religion. They are in fact the criterion of sanity, civility and humanity. Therefore it is legitimate to impose those rights even at the cost of democracy prescribed by the liberals themselves. According to Gowan liberals are “talking about cosmopolitan governance, that is cosmopolitan rules and norms, not about everything, but, about certain fundamental things namely human rights and of course, some global governance on the economic field” (Gowen, 2001 p. 5). But this priority of right has been questioned by the communitarians and post-modernist thinkers even within the Establishment. They believe that “right” i.e. abstract and neutral right cannot be derived from pure form i.e. universally valid reason. These rights are derived from the history of a particular community. This means that the system of rights cannot be detached from the good of a community which is historically specific and culturally determined. Zakaria’s whole thesis rests upon the assumption that liberal right has priority over any conception of the good presumed by the individuals or the community. The communitarians are not satisfied with this prioritization of the right over the good, and believe that the prioritization of right over the good undermines the role of community in the constitution of individual selfhood and trivializes the significance of good in the determination of a body of rights.

Men are not to be treated as an object of scientific study. According to Taylor, man is a self-interpreting animal and there is no possibility of having an abstract realm which transcends historical specificity and the particularity of a linguistic community. In this regard human beings are considered to be “creatures whose identity as persons depends upon their orientation and attachment to the conception of the good which they derive from the matrix of their linguistic community” (Mulhall, 1992 p. 102).

The self is embedded in a particular community and answers the questions which have emerged and are organically related to the ontological basis of that community. The priority of right over the good presumes that self identity is not determined by ends, virtues and conceptions of the good which emerge from the history of a particular community. Thus the politics of rights justifies the triviality of communal good and defends the individuality of every person. Sandel believes that in the liberal framework the person is an autonomous chooser of ends, because this autonomous “capacity must be given prior to its exercise, the locus of moral worth in human beings must be seen prior to its ends” (Ibid, . 45). Thus the priority of the self over its ends actually reflects the “essential unity of the self (which) is already provided by the conception of right” (Rawls 1971, p. 563). This implies that the priority of right over the good presumes a specific ontological, metaphysical account derived from the history of a particular community. Therefore Zakaria’s assumptions that these liberal rights are absolute, certain and universal is a questionable claim.

Due to the unavailability of an epistemologically grounded and ontologically backed universalist defence of liberalism it is generally believed that, Western liberal democracy is not universally applicable. The recognition of the cultural particularity and historical specificity of liberal theory justifies a political structure which is democratic but at the same time illiberal in practice. Zakaria is worried about the fact that, "many countries are settling into a form of government that mixes a substantial degree of democracy with substantial degree of illiberalism". (Zakaria, p. 24). He fears that democracy may be an instrument for overthrowing capitalist order and advocates liberal terrorism to avoid this calamity

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